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In the introduction to last year’s Strategic Panorama, we pointed out
the Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos’ interest in producing this
publication and our aim of securing it a place among the collection of simi-
lar documents that exist in the international sphere. We are therefore ple-
ased to say that the decision was made to translate our Panorama into
English;  this will no doubt facilitate its dissemination beyond our borders
and, particularly, among our allies. This leads us to recall the goal we set
ourselves: to reflect a Spanish point of view of the year’s events and, as
befits a «Panorama», pay special attention to the areas on which our inte-
rests are focused primarily, though at the same time presenting a global
vision of the world. The Panorama therefore consists of specific chapters
on the building of Europe, reforms in the central and eastern regions of our
continent, stability in the Mediterranean and the strategic situation in Latin
America.
In order to give coverage to the whole of 1998 and not to delay publi-
cation, the deadline for contributions to this year’s edition was set for 30
November. This enabled us to get on with the translation and edition tasks
and meanwhile complete the articles with an epilogue dealing with the
month of December, which is generally rich in interesting events. As we
pointed out in last year’s Panorama, references to next year—in this case,
1999—are made in connection with prospective events and forecasts of
important happenings slated for the new year.
We hope that the publication of this second edition will consolidate our
Panorama and that it becomes a regular feature in the field of strategic stu-
dies, enriching knowledge of security and defence matters in Spain and
providing scholars and people outside Spain who are interested in these
issues, particularly our allies, with a Spanish vision of the world we live in.
THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE WORKING GROUP
CHAPTER ONE
A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW OF 1998
A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW OF 1998
By FEDERICO F. DE BORDEJÉ Y MORENCOS
THE OUTLOOK IN A NEW WORLD ORDER
1998 was a year of hopes and vexations—Ulster, the Middle East,
Kosovo, etc. Unfortunately, many of these hopes were not realised, per-
haps because preventive diplomacy worked in certain areas and not in
others where the regimes or groups in question were not interested in rea-
ching a compromise. On the other hand, the dominant trends of this
decade—world-wide interdependence amid the diversity of the internatio-
nal scene, the growing consolidation of democracy and political pluralism,
the diffusion of power and the West’s inability to prevent and control
events not only in unstable developing regions but also within its own
spheres of influence—proved to be a constant feature.
Western Europe underwent a process of change that entailed a rever-
sal of previous years’ political trends, as conservative governments step-
ped down in favour of progressive parties in Germany, Sweden and Italy.
Foreign policy and security criteria were not consolidated, despite the
growth of collective defence structures—NATO, WEU, OSCE, the Council
of Europe and the Partnerships for Peace programme—the strengthening
and enlargement of the EU and the expansion of the Atlantic alliance. The
birth of monetary union did not prevent solidarity among the EU member
states from failing to find a foothold, as evidenced by the plans to deprive
the poorer countries of the Cohesion Funds, the differences witnessed in
the dispute between Greece and Turkey and lack of decision regarding
Kosovo. Western Europe likewise continued to display little power to inter-
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vene in the problems of the Middle East and Africa and has yet to develop
a lasting partnership with the United States to prevent unnecessary strug-
gles now that the new currency has come into force. Therefore, in order to
counteract Washington’s unilateralist temptations and build a multilateral
economic and security system, Europe needs to be stronger, more cohe-
rent and clear-headed—since this is the only way to ensure the balance
with the United States—and suitably poised to face the challenges of the
next century.
Despite certain unsavoury controversies at home, America consolida-
ted its position of superpower in all areas, from foreign to economic and
military policy, gradually imposing its model on the rest of the world. This
indicates that the other side of the Atlantic pursues a realistic, pragmatic
policy, managing and directing its structures with continuity and a firm
hand. Indeed, despite their shortcomings, its guidelines have nevertheless
secured it the only leading role in world affairs, as evidenced by the US
intervention in the Palestinian issue and the pacification of Ulster and the
Balkans or sub-Saharan Africa.
Russia, on the contrary, was unable to rid itself of the scourge of
corruption, finding itself governed by an ailing leader and plunged into
economic turmoil and a moral and social crisis. These factors could have
a negative effect on Europe, with the aggravating circumstance of the lack
of agreement on security matters vis-à-vis NATO’s enlargement.
In the Balkans, the Kosovo crisis demonstrated that the area continues
to be unstable and a permanent source of violence and tension; mean-
while, in the Middle East, the hope of lasting peace seems to have arrived
with the Wye accords, though it is too soon to be sure. The Iraq weapons
inspection crisis, tensions between Turkey and Syria, and Turkey’s colla-
boration with Israel also indicate that unforeseeable events can occur at
any time.
Japan is experiencing moments of great uncertainty which point to the
need for a radical change of economic, financial and social model. The
countries of South-East Asia and Indonesia, sustained by foreign aid, con-
tinue in the throes of the serious financial crisis which had set in the pre-
vious year as a result of following a policy of economic liberalisation direc-
ted and controlled by the state. 
Although moderately affected by the crisis of the Asian «tigers», China
is progressing slowly but surely with its economic-financial and industrial
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development, following an «eastern-style» policy of openness. Its econo-
mic and investment policy differs greatly from its social policy and the
country is expected to take some time to achieve full democracy and poli-
tical pluralism.
In India, the regionalist parties gained popularity, while the governing
coalition members were spurned by voters. Its nuclear tests triggered a
reaction from Pakistan, which followed suit, causing the tension between
the two countries to mount. While the West was unable to curb reactions
in Asia, Iran showed signs of opening with regard to its domestic and, par-
ticularly, foreign policy, whereas in Afghanistan and northern Africa, mainly
Algeria and Sudan, radical Islam gained ground, and the world proved
incapable of halting it.
The conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa—Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Soma-
lia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, etc—did not die down. South Africa,
Uganda and Nigeria confirmed their status as regional powers whose
sphere of action and influence stretches well beyond their borders.
Democracy in Latin America continued to strengthen its foothold,
though authoritarian or overly personal styles of politics continue to be
observed in certain areas. The world financial crisis had a moderate
impact on this part of the continent, while Cuba showed certain signs of
opening up, something which would have been unthinkable only a year
ago.
By and large, the turmoil in Asia and Russia has caused a slow cooling-
down of the world economy, as evidenced, for example, by the fact that
the EU has lowered this year’s growth forecast. It is not expected to be
possible to halt the collapse of the Japanese economy or developments in
Singapore and Hong Kong, which have been drawn into the downward
spiral, and the fears that the crisis would spread to Latin America were
confirmed. North America and Europe have come off somewhat better,
keeping up a brisk pace of economic activity. Our government announced
that Spain is able to cope with the international crisis because it has a
sound economic base, though the problems should not be underestima-
ted.
In 1998, as in 1997, the so-called Third World undoubtedly witnessed
a surge of territorial disputes and territorial, ethnic, religious, economic
and other types of conflict of very different political and strategic signifi-
cance. It is a fact that conflicts in peripheral areas are largely due to local
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conditions, and should therefore not be settled by applying formulas simi-
lar to those used to solve western clashes, and also that military force in
that part of the world has come to be more important in mediators’ risk
calculations or when considering intervention; America’s fiasco in Soma-
lia, which demonstrated that the cost of intervention can be very high, has
not been forgotten and is, perhaps, a case for not intervening in Kosovo.
The founding of the International Criminal Court to try cases of geno-
cide, aggression, crimes against humanity, etc., is part of the globalisation
process. It has taken its time, since the request to set up a court of this
kind was made after the Nuremberg trials. Nonetheless, certain countries
such as the United States, Israel, China, India and Turkey declined to par-
ticipate; this was undoubtedly due, in the case of the first, to America’s
obsessive reluctance to be a member of bodies where it does not enjoy
the right of veto, as in the Security Council.
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE BUILDING OF EUROPE
Early in the year the Fifteen agreed on the distribution of power at the
future European Central Bank and on the criteria for choosing its board,
thereby amending the unfavourable impression left by the debate held the
previous June at the Council of Amsterdam, which seemed to indicate that
the progress towards the single currency was being hindered by Ger-
many’s and France’s failure to see eye to eye. Spain was found to meet the
inflation criteria, and its economic growth, at 3.3%, outperformed the offi-
cial forecast by one tenth of a point.
Nonetheless, since all the highest-level meetings had confirmed that
the date set at Maastricht—1 January 1999—would be respected, single
currency seemed to be an inevitable reality at the beginning of the year, as
without the euro, the European market would continue to be weak and
incomplete. It was thus necessary to abandon earlier financial policies that
entailed shared monetary sovereignty and move towards the creation of a
European Central Bank and a single-currency policy in order to ensure
exchange-rate stability and the free movement of capital.
As a result, eleven of the fifteen countries were found to be prepared
to join the euro, among them Spain. This is a remarkable achievement
bearing in mind that at the end of 1995 it did not meet any of the conver-
gence criteria. Greece, with an inflation rate of 5.4%, did not measure up,
and Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom chose not to join during
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this first round. The Commission underlined the rigour shown by the Spa-
nish government, awarding our country one of the best scores, higher
even than those of Germany and Italy, while Greece and Sweden failed to
pass the test. Spain thus proved that it had successfully combined rigour,
austerity, wage control and economic relaunch with a moderate cut in
public spending, a rise in employment levels and maintenance of a pea-
ceful social atmosphere, eradicating corruption and displaying a discipli-
ned and transparent approach to economic management.
Something of a controversy arose when Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden and Austria proposed that EU enlargement should be financed by
the southern European countries since, according to Bonn, Germany was
paying a lot and Spain was getting too much. However, our government
demonstrated that if one took the GNP of each country and the contribu-
tions made by each partner, these were more or less consistent with the
weight of their respective economies. This was followed by another con-
troversy surrounding the forthcoming appointment of the president of the
future European Central Bank, for which there were seemingly two candi-
dates, Mr Duisenberg, a Dutchman, and his French rival, Mr Trichet.
While the so-called «fast-track» enlargement negotiations were begun
with Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus—whose
accession will cost 75 million ecus—and it was announced that the measu-
res taken regarding the rest of the candidates would be revised, the draft pro-
posals for reforming the EU farming sector, to be included in the Community’s
agricultural budget for 2000-2006, were presented. The reform plans benefi-
ted the produce of the countries in the centre and north of the continent and
clearly discriminated against southern and Mediterranean partners.
The crisis in South-East Asia spurred the creation of a 40 million-ecu
fund to aid the countries in the area. Spain proposed organising a Euro-
Asian meeting for 2002 and paying additional sums into the fund, apart
from its contribution. At the 15th meeting of the Fifteen with ten Asian coun-
tries in London, our government clearly stated its wish for Asia to become
the new frontier for Spanish foreign policy. A variety of issues were dis-
cussed at this meeting, save, for the sake of China, human rights and
democratisation.
Since Europe is not indifferent to the problems of the Middle East and
Africa, it could not be so to those of Asia. The EU’s participation in the
ASEAN Regional Forum marked a first step in the same direction taken in
London. Indeed, the threats to European security are also located near its
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outer borders, from Morocco to the Near East and, further afield, in Asia,
which seeks a counterweight to Chinese and American influence.
President Chirac struck a discordant note in the integration process by
opposing not just enlargement and the reform of agricultural policy without
prior institutional reform, but also the project to create a free exchange
zone with Latin America, demonstrating his nationalist stance and forget-
ting that the advantages—a move towards a politically united Europe,
grea-ter weight in the world scene, security for the continent and a bigger
market—outweigh the disadvantages. Among the drawbacks are the risk
that the EU will become merely an economic area and the fact that it is
more difficult to get 25 countries to agree than it is 15.
A historic event occurred on 1 May at the Brussels summit, when ele-
ven countries passed the test for first-round euro membership. A debate
was also held on the founding of the ECB and other important issues such
as co-ordination of economic policy, since, in such an integrated area,
budgetary policies have both positive and negative repercussions on the
different economies and co-ordination can maximise the positive effects
and minimise the negative ones. Also on the agenda were the euro
exchange-rate policy, since the Council must define the guidelines in con-
junction with the European Commission and the ECB and, lastly, the social
situation, as the varying unemployment rates of the different countries
require structural solutions that must be sought at national level.
It was confirmed at the aforementioned summit that the Maastricht cri-
teria—2.7% inflation, 5% public deficit, 60% public debt and maximum
interest rates of 7.8%—were met by Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain
(with 1.8%, 2.6%, 68.8% and 6.5%), Finland, France, the Netherlands, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal. The United Kingdom and Denmark
also passed the test but would not be joining at the first stage, while Swe-
den and Greece failed to meet the requirements. In a referendum held in
May, Denmark voted in favour of ratifying the Amsterdam treaty. The Euro-
pean Parliament pledged its support to Monetary Union two days later,
while the euro’s critics branded it as a symbol of globalisation and, as
such, the first step towards a single world currency and, eventually, to a
single world government, forgetting that for the past decade we have been
immersed in the irreversible process of globalisation.
It seems certain that the euro is not only expected to oust the dollar
from its dominant position, which is out of keeping both with the weight of
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the American economy and its volume of trade, but also to secure Europe
benefits and liquidity, cut expenditure and attract investments, among
other things, making it a bigger domestic market than the United States in
terms of number of inhabitants, GDP generated and volume of trade. The
new currency could amount to 18% of world reserves and mark the end
of centuries of bloody conflict, though we do not know if all this will occur
in the short, medium or long term.
The designation of the ECB board was a laborious task. The founda-
tion date was set for 1 June and the Dutch candidate appointed the bank’s
first president, with one Spaniard figuring among the six board members.
It was difficult to reach agreement owing to the conflicting opinions of Mr
Chirac and Mr Kohl, which cast a shadow over the summit, though the cri-
sis soon blew over when the two statesmen met in Avignon.
Days after the summit, the Commission praised the employment 
schemes submitted by Spain reflecting the commitments it had made at
the previous Luxembourg summit. No agreement was reached with the US
to bury the Helms-Burton Act and, while on the subject, the application of
the d’Amato Act banning investment and trade with Libya and Iran. Pro-
gress on this issue thus came to a standstill yet again.
At Germany’s request, and with the backing of the Netherlands, Aus-
tria and Sweden, the European Parliament asked for the Cohesion Funds
to be withdrawn from the countries which had joined the euro—a move
with negative implications for Spain, Portugal and Ireland. Although the
Parliament’s decisions are not binding, this one provided Mr Kohl with a
slogan for the October elections. A few months later, the European Parlia-
ment went back on its decision, leaving the issue up in the air, perhaps
after realising that the European Court of Auditors supported Spain in its
dispute with those four countries, which insisted that they were contribu-
ting too much to the EU’s coffers and receiving little in return.
The issue raised its head again in July and October. In July, Mr Kohl
warned of the danger of overheating the economies of some countries
«which benefit from the EU’s solidarity», again calling for the subsidies to
Spain, among others, to be cut. Our government’s response coincided
with that of the Commission: the funds could not be the cause of overhe-
ating and «those who have the most should pay the most», as this was a
criterion of equity and justice. However, in October the Commission sho-
wed itself more inclined to favour Germany’s position and advised Spain
to negotiate through the CAP, putting the issue on the back burner.
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At the Cardiff summit in June to mark the end of the United Kingdom’s
presidency, Mr Kohl’s offensive regarding the need for a new distribution
of powers, «because otherwise the community institutions could have
their room for manoeuvre curtailed» was also left in the air. Spain’s prime
minister retorted that what is needed is greater political and economic
integration, not the annulment or curtailment of powers, though he did
admit that enlargement required reforms in order to design a Europe of the
future, an issue that ought to be discussed at the following summit. At the
same time, examination of community budgets was postponed until
spring 1999.
Mr Fischler’s scheme for the subsidies to the olive oil sector had far-
reaching political and social implications in Spain owing to its negative
impact on employment and because it contradicted the Amsterdam Tre-
aty. The discussion has not yet completely died down, even though the ini-
tial quotas have been improved.
On 1 June, Austria took over the presidency of the EU, thereby making
a comeback to the international stage after three decades of isolation. One
of its first proposals was to allow Ukraine (previously put forward by Ger-
many as an applicant), Moldova and some of the Balkan states to join the
EU.
By the autumn, Austria’s idea of setting up a partnership for Europe
scheme for countries which are not even candidates for EU membership
had been discarded. At the Portschach summit held later in the year, the
emphasis was on general principles: employment and growth policy, cut-
ting interest rates, the European defence pillar, assistance to Latin Ame-
rica, creation of the figure of «monsieur PESC»—the high representative
for common foreign and security policy—etc. As for the WEU, the defence
and foreign ministers discussed two proposals at their meeting in Rome: 
France’s idea to integrate it into the EU and the United Kingdom’s sug-
gestion of allocating the political side to the EU and the military part to
NATO. No agreement was reached and the final decision as to whether it
should continue or disappear was postponed until the Vienna summit of
heads of state and government in December.
On another note, events of major importance occurred throughout the
year: the problem of Ireland was solved when an agreement was signed in
Stormont on Easter Friday, putting an end to the violence and hatred that
had characterised relations between the two Ulster communities for 60
years; elections in Malta, won by the conservative opposition which imme-
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diately announced its intention to renew negotiations with Brussels, bro-
ken off in 1996 by the previous labour government; and, lastly, the German
elections in October, won by Mr Schröder who promised continuity in
foreign policy and that the change of government did not mean a change
of goals. Nonetheless, the departure of Mr Kohl—as a result of his long,
16-year stint in government and his succumbing to the seductive allure of
power, yet failing to leave behind a clear successor—ushered in a new
period in the EU characterised by the absence of an obvious leader, pen-
ding Mr Schröder’s running in. During his visit to Moscow, Mr Schröder
sought to free Russian-German relations from the close personal ties that
linked Mr Kohl and Mr Yeltsin.
At the end of the year, France, Italy and Germany attempted to be the
exclusive representatives of the euro in G7. This opinion clashed some-
what with that of Spain and the rest of the EU members, who are in favour
of representation being held by the rotating EU presidency.
The Vienna summit came to its close in December without having re-
solved the problem of the future funding of the EU. Neither the supporters
nor the opponents of the Cohesion Funds made any concessions. Spain
managed to ensure that the world «stabilisation», which is synonymous
with freezing of expenditure, did not figure in the conclusions, and new
avenues for settling the issue other than withdrawing these funds from the
poor er countries were opened. The matter will be on the agenda for the
next summit in 1999.
THE NEW NATO MISSIONS
1998 began with the signature of Partnership Charters with the three
Baltic republics at the White House. This was not a consolation prize for
those who failed to join NATO but rather a step towards membership, al-
though the agreement does not include the automatic intervention of the
United States in the event of threats to the integrity, independence and
liberty of these countries. The accord was something of a slight to Russia,
which had offered the states similar treaties.
The Strait of Gibraltar once more proved to be a critical or key element
of the subregional NATO command, dependent on the southern command
in Naples. The subregional command will be located in Spain, the only
country with operational capacity in the area, and will to an extent replace
the British command in Gibraltar, which will remain as a British installation.
— 23 —
It was also announced that Spain will join the alliance’s Early Warning
Force, thus gaining access to the information obtained by the AWAC.
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At Vienna, the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe asked why Aus-
tria does not join the organisation, since it could not be oblivious to the
conflicts in Europe. No doubt, he was referring to the situation of Kosovo
and Montenegro, the dispute between Greece and Turkey or to the pro-
blem of Islam in Ankara. According to General Clark, this traditional neu-
trality, laid down in the peace treaty with Russia in 1955, is meaningless
now that there are no blocs—not even the USSR—and stems more from
traditional reasons that from political and strategic decisions.
For its part, Russia pointed out that it would reconsider its relationship
with NATO if force were used to settle the Iraqi crisis and that Ukraine
would not apply for accession. This statement was neither denied nor
approved by Ukraine, which had signed a specific partnership agreement
in Madrid the previous year and takes part in NATO manoeuvres and
peace missions in the Balkans. Russia’s basic message was that it was not
willing for the alliance to expand further eastwards.
Russia’s declarations were confirmed when President Yeltsin and Pre-
sident Lukashenka of Belarus agreed on the principles for a common mili-
tary and defence policy in the event of external aggression. This move was
designed to counteract the agreement between the US and the Baltic 
States, and was a warning to those republics that Russia condemned their
rapprochement with the Atlantic alliance.
Months later, the US Senate ratified by a majority the decision to allow
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join the alliance. The possibi-
lity was furthermore addressed of sending forces to Albania to prevent the
Kosovo conflict from spreading. While Italy backed Tirana’s request, the
rest of the member states reacted with greater caution, fearing that a go-
ahead could be interpreted as a step prior to intervention on Serbian soil.
In view of the growing activity of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), the
EU decided against any type of military intervention, preferring to focus on
designing a plan to give the region wide autonomy, backed with the threat
of using force. The problem lay in getting the Fifteen to reach a unanimous
decision, since Greece and Italy had always been reluctant to recognise
the UCK as their interlocutor and to carry out a formal intervention. For its
part, the US state department underlined that NATO had an action plan
should a humanitarian disaster occur in Kosovo, which had been suffering
for months. The plan was ready in September and it was thus possible in
October to decide to go ahead with the by then stale intervention if Mr
Milosevic did not put an end to the ethnic cleansing and withdraw his for-
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ces from the region. The threat led him to accept the conditions, which will
be dealt with later on, and it was likewise positive to see Macedonia agree
to a NATO Rapid Reaction Force being stationed on its soil. 
What there is no doubt about is that NATO responded suitably to the
sectors which still ask if there is any point in the survival of an organisation
which no longer has any adversaries. Indeed, in 1998, once again, the
alliance proved that it plays a useful role of deterrent organisation and mili-
tary arm of the UN on pacification missions in its area of responsibility. It
thus serves a number of purposes, such as for example, that of supervi-
sing the Dayton accords in 1995—an achievement which should by rights
be attributed to the United States but has consolidated the alliance, clea-
ring up the doubts as to its usefulness and boosting its credibility, which
was enhanced by the accession of several former Warsaw Pact enemies
and by the Europeans’ capacity to reach an understanding to create a
European defence body. This development, based on new political, mili-
tary, humanitarian and mediation functions, has the effect of weakening
the role of the OSCE, which Russia and other continental governments
would like to see strengthened.
Although the OSCE machinery is complicated to run, since decisions
require unanimous agreement, this is generally conducive to negotiation
and conflict prevention rather than to resorting to the use of force. There-
fore, after NATO is consolidated, it will be necessary to strengthen OSCE. 
At the beginning of December, France and the United Kingdom sub-
mitted a plan to the rest of the EU allies to create a European defence with
an autonomous military capacity, capable of responding to possible
international crises when neither NATO nor the United States is directly
involved. This would entail dissolving the WEU, integrating its military res-
ponsibilities into the EU. Washington expressed its enthusiastic support
for this plan, with the reservation that such a body should be linked to, and
not dissociated from, the Atlantic alliance.
AMERICA CONSOLIDATES ITS POSITION AS SOLE WORLD POWER
Although US hegemony is not new, the country, owing to a combina-
tion of factors, has still not found a rival in 1998 and continues to domi-
nate five basis spheres: economic, diplomatic, military, scientific and even
cultural.
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An analysis of its macroeconomic indicators shows that its economy is
the healthiest and strongest on the planet, with sustained GDP growth, an
inflation rate in the region of 1.7%, no budgetary deficit and an unemploy-
ment level down to 3.1%, the lowest in 28 years. Although negative, its
trade balance is offset by inflows of foreign capital. At microeconomic
level, US companies account for a third of the most important world firms
and dominate key industries such as telecommunications, computing,
aero-space and consumer goods, while exercising determining influence
in international bodies such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the World
Trade Organisation, G7 and military alliances such as NATO. 
On the military and strategic front, the United States has yet to see the
emergence of an enemy that is a match for it and has thus reduced the
expenditures for defence deriving from the arms race of the seventies and
eighties; these cuts been criticised, among others by former defence
secretary Caspar Weinberger, who in his book «The Next War» accuses the
Clinton administration of being too heavy-handed in trimming the defence
budgets, abandoning the «Star Wars» project, making concessions to
China and ignoring the new threats, in the form of fundamentalists or eth-
nic and religious rivalry, which will play a decisive role in the conflicts of the
future. The doctrines of the past have lost much of their value, as the Pen-
tagon demonstrated when it decided to change those that are still valid
today and described the new world situation as an «expansion of uncer-
tainty», in view of the difficulty of eliminating nuclear hazards and the sim-
plicity of hacking the most protected computer networks. Nonetheless, it
may be that those criticisms and the new strategic and military prospects
have led to the appearance of special items totalling nearly 1.3 trillion
pesetas in the 1999 defence budget, designed to raise alertness levels and
step up the training of the armed forces.
In the nuclear field, the tests carried out by India and Pakistan in June
and July demonstrated to Washington that it is of no use to impose sanc-
tions against proliferation without the agreement of the other nuclear
powers, and that no international inspection system will succeed in abo-
lishing it.
In another respect, it seems that the concept of a «new world order» 
—to quote president Bush after the Gulf war—aimed at achieving peace
and co-operation between nations, with America in the lead role, interve-
ning in crisis to order to swing events whichever way most suits its inte-
rests, has not been achieved, despite the assertions of the secretary of
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state, Madelaine Albright, this year. The reason why this goal has not been
achieved is that events did not measure up to this lofty concept, as 1998
witnessed the continuation and intensification of nationalist movements,
conflicts of all kinds and lack of peace and stability in large areas of the
world.
From the beginning of the year, the United States found itself shado-
wed by a new Watergate and by the implacable counsel Mr Starr, who had
been investigating the allegedly shady real estate dealings of the Clintons
in Little Rock before moving onto the president’s sexual misdemeanours,
beginning with the Lewinsky saga which had wide-reaching implications in
the national press. The issue reached boiling point in June, culminating in
Mr Clinton’s testimony before the Grand Jury in which he admitted to
some of the charges, and the publication of the Starr report later in Sep-
tember, which was even disseminated through the Internet. The US Con-
gress decided to set up a judicial y committee to start an enquiry and
decide on possible impeachment proceedings.
Paradoxically, this situation did not damage the President’s popularity
as a statesman, as evidenced by the results of the Congress elections on
3 November, though it did affect his personal reputation entailing, by
extension, loss of political support and the possible erosion of the powers
and privileges of the office, which may affect his successors to the White
House. The Republican party played a major role in this harassment, refu-
sing to approve budgetary allocations requested by the president for
social programmes and calling for hefty tax cuts. This situation was fortu-
nately overcome when the budgets for the following year were approved
unanimously.
Nobody disputes Mr Clinton’s considerable achievements in home and
foreign policy, though the president faced a number of serious problems
over the course of the year: the eruption of a new UN-Iraq weapons ins-
pection crisis; the impossibility of halting Israel’s colonisation policy in the
West Bank and Jerusalem, despite the long-awaited Wye agreement pro-
moted by Mr Clinton; the delicate situation in the Balkans, namely Kosovo
and, partially, Albania and Montenegro and the uncertain future; conflicts
in Africa; and financial instability in Russia, Japan and Latin America.
The president’s greatest achievement, as mentioned earlier, was
undoubtedly in the economic field. It has been said that while the Japa-
nese economic model was the myth of the seventies, that of a new and
better model—the American system—has emerged at the turn of the cen-
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tury. However, the Asian «tigers» and similar economies, even Japan, will
not be prepared to adopt it unless they overhaul their structures and put
their home affairs into shape.
On visiting Berlin, Mr Clinton reaffirmed that Europe was the focus of
America’s foreign policy and that this collaboration should be based on
expanding NATO, boosting trade and spreading democracy by supporting
weak countries such as those of the Caucasus or the Balkans, with NATO
as the mainstay of a common security policy. He went on to state that al-
though today’s threats are more vague, they are not necessarily less cer-
tain. This visit coincided with a reduction in military deployment in the Gulf
area, leaving only 17,000 men, though Saddam Hussein was warned that
the United States would not be lowering its guard.
A major event during the year was the president’s visit to China in June.
America regards this country as a huge potential market, but also as a
future superpower which, sooner or later, will try to dispute world domi-
nance. It is thus necessary to hold talks and establish links in different
spheres, while monitoring its development. On this occasion, China did
not manage to see one of its major goals achieved, that of joining the
World Trade Organization.
The attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August, in
which some 260 people died, were attributed to the Saudi fundamentalist
and multi-millionaire Bin Landen, exiled in Afghanistan under the protec-
tion of the Taliban, since it was he who funded the Afghan uprising against
the Russian occupation. Washington accused Sudan and Afghanistan of
collaborating in the attacks, and President Clinton ordered air strikes on
targets in the two countries. This action won the support of some coun-
tries, among them Spain, but was criticised by many.
Mr Clinton continued to be harassed in December, when the House
Judicial Committee approved the charges of perjury before the Grand Jury
and obstruction of justice and Congress. Not only was the president’s
resignation called for, but the Judicial Committee, controlled by the Repu-
blicans, voted for impeachment.
A project with far-reaching implications to which the American public
did not pay much attention—and one which, in a sense, affects Spain—
was the March debate in the House of Representatives of the Young Plan
for the future of Puerto Rico. The plan entailed calling a referendum in
which the islanders would decide whether or not they wished to become
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the 51st state. In the 1993 referendum, 46% of the population had voted
in favour of this new status, while a meagre 4.4% voted for independence
and 48.6% preferred Puerto Rico to continue to be a Free Associated
State. In the non-binding referendum held in mid-December, Puerto
Ricans chose to maintain their current status, as 50.2% of voters ticked
the so-called «fifth column», handing in blank ballot papers, versus 46.7%
in favour of annexation. This result came as a harsh blow to the United
States’ aspirations of integration.
The president scored a personal success by getting the Palestinian and
Israeli leaders to meet at Wye, near Washington, to discuss and reach an
agreement which appeared to be acceptable to both parties. However, it is
too soon to know what the real results will be and, indeed, subsequent
events and statements are more conducive to pessimism. In December, the
United States warned that the European defence plan, which examines the
creation of a defence pillar between the EU and NATO in order to equip
Europe with its own military resources to cope with crises within its area,
should not dissociate itself from NATO. In this connection, Spain supported
the idea of dissolving the WEU into the EU, in keeping with the Franco-Bri-
tish initiative, though this poses problems such as what would happen with
Turkey, which is a NATO member, or with the neutral countries such as Swe-
den, Austria, Finland and Ireland, which belong to the EU but not to NATO.
A prominent issue in Canada throughout 1998 was the problem of the
possible secession of Quebec, which voters had rejected in 1980 and
1995 for several reasons: the existence of a large minority of English-spe-
aking immigrants; the federalist attitude of the indigenous ethnic groups;
the indecision of a large sector of the French-speaking population, who
regard themselves as Canadians just as much as Quebeckers; and
because, if separation were to occur, conflicts of interests and cultures
would emerge between the east and the English-speaking west, between
new and old provinces. Other provinces, such as Alberta or British Colum-
bia, seek to return to the past, that is, to validate the treaty which formerly
linked them to the British crown. These provinces want to continue to be
Canadian but threaten secession should Quebec achieve it. Lastly, the
country cannot ignore the continual growth of the Asian communities,
whose economic and political influence is increasing. China’s awakening
could lead to the forming of genuine cultural and linguistic communities,
complicating the scene even further. In the December parliamentary elec-
tions, the Liberal Party won more votes than the secessionists, and the
problem was again put on ice, though president Bouchard was re-elected
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with a majority of seats.
FROM THE APPEARANCE OF NORMALITY TO INCREASED
VIOLENCE IN THE BALKANS
While at the beginning of the year the UN handed over to Croatia the
last of the territories occupied by the Serbs in 1991—known to Croatia
as the Danube region and controlled by the United Nations since 1996—
the government crisis of the Serb part of Bosnia was settled with the
election of a moderate prime minister who was willing to collaborate with
the West.
At the same time, the International High Representative, the Spaniard
Westendorp, established a single currency after the three Bosnian com-
munities failed to reach an agreement; this was another of a set of mea-
sures designed to make a true state of this country which already had a
passport, a single flag and common citizenship, though the most suc-
cessful measure was to isolate the Croat hardliners of Bosnia, who sup-
ported the interests of Zaghreb, just as the Serb right-wing extremists bac-
ked those of Belgrade.
One of the Bosnian problems still pending settlement at year end was
thus the future of Brcko, the only river port on the bank of the Sava river,
located at the border between Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. It has been
under Serbian control since 1992 and is claimed by all three communities. 
But the major issue that continues to be unresolved is the one million
three hundred thousand refugees who, according to the Dayton agree-
ments, are entitled to return to their homes; of them, 400,000 have already
returned and a further 200,000 are expected to do so this year. As long as
this matter, among others, continues to be unresolved, it is hard to talk of
peace and reconciliation.
In the tripartite presidential elections, only the Bosnian Mr Izetbegovic
was re-elected. In Banja Luka the pro-west candidate was defeated and in
the republic of Spak a radical won. This victory of the die-hards raises
uncertainties, since both the Serb and the Croat want secession, which
would entail amending the Dayton accords.
In actual fact, Bosnia is not the only western failure in former Yugosla-
via. With the exception of prosperous northern Slovenia, the rest of the
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republics and regions are struggling amid uncertainty, chaos and authori-
tarianism. The situation of Croatia, governed by the highly individualist and
intransigent Mr Tudjman, is by no means to be envied. To the north of Ser-
bia, tension is mounting in Vojvodina, where there is a Hungarian majority.
The Serbs in Montenegro are losing ground and power. The state of Mace-
donia, for its part, has been left «hanging in a vacuum», under harassment
from Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. Meanwhile Albania which, though not
an EU candidate is of vital interest to Europe owing to its geographical
location, is slowly emerging from its chaotic past.
However, the problems deriving from the implementation of the Dayton
agreements were pushed into the background by the serious crisis or civil
war in Kosovo.
Kosovo, the poorest of the Serb republics, which lost its autonomy in
1989, hoped to take the first steps towards a peaceful and negotiated
independence or the building of a parallel state with powers in educatio-
nal, health and legal matters. However, Belgrade rejected these aspira-
tions. Following several weeks of warning and after talks between Mr Milo-
sevic and the moderate Albanian leader, Mr Rugova, failed, Belgrade
launched a crackdown in that province in March, with a policy of ethnic
cleansing, defying the international community and heedless of the US
warning that a bloodbath would not be tolerated. The European Union’s
request to the Serb leader to send a mediator and restore to Kosovo its
lost autonomy also fell on deaf ears, the argument being that this was an
internal problem and as such had to be resolved by Serbia.
Of the Fifteen, only France, Germany and Spain were in favour of a
possible military intervention as a solution to the conflict, while Greece and
Italy opposed taking further action. This once again showed that, except
for in the economic sphere, Europe lacks a common policy capable of
guaranteeing security in the continent. Although it attempted to convey to
the world an impression of unity on this issue, the EU actually adopted an
attitude of utmost caution, drawing up a highly ambiguous communiqué
which, although recalling the need to back a statute for Kosovo, failed to
mention the word «autonomy». This furthermore came at a time when Ser-
bia was staging a referendum to ask the population whether it wished for
international mediation—pure farce, since the result, a categorical no, was
a foregone conclusion. Neither did the meeting of foreign ministers in Lon-
don serve to analyse the issue, since it merely led to the Security Council




In the face of a possible Serb aggression, in April Albania requested the
deployment of NATO forces in its territory as a pressure and security fac-
tor, while the contact group described the situation in Kosovo as high-risk,
agreeing to implement the following measures: to freeze Yugoslavian
funds abroad; to establish talks without conditions between the two sides;
and to stop new investments flowing into Serbia. These measures did not
win the approval of Russia which, from the outset, openly supported Bel-
grade.
When June arrived, while President Clinton issued a statement reaffir-
ming that what had happened in Bosnia would not occur again—secon-
ded by British prime minister Blair, then president of the EU—over 100,000
inhabitants of Kosovo were roaming the woods and whole towns were set
light to. These events spurred NATO to study military action. The alliance
limited its action to reconnaissance flights as part of Operation «Determi-
ned Falcon» in which Spanish aircraft took part. The UN secretary-general
was reproachful of this attitude, pointing out that it was dangerous to inter-
vene without the backing of the UN, a view shared by the Spanish foreign
minister at the Cardiff summit.
In summer, the Fifteen refused to negotiate a ceasefire with the UCK
guerrilla, reiterating their support for Mr Rugova and, once again, their
opposition to Kosovo being granted independence. According to Greece,
the secession of Kosovo would be the spark that would kindle conflict in
Macedonia or Vojvodina, with unforeseeable consequences.
When summer was over NATO, fearing a «human disaster», again plan-
ned to use force. At the time, the resistance being put up by the guerrilla
was coming to an end, after the Serbs conquered Junik, the separatists’
last stronghold. However, it can be said that this turn of events was largely
due to the UCK’s own errors, such as attempting to neutralise Mr Rugova,
who had proposed unsuccessfully that Kosovo become an international
protectorate, and to conquer Orahovac; a further error was to declare it
would begin operations in Macedonia which, together with Kosovo and
Albania, should make up the great Albania. By alluding to Macedonia, the
separatists wished to give the impression that the conflict would unavoi-
dably spread, thus provoking NATO intervention. What they did not realise
is that the West would react by reconsidering its plans for military inter-
vention, thus giving the «go-ahead» to Serb cleansing operations. Later, in
an attempt to halt the orgy of blood and fire, US secretary of State Made-
laine Albright, NATO and the architect of the Dayton agreements, Mr Hol-
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brooke, relaunched the threat of military intervention, though in the know-
ledge that without Russia’s consent and without the Security Council man-
date it was impossible to carry out. For this reason Mr Milosevic did not
keep his word or promises.
Nonetheless, as a result of NATO’s firm decision to begin air opera-
tions, Mr Holbrooke managed to get Mr Milosevic to agree in Belgrade to
withdraw his forces and to allow international inspectors to verify this with-
drawal, which by all accounts has been completed. However, NATO, at
Macedonia’s request, will deploy forces in that country.
Despite the foregoing, it can be said that in the medium term, the solu-
tion will involve redefining the Yugoslavian framework of states, since Mr
Milosevic is less fearful of the problem in that province than of political
developments in Montenegro, which controls the Serbian coast that is the
route for trade to and from Belgrade. In order to keep up the fiction that
Yugoslavia continued to exist, Montenegro was granted excessive privile-
ges in 1992, such as almost a third of the seats in Serbia’s lower house
and half of those in the upper house. This enables the current president of
this republic to block any attempts by Mr Milosevic to reform the consti-
tution to the disadvantage of the region and to reinforce his power. He is
thus more dangerous than those of Bosnia and Kosovo.
There is no doubt that Montenegro will not agree to relinquishing its
current status of almost a sovereign state to become a mere province as
it was until 1941, and it is therefore holding on to its trump card which is
ownership of the only Adriatic coast—something essential to Belgrade.
In December, Washington accused Mr Milosevic of being the cause of,
rather than the solution to, the crisis in south east Europe, while Mr Milo-
sevic regarded the international mediators’ solution to allow the UCK com-
mand to take part in the peace negotiations as a «gross attack on Yugos-
lavia».
THE TURKISH DILEMMA
At the beginning of the year the Turkish government gave cause for
concern with its decision to try former minister Erkeban and five leaders of
the by then outlawed Welfare Party, who were charged with inciting the
Turkish society to rebellion and banned from belonging to any association
and from being parliamentarians for five years. As a result, thousands of
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supporters took to the streets, though, as the accused intend, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights may refute the ruling, as it did when it con-
demned the disbandment of the Unified Communist Party two weeks after
the Welfare party was outlawed, for violating article 11 of the European
Convention on Human Rights which authorises freedom of association.
Islam in Turkey was relegated by Ataturk to a mere historical reference
as it hindered secularisation and, as such, it has no place in political and
legislative life. Islam supporters in Algeria and the rest of the Muslim world
want political life to be governed by religious precepts or by the Koran, but
without laws to develop it. But in certain countries, such as Algeria or
Syria, the military did not support Islam since, although it could be, or has
been, adopted democratically, they knew it would mean the end of demo-
cracy once the Islamic parties were in power and consequently, the end of
the privileges the military enjoy in those countries.
In this context, the approval in parliament of the proposal to hold legis-
lative and local elections next 18 April, two years early, led the Islamic acti-
vists regrouped under the Virtue Party to again achieve a majority. This
gave rise to new concerns about the country’s future and the possibility of
a reaction by the armed forces.
Turkey’s relations with the EU did not improve during the year. Indeed,
Ankara did not send a delegation to Brussels to renew the talks which had
been at a standstill since the previous December, when Turkey had accu-
sed the Fifteen of ambiguity in their statements and proposals. The situa-
tion was further worsened by the incident of the Greek veto on Turkey’s
receiving the 400 million dollars established by the Customs Union Treaty,
which had injured Turkish pride.
In this connection, during President Demirel’s visit to Spain in March, HM
The King expressed his support for Turkey’s membership of the EU, stating
that he was aware of the country’s wish to take part in the achievement of a
united Europe and that Spain acknowledged, without reservations, Turkey’s
orientation towards Europe and legitimate aspirations of integration, and
applied the same criteria as for other candidates; the national press linked
this trip, partly, to the sale of weapons, provoking conflicting reactions.
Similarly, the Kurdish problem constantly made the headlines in 1998,
particularly after the scene of operations shifted to the north of Iraq. This
conflict is kept alive by the precarious economic and social conditions in
south east Anatolia. Turkey is thus preparing to implement the GAP pro-
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ject in the area, which entails building 35 reservoirs and hydroelectric
power stations in order to industrialise and develop the farming sector,
ensuring competitiveness, and to raise the standard of living of the Kurds.
However, this project has a negative impact on Syria and Iraq. The arrest
of Kurd leader Ocalan in Italy marred relations between the latter and Tur-
key when Rome refused to grant extradition.
Another serious problem which hangs over Turkish politics is the divi-
sion of Cyprus. Tension mounted in 1998 when President Demirel an-
nounced that the EU’s decision to open negotiations with the Greek
Cypriots had put paid to the possibility of reunification and that acknow-
ledging only that government was the wrong way to go about holding
talks. This undoubtedly led Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot government—
which is not internationally recognised but controls 37% of the island and
accounts for 20% of its population—to lay the foundations for political and
economic integration and to join forces to press the international bodies
for self-government.
This lengthy conflict with Turkey and its likely accession to the EU
made the Greek zone the focus of campaigning for the presidential elec-
tion, which was won by the conservative Mr Clerides, who was already in
power. The predominate concern in this election was not so much a ques-
tion of ideology but rather of the candidates’ capacity to negotiate with
Ankara on the forming of a federal state, EU membership and participation
in a joint programme with Greece. There is no doubt that for years this
conflict has been poisoning the envisaged enlargement of the EU and was
the reason for Turkey’s absence from the aforementioned March meeting
set up especially to address this issue. It gives cause for concern, not only
because it is isolating the country in a dangerous vacuum in Europe, owing
to its convergence problems, but also because of its capacity to hinder
Cyprus’s accession. It should not be forgotten that Athens has threatened
to veto the intended enlargement if the EU agrees to Turkey’s aims, and
that this warning finally prevailed. Turkey’s proposal to set up a confede-
ration of «two states» on the island was not accepted by the Greek
government, which considered that such a measure would drag division
on eternally, provide an institutional framework for the occupation of the
northern zone and would not be in accordance with the United Nations’
proposal to settle the dispute. However, Greece was hardly seeking to set-
tle the conflict when it allowed the Kurdish PKK to establish an office on
Greek soil.
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Greece claims that it is not opposed to the role Turkey should play in
Europe, since ethnic or religious barriers should not be established; rather,
if the Turks reckon they have rights over the Aegean Sea, they should take
their case to the International Court of Justice, as Greece did.
A HARD YEAR FOR RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS
Although the economic programme designed by Mr Yeltsin to achieve
sustained growth in 1998 included twelve basic goals, it was rejected by
the Duma owing to the difficulties in raising the taxes needed to attain
those objectives and, also, because they were unrealistic bearing in mind
the state of the country’s economy; the programmes and budgets, which
entailed cuts of 4.6 billion dollars, were thus not passed for the time being.
In view of this adversity, Mr Yeltsin did not hesitate to dismiss his entire
cabinet in March, arguing that it was necessary to deepen reforms and
improve the population’s standard of living. The West wondered if this
would be a new window-dressing ploy to shake off the crisis no matter
how, or a manoeuvre with more long-term implications.
The appointment of Mr Kiriyenko, a 35 year old technocrat, as head of
the executive at the end of the month and a harsh warning to the Duma
not to reject this designation seemed to settle the political crisis. The
government was faced with the task of putting an end to capital flight;
paying the wages arrears to the military and civil servants; swelling the
coffers of the state, which, in 1997, only managed to raise 57% of the
taxes budgeted; bolstering the country’s GDP, which had slumped by 50%
since the collapse of the USSR; and providing guarantees to foreign inves-
tors, among other objectives. These excellent plans seemed to ignore the
fact that there were little or no resources available for the task. Paradoxi-
cally, the programme was presented before Mr Kiriyenko’s appointment
was ratified by the Duma, which was dominated by communists and natio-
nalists who opposed both the president and his reforms.
The ratification process became a duel between Mr Yeltsin and the
state assembly. It was rejected twice successively, owing largely to figures
such as Mr Berezovski, who had been the president’s mainstay until two
years previously but had turned into an opponent on learning of the pri-
vatisation conditions of the main state-owned petrol company hitherto
under his charge.
The president’s threat of new elections made the members of parlia-
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ment think twice, realising they stood to lose their juicy emoluments and
privileges, from their dachas to official cars. Mr Kiriyenko thus came to
power third time round, though Mr Yeltsin made it very clear who ruled
Russia and believed that, by placing a loyal and manageable prime minis-
ter in office, he was paving the way for the presidential elections in 2000.
General Lebed, currently fuelling his ambitions as governor of the vast
Siberian region of Krasnoyarsk, the country’s electoral barometer, is a
likely candidate in these elections.
The opponents who came out of this crisis the worst were communist
Zyuganov, the aforementioned Berezovski and Mr Chernomyrdin, the
director of a huge economic empire based on the monopoly of state com-
panies, while Mr Yirinovski, an extreme nationalist, had not objected to the
appointment. But what the young technocrat needed to bear in mind was
that in 1992 Mr Yeltsin had begun to do away with the old political system,
and that the country’s future was increasingly determined not by the inte-
raction of reformers and communists, but by a struggle for real power bet-
ween the different economic forces who were the arbiters of politics as
they funded campaigns, granted privileges and controlled the media.
When Russia was plunged into a deep financial and economic crisis, it
was thought that salvation could only come from western and IMF aid for,
if it were not received, the social environment, almost collapsing under the
strain as evidenced by the miners’ strikes in May, could have caused the
system to fall apart as had occurred in Indonesia, where Mr Suharto had
been forced to step down from power. Therefore, in order to prevent bank-
ruptcy, the IMF decided to hand over the 670 million dollar package which,
though granted, had been frozen since January, while Mr Chunais, the fa-
ther of privatisation and of whom too much was expected, was appointed
deputy prime minister. His programmes aimed to raise more taxes, elimi-
nate fraud, cut public spending by 7 billion dollars, adopt a new tax sys-
tem, streamline government bureaucracy and save the rouble from deva-
luation, among other objectives, while the West, which had by then
committed 72 billion dollars, grew tired of granting loans. But the spectre
of nuclear warheads, together with the threat of possible social turmoil,
spurred the IMF to hand over almost three trillion pesetas.
The Moscow stock market took another sharp fall in August as a result
of fear of devaluation of the rouble and the flight of foreign capital, as
investors became convinced that the IMF money was only used to plug
holes rather than being injected into the economy. This, together with the
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depreciation of the yen, led investors to take refuge in the dollar, which
streng-thened as a result, while the G7 issued warnings to no avail. Later
that month, the rouble was devaluated by 30% and repayment of Russian
debt, which stood at some 28.7 trillion pesetas, was suspended for 90
days. The United States criticised this devaluation and recommended that
other economies in the area should not follow suit. However, although
risky, it was a correct measure in view of the depletion of the national
monetary reserves which were being poured into maintaining the currency
artificially high.
As expected, August witnessed the fall of Mr Kiriyenko’s government,
which had proved incapable of putting the economy it had inherited into
shape. Mr Kiriyenko was replaced by Mr Chernomyrdin—a move which
did not go down well with the public, who remembered his disastrous
government policy. Indeed, even before his appointment had been confir-
med by the Duma, he introduced new price control measures, issued new
currency without knowing what it would be worth the following day and
went back on the reforms by renationalising the banking sector, while Mr
Chubais, the previous reformer and negotiator with the IMF, was dismis-
sed.
This chaos led Mr Yeltsin to cede part of his power and prerogatives to
the Duma and the government in issues such as dismissing ministers.
Meanwhile, Mr Chernomyrdin was rejected by the houses, who did howe-
ver accept his successor, foreign minister Primakov. The political climate
having cooled down somewhat, the Kosovo crisis provided breathing
space to the seriously ill Mr Yeltsin, who again claimed that NATO’s non
intervention was largely due to him. But the reality at year end is that the
crisis is slowly worsening, Mr Yeltsin is in hospital and the president of the
IMF left Moscow without offering assistance.
As for foreign policy, Russia sought to play a leading role in the Iraqi
crisis at the beginning of the year, attempting to convince the world that
the situation was largely resolved due to its diplomatic intervention. Later,
at a meeting with Mr Kohl and President Chirac, Mr Yeltsin proposed set-
ting up a Paris-Moscow-Bonn axis, an idea which the European statesmen
did not applaud.
In his visit to Japan, the president undertook to sign a peace treaty
before 2000, though certain problems need to be solved in order for rela-
tions to be cordial, such as the dispute over the sovereignty of the Kuril
Islands in the south, which were occupied by the USSR in 1945 and have
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been repeatedly claimed by Tokyo.
As for its sphere of influence, Russia is currently trying to define its
vital interests, declaring two scenarios, Europe and the Middle East as far
as Pakistan, to be priorities, since whatever occurs in those areas has
repercussions on Russian territory. Russia will find it difficult to secure
more than a modest influence over the CIS since, as witnessed at the 1997
summit, the member countries are calling for a revamp of the current com-
munity machinery which they regard as useless and ineffective, given the
wide variety of interests. While some consider it an unsatisfactory frame-
work, others believe it should be a melting pot for integration. According
to Russia, these points of view are none other than a «plot» to break up
the community, as it stressed at the summit of presidents of the Asian
republics in January 1998.
A problem that Russia has yet to assimilate is that of the Baltic states,
which are going through a difficult transition period. Of the three republics,
Lithuania gives Moscow least cause for concern. In Latvia, where the eth-
nic issue is more prominent—40% of the population are Russian speakers,
compared with 57% of Latvians—the failure of the integration policy 
seemed to be overcome in 1998 when integration advocates won the
referendum held in October, a fact which will facilitate the country’s acces-
sion to NATO and the EU. For its part, Estonia does not have any integra-
tion problems, though relations with Russia continue to be tense and no
border treaty has yet been signed. 
A particularly sensitive area for Russia is the Caucasus, where there is
a hotchpotch of nationalist groups, ethnic and religious rivalry and, above
all, a conflict of economic interests. Although Chechnya seemed to be on
the way to achieving peace at the end of 1996, relations deteriorated in
May when the Chechen government put an end to its negotiations with
Russia, which had failed to comply with the terms agreed. The Chechen
president refused to guarantee the security of the Baku-Novorossisk oil
pipeline which runs for 153 km across this secessionist territory, even
though this entails a loss of income for the new state.
In Georgia, a second assassination attempt was carried out on Presi-
dent Shevardnadze. Some held former president Mr Gamanjundin respon-
sible, while others suspected Russia. Although Mr Shevardnadze intends
to make his country the focal point of Caucasian policy through an alliance
with Ukraine and Azerbaijan, Georgia’s complex relations with Russia
regarding oil are hampering this. While Moscow wants all the Caspian oil
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to be channelled along a pipeline with Novorossisk as terminal, Georgia
has recently signed international contracts whereby part of the crude oil
will be transferred by pipeline to Sujumi, the Georgian Black Sea coast.
Furthermore, the Georgian political scene continues to be dominated
by two pressing problems: the self-proclaimed republic of Abkhazia, the
separatist area which Georgia accuses of receiving Russian support, as
evidenced by the unilateral withdrawal of the Russian forces stationed
there under UN mandate; and the secessionist region of south Ossetia,
where the negotiations to put an end to the conflict seem to have come to
a standstill—a fact which shows the lack of a regional policy.
In Armenia, the resignation of President Ter-Petrosian during the year
jeopardised the peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh, as it afforded more
power to the prime minister, who firmly opposes the peace negotiations.
Azerbaijan is the Caucasian country with the best future prospects if it
continues to monopolise oil and gas production in the area. The problem
of getting the oil out of the country was thought to be settled in 1998 with
the new pipeline that runs though Georgia, thus avoiding the need to use
Novorossisk as a terminal since, until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is
resolved, Turkey cannot be used as a terminal because the pipeline would
have to cross Armenia. The dispute with Russia continues over the status
of the waters of the Caspian Sea, for while Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan
are in favour of considering them high seas, Russia and Iran demand they
be regarded as territorial waters.
The new Central Asian republics forged ahead in 1998, asserting the
independence they had not wished for and shedding the too recent past
in which they endured sacrifices in the interests of the former Soviet
Union’s economy and defence.
Despite its apparently brilliant foreign policy, Kazakhstan witnessed
the deterioration of its social environment and the relationships between
the different ethnic groups on account of a law reinforcing the role of the
Kazak language, which is encouraging the Russian-speaking population to
emigrate. Spain decided to open its first Central Asian embassy in this
country.
For its part, Turkmenistan continues to be totally under the sway of
President Nyazov, who refuses to enter into conflict with the Taliban as
they are needed to carry out the work on the oil pipeline which is planned
to cross Afghanistan. The project to build a new pipeline towards the
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Indian Ocean which could link up with Turkey was rejected by the United
States since it would require investments in Iran.
Uzbekistan, which regards itself as the heir to the Tamerlane empire
and aspires to become the dominant regional power, continued with its
rapprochement towards the United States, shifting away from Russia. It
also increased its trade flows with South Korea and Japan, while easing
trade relations with the CIS and emerging as a firm enemy of the Taliban.
Tajikistan ended its civil war and found itself obliged to remain within
Russia’s sphere of influence as a member of the monetary union to which
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan belong, though in 1998 it had not yet rati-
fied it. This is a clear sign of its reluctance to become excessively depen-
dent on Moscow.
Relations with Ukraine continue to be stormy. At 1998 year end the
trea-ty putting an end to the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet and the sta-
tus of the naval bases of Feodosiya and Sevastopol had not yet been rati-
fied. Al-though it was the first CIS country to adhere to the NATO Part-
nership for Peace programme, its policy this year has fluctuated, since, in
order to attract the vote of Crimean Russians, Ukraine hastily signed an
agreement with Moscow to boost political consultation and trade. Whate-
ver the case, it appears to be unstable owing to the constant power strug-
gle between the big industrial clans of the Don and Dnieper river basins.
Although the groups from the Don have disappeared from the political
scene, as wit-
nessed in the May elections, the battle is currently being waged within the
Dnieper group, from which all the ministers and over 200 senior officials
hail. A huge deficit is expected to appear in the 1998-99 financial year.
In Belarus the personal power of the president was consolidated
throughout the year. His politics arouse the suspicion of Moscow’s neo-
liberal circles, who accuse him of subjecting the country to obsessive eco-
nomic interventionism.
MEDITERRANEAN AFRICA—FANATICISM AND STABILITY
Two countries, Algeria and Morocco, played a particularly prominent
role in affairs in the Muslim areas of the Mediterranean.
Owing to the secrecy and total misinformation that characterise the
National Liberation Front, which merely implements the guidelines esta-
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blished by the armed forces in Algeria, it is difficult to evaluate the true
state of affairs regarding fundamentalism.
The major problem of how to achieve democratisation continued to be
unresolved in 1998. For some, it will only be achieved if fundamentalism is
neutralised, while for others, it is vital to establish a system of alternation,
even if this initially benefits the fundamentalists. But the fact is that only
three groups carry any weight in Algeria: the FAS, who are keen to hold on
to their domination; the FIS, who seek to supplant them through violence;
and the socialist FFS who believe that power should be allocated through
electoral means; the rest are an indistinct opposition which fails to engage
popular support.
The year began with 600 killings in the first week of Ramadan, the high-
est figure since 1992 when the conflict erupted. This rocked the Muslim
world, which considered it blasphemous to carry out such actions at that
time of the year and appealed to the EU and to the United States to send
a commission. Algeria interpreted this request as interference in its inter-
nal affairs, though it did agree to the visit of an EU «troika», which merely 
ga-thered information with a view to sending subsequent aid. The autho-
rities were, however, totally uncooperative and unforthcoming and indeed,
spurred on by the press, they accused France, Sweden and the United
Kingdom of allowing FIS terrorist havens in their respective territories.
In view of the scanty results obtained, the Fifteen announced that a
European Parliament delegation would be visiting Algeria. The delegation
fared no better, refusing to receive a message from the FIS so as not to
spark any further tension.
The existence of these Islamic networks in Europe should not be con-
fused with the Muslim presence in the continent, which is giving rise to a
certain amount of concern among the population about a more than likely
wave of immigration from the South. The problem lies in the fact that, whe-
reas other minorities became integrated, acquiring full rights after centu-
ries of conflicts, the Muslim presence goes back only two or three gene-
rations; even though the most recent generations, who were born in
Europe, have partly absorbed European culture and the way of life, it is too
soon for their religious, ethnic and mental references to have evolved and
adapted to 
the western environment in which they live. Nonetheless, there new gene-
rations who are settled in Europe are endeavouring little by little to free
themselves of any form of religious dependence and are even giving 
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rise to a lay Islamic culture that will contribute to the building of the new
Europe.
Months after the visit of the Euro MPs, a UN mission headed by Mario
Soares landed in Algiers. It made some progress in discovering part of
what was going on in the country, since it was allowed to visit the areas
where the killings had taken place.
The murder of a charismatic Berber singer triggered off serious rioting
among the Berber population whose feelings were already running high
following the executive’s decision to impose the language of the Koran 
—Arabic—throughout the country, forgetting that it was introduced only in
1963 when the country gained its independence. Most Algerians aged bet-
ween 30 and 60 have scarcely any knowledge of the language of the
Koran, as French is more widely used; by contrast, in Kalibia, the Berber
area, French is hardly spoken, and the inhabitants demand respect for
their language and cultural identity which date back more than 13 centu-
ries.
An important fact uncovered by the press was the power struggle wit-
hin the armed forces, specifically, the open rivalry between General
Lamari, the chief of the general staff, and General Betchine, security advi-
ser to President Zeroual. This was none other than a manifestation of the
dispute over who would stand for the next elections, which the president
unexpectedly announced for 1999, the true reasons for which are unk-
nown. General Betchine, tired of the constant harassment, withdrew from
the fight in autumn, leaving the field clear for his rival, though there is also
a good chance that a civilian will become head of state. Nonetheless, his
resignation caused perplexity, indicating that there is a power struggle to
find a credible candidate who satisfies all the parties concerned.
Morocco. It is considered that the appeal made to the king in January
by the radical fundamentalists, whose leader had been held in house
arrest for eight years for denying to recognise the monarch’s religious aut-
hority and for calling for the opening of the country to prevent a situation
similar to the one in Algeria from developing, may have been what led Has-
san II one month later to undertake to establish and consolidate a demo-
cratic, pluralistic regime based on the monarchy. The king is aware that the
future of Morocco hinges on his succession and on the consolidation of
democracy, and also on the opposition’s support for a new constitution
establish-ing a bicameral system, and that the moderate Islamists decided
to take part in the political game in the so-called «transparent» elections of
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1997.
These reasons led Hassan II to take an historic decision—that of
entrusting the socialist Youssoufi, who had spent most of his life in exile,
with the task of forming a government, thus putting an end to an uncertain
situation which had been dragging on since the previous year’s elections.
The Istiqulal nationalist party did not form part of the executive, since they
considered that the election results had been rigged, though the king had
counted on this manifest enmity between that conservative party and the
socialists. Indeed, the king had demonstrated his wish to see the country
grow with three main blocks—the conservatives, the centre and a tolerant
and constructive left.
Although during the first part of the year Mr Youssoufi found it difficult
to fulfil his electoral promises, such as the one relating to human rights, by
autumn he had overcome these problems and managed to free «sheikh»
Yasin, the leader of the «Justice and Charity» fundamentalists and one of
the main champions of human rights. Mr Filali subsequently stated in
Madrid that within six months no political prisoners would be left in
Morocco.
This was the climate for the fourth Hispano-Moroccan high-level sum-
mit held in Rabat in April. The issue of Ceuta and Melilla was pigeonholed,
but the forthcoming referendum on the Sahara was discussed, and Spain
said it would remain strictly neutral. The Spanish premier took the oppor-
tunity to address the new fisheries agreement with the EU, which will affect
over 500 Spanish vessels when the present one expires in a year and a
half’s time.
The future of the Sahara is a conflictive issue in which economic and
geopolitical interests come into play, for it is a priority area for European
security. It also directly involves Algeria, with which Morocco is basically
vying for domination of the region. Spain is affected by the dispute since
the Canary Islands are located in the area.
The UN mission in charge of organising and supervising a referendum
initially slated for December 1998 and subsequently postponed set about
taking a census, identifying 147,350 would-be voters on both sides of the
border. It made the serious mistake of allowing the Polisario Front and
Rabat to submit lists of possible voters, when it is known that each side
will try to tailor the census to its own aims and has its own interpretation
of the peace programme, which varies from self-determination and inde-
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pendence to integration into Morocco as a region with wide autonomy.
So as not to damage relations with Rabat, Spain adopted an attitude of
constraint, while the Arab League and OAU turned their gaze elsewhere
(Middle East, Sudan, former Zaire). At the OAU summit held in Burkina Faso
in the middle of the year, Hassan II tried to convince the organisation to
expel the Saharawi Republic, which is recognised by 31 African countries. No
agree-ment was reached, and Rabat continued to be deaf to Mr Mandela’s
pleas, while encouraging the formation of a Saharawi nationalist party, even
though regionalist groups are banned in the kingdom. This was yet another
ploy to ensure a favourable outcome for Morocco in the territorial dispute.
Kofi Annan’s visit to the area to break the deadlock on the peace plan did
not seem to please Morocco, which distrusts the lists drawn up by
MINURSO and has warned that the plan could trigger off disturbances in the
Sahara.
The political scene in Egypt, which is controlled by Mubarak’s National
Democratic Party, was affected by permanent clashes with Islamic militants
of the South, the crackdown on its political arm «Muslim Brotherhood» and
the socio-economic problems arising from the liberalisation of public com-
panies.
The security forces have clamped down on fundamentalist terrorism by
setting up a tourist police force. The apparent tranquillity witnessed during
the year—compared to the tragic events in 1997—evidences that, alt-
hough it remains, the problem is well under control and limited to two
regions in Upper Egypt.
Nonetheless, a number of factors will contribute over time to weake-
ning terrorism under its current form: its growing unpopularity; the harsh-
ness of the crackdown, based on a state of emergency in force for 30
years; the emergence of a new party which splintered off from the «Mus-
lim Brotherhood», is non-denominational, pluralistic and western-style,
undertakes to respect the current constitution and regards Islam more as
a culture than a religious denomination; and lastly, the policy of making
concessions to the official religious authorities of Al Azhar, withdrawing
works and publications that constitute an attack on religion and good
habits.
In 1998, despite the country’s considerable amount of bad debts to
Spanish companies, Spain renewed its talks and high-level contacts with
Libya, practically deadlocked since 1994. In addition, Libya and Italy clo-
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sed the wounds of their colonial past by signing an agreement in July on
terrorism and allowing the return of 20,000 former colonists expelled by
Colonel Quadaffi in 1970.
Lastly, it should be recalled that Spain asked NATO to pay more atten-
tion to the Maghreb, since dialogue with the Mediterranean South is just
as important as talks with Eastern Europe. At the Luxembourg meeting our
premier announced that a seminar would be held in Valencia in 1999 in
which the NATO countries and six from the Mediterranean basin would
take part. For the time being, Egypt and Algeria will not attend the mee-
ting, though the former has renewed its contacts by carrying out naval ma-
noeuvres in October with NATO marines.
THE MIDDLE EAST, A PERMANENT SOURCE 
OF TENSION, RIVALRY AND CONFLICT
Throughout 1998 the Middle East was affected by major tensions, con-
flicts and clashes of very different interests. The eternal problem of Pales-
tine and Israel continued to suffer ups and downs. In Afghanistan, civil war
drew on, with a clear advantage for the Taliban and possible repercussions
on the Central Asian countries. In Iran, the struggle between reformists
and radical conservatives intensified, while in Iraq a second crisis with the
US erupted and could have led to a new war. Jordan and Saudi Arabia
faced the question of succession of their respective monarchies, and the
r a p -
prochement between Turkey and Israel, which involves four countries, is
having negative repercussions on Syria. These are just some of the
obvious examples of the complexity of affairs in the area.
As for the Palestinian conflict, it should be pointed out that Israeli
nationalism has not proved itself to be any different from other nationalist
movements, since its exponents do not hesitate to deny others what they
themselves claim, convinced of their legitimate right to the land of their
forefathers as accorded by the Bible. That is why, since 1945, Israel has
pursued the political and strategic goal of keeping its borders as wide as
possible, seeming to ignore that in a globalised world borders have lost
much of their value as they must be permeable to economic and migratory
flows and streams of ideas. Its successive annexation wars have been a
source of misfortune for the Jews, ever since the occupation sowed the
seeds of colonisation. This was accepted by the different governments,
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who were under pressure from «hawks» such as Dayan, Igal Alon and Sha-
ron, from the Labour Party—who, until 1977 remained loyal to the theory
of not abandoning the conquered land—to the Conservatives of Likud.
However, in 1993, former nationalists such as Shimon Peres and Yitzac
Rabin became convinced that it was necessary to put an end to the con-
flict with the Palestinians, thus giving rise to two trends in Jewish society:
those in favour of understanding and territorial compromise, and the
extremist advocates of annexation, whose stance is orthodox and intran-
sigent. The latter not only deny the existence of the Palestinian nationalist
movement, but also think that acceptance of a dual legitimacy would
undermine the very foundations of Zionism, since the Arab Palestinians
have rights as individuals but not as a group. It was thus not considered
that they could eventually harbour aspirations of autonomy and indepen-
dence—a right which is recognised in the Oslo agreements.
The Peace Process had thus come to a halt in March the previous year
and the efforts of the EU’s special envoy to the area, Spaniard Moratinos,
had been neutralised when Tel Aviv approved a list of vital interests for
keep-ing 80% of the occupied territories within the West Bank. These
efforts were stepped up when, in January, Mr Netanyahu did not yield to
the tentative pressure of Mr Clinton, who attempted to persuade him to
divide the second withdrawal into stages, with an initial hand-over of 13%
of the an-nexed areas, which would have facilitated Mr Arafat’s return to
the negotiating table. 
When Mr Netanyahu visited Madrid not long after the Palestinian lea-
der, he accused the EU of being closer in its stance to Palestine interests
and announced that he would like to hold a meeting with Mr Arafat in
Madrid. He also promised to withdraw forces from the security zone in the
south of Lebanon, which was occupied in 1985, if Beirut provided suffi-
cient guarantees. This withdrawal was partially carried out in April, thus
fulfilling one of the United Nations Resolutions. It was a unilateral decision,
since Syria announced that it would withdraw from Lebanon if Israel did so
from the Golan Heights.
Mr Netanyahu’s intransigence, which did not ease even when Mr Weiz-
man, who opposed his policy, was re-elected president or when the Pales-
tinian leader showed a lenient attitude towards the Hamas’ terrorist
attacks, proved how difficult it was to reach an understanding. Nor was it
clear that the colonisation policy was going to be put on ice, even though
the process does not stem from a demographic need, but rather from a
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nationalist political aim.
The failure of the meeting of the two leaders in London, which was 
backed by Washington and raised many expectations—though Egypt
expressed its pessimism at the fifth Mediterranean Forum held in Palma
de Mallorca—seemed to confirm that the schedule drawn up at Oslo had
come to a standstill and was hanging in shreds.
The United States attempted to give fresh impetus to the talks by orga-
nising the Washington meetings. Tel Aviv submitted a new plan to hand
over 9 or 10% and convert a further 3 or 4% of the ceded territories into
a Palestinian industrial area under Israeli control in security matters. Mr
Arafat, who did not talk personally to his rival, rejected this proposal.
Mean-while in Israel, demonstrations to mark the 50th anniversary of the
Palestinians’ exodus that began when the 1948 war ended were suppres-
sed.
In the summer, while Mr Netanyahu overcame three votes of censure
and a parliament bill to dissolve the government and bring forward the
elections due to be held in 2000, since the date was not binding, the other
side saw the resignation of two Palestinian ministers following a cabinet
reshuffle in which Mr Arafat had kept on two former colleagues from his
period of exile in Tunisia. A curious fact about the Palestinian government
is that it has 30 portfolios—more even than China. At the same time, Mr
Arafat announced that if withdrawal did not take place within the establis-
hed period, he was determined to found an independent state in 1999.
Yet another attempt at reaching an understanding succeeded in Octo-
ber, when President Clinton managed to persuade the two leaders to
meet at the Wye Plantation near Washington in a new version of the
Camp David negotiations that led to the establishment of peace between
Egypt and Israel in 1979. The meeting commenced amid an atmosphere
of tension and distrust and after nine days of talks an agreement was sig-
ned, which can basically be summed up as «land for security». Israel
agreed to withdraw from 13% of the West Bank, though crucial problems
were left unresolved, such as the future of Jerusalem, settlement policy,
rights of refugees, and ports and airports, among others. The agreement
was therefore not satisfactory for either of the parties and implementation
even looked doubtful. The grave attack by Hamas, on 6 November, which
de-layed the implementation of the agreement, drew attention to the fact
that the problem continued to be practically at a standstill. Although the
Israeli parliament approved the agreement, the process again came to a
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halt in December as a result of bloody clashes and because of certain
parts of the agreement dealing with release of prisoners, expansion of
settlements, etc. Tel Aviv made withdrawal conditional on its own terms.
This was rejected by Mr Arafat, and tension thus mounted shortly before
Mr Clinton’s arrival.
Bill Clinton’s visit to Israel and Palestine in December, amid considera-
ble street violence, achieved scanty results. Israel did not waver, even
though the US president promised to grant the country $1.2 billion if it ful-
filled the Wye accords, and Mr Arafat, for his part, stated he was prepared
to honour his commitments in Gaza.
A further cause for concern in the region is the Turkish-Israeli alliance
established in 1995. Little publicity has been given to this alliance, as it
alters the power balance in the area. As far as Turkey is concerned, this
move can be explained by the loss of its privileged position with NATO vis-
à-vis Russia and a possible fundamentalist Middle East. These reasons
have led Turkey to play a new role, becoming a regional power, whose
security is endangered by fundamentalism. Its alliance with Israel further-
more secures it the support of the Jewish lobby gruop in the US Congress,
which today also acts as Ankara’s spokesman in the United States. The
alliance is likewise highly favourable for Israel, since it poses a threat to
Syria in the north.
It is a well-known fact that relations between Turkey and Syria have
always been tense owing to Syria’s support for the Kurdish PKK. This led
Turkey to issue serious warnings in October, and a new armed conflict 
threatened to erupt. The situation was soon resolved, when President
Hafez Assad promised not to supply weapons or money and to keep the
PKK under control, thus guaranteeing security at the borders.
Syria, for its part, is concerned by Turkey’s GAP project for Anatolia
since it affects the course of the river Euphrates which begins in Turkey
and flows through Syria and Iraq. Although a treaty concerning these
waters was signed in 1987, Syria’s fear became apparent in 1990 when the
Ataturk dam was filled; moreover, when the works are completed, in
around 2010, the volume of water flowing through Syrian territory will be
halved, while Iraq will lose a third. The water will furthermore be of low
quality owing to the fertilisers and pesticides used to boost the agricultu-
ral development of south east Anatolia.
The state of relations between Syria and Israel likewise continues to
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be poor, owing to the agreement signed in 1996 between President Assad
and Yitzhak Rabin whereby the latter was to withdraw forces from the
Golan Heights along the line of the June 1967 ceasefire and to comply with
Washington’s security recommendations which Israel had accepted in
1995. Mr Netanyahu demands that two conditions be met, the first being
that an early warning station be kept in the Golan Heights, once the terri-
tory is returned, and that Syria install another in Israel. Syria believes this
request to be unnecessary, since Tel Aviv obtains a variety of information
from American satellites. The other condition is that, since the water
supply to the Golan Heights comes from Turkey and accounts for almost
a third of the country’s consumption, Turkey be included in the nego-
tiations. Ankara, however, refuses to participate as it considers that the
problem does not affect Turkey.
Iraq’s refusal to allow the UN team of inspectors to carry on with their
work in October 1997 triggered a serious crisis in January, placing the
world on the verge of another Gulf war. The situation worsened when Sad-
dam Hussein reacted to the chief of UNSCOM’s accusation that Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction by deciding to expel all American inspectors
from the country and to put a stop to the inspections. This measure led
Washington to deploy large military contingents of naval, land and air for-
ces, though it did not succeed in rebuilding the former coalition, and the
mounting tension led to a meeting of the French, US and Russian foreign
ministers in Paris. At the end of the meeting, Mr Primakov announced that
Iraq agreed to the return of all the inspectors, including the Americans,
thus warding off the threat of military action, though the crisis did not auto-
matically die down. The Spanish government expressed its support for the
Security Council’s decisions, stating that it had no objections to Spanish
bases being used. 
This tense climate saw a stream of declarations: Riyadh implied that it
would support an attack on Saddam Hussein; Israel stated its right to coun-
terattack if it were targeted by Iraqi Scud missiles; Russia insisted that
aggression towards Iraq would amount to an attack on Russia’s vital inte-
rests and could trigger a third world war. However, it was not so much a pro-
blem of whether or not to attack as what to do in the wake of what was a
much simpler crisis than that of 90-91, as this time no country had been
invaded.
At the end of February, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan visited Bagh-
dad to hand over the Security Council’s conditions: no presidential palace
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could be a haven; UNSCOM’s work could not be limited in time and space;
and the Security Council should be free to form teams of inspectors wit-
hout discriminating against American members. The whole world breathed
a sigh of relief when Mr Annan achieved an agreement based on those
conditions. Mr Clinton accepted the agreement but did not lower his guard
until the conditions were seen to be fulfilled.
But it was precisely during those days that it was known that the UN
agencies FAO, WHO and UNICEF had allowed medical products that
could be used to develop the feared anthrax to be sold to Iraq, and that
Germany and France had collaborated technologically with Iraq in the
development of chemical weapons and in broadening the range of Soviet
Scud missiles. Indeed, President Bush had not only blocked the passage
through Congress of sanctions on Iraq but had also granted the country a
new credit line. Only when Saddam Hussein occupied Kuwait did Iraq’s
chemical arsenal become cause for alarm in the Pentagon, and the Bathist
regime was seen as a bête noire that had to be put in its place.
Although Saddam Hussein’s position was strengthened by the crisis,
the real victor was Mr Annan, since he obliged the Iraqi leader to go back
to square one without guaranteeing the lifting of the sanctions.
While Mr Annan was conducting his mission, the US army War School
issued a report stating that the strategy of dual contention regarding Iran
and Iraq made the region chronically unstable and that Washington would
be better advised to co-operate with all the countries in the area in order
to increase stability and cut the costs of large-scale military deployment.
In spring, the Pentagon eased its military pressure in the Gulf area,
while the UN and Baghdad agreed on completing the inspections within a
two-month period. These good intentions vanished into thin air when it
was discovered that at some point 95 missiles had been loaded with the
lethal nerve gas VX. The crisis, which had not completely died down, again 
flared up towards the end of the year when Saddam Hussein once more
refused to collaborate with UNSCOM unless it reconsidered lifting the
embargo and changing the composition of the international commission.
The rattling of sabres was once again heard, though Iraq’s manoeuvre
regarding the UN obliged Mr Clinton to rule out the use of force.
In 1998 the political scene in Iran was dominated by echoes and con-
sequences of the presidential elections that brought Mr Khatami to power,
while the failure of the radical clergy and the importance of women’s vote
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became evident. The new president, who controls the executive and legis-
lative powers but not the judiciary or the Council of Guardians—which is
in the hands of the spiritual guide and head of state, Ayatollah Khamenei,
who continues to be the highest arbiter of the regime and enforcer of Isla-
mic law—is attempting to reconcile religion to modernity, preventing the
Koran and Islamic moral code from clashing with individual freedoms,
human rights and other such principles. This is a very difficult task.
As regards external relations, the rapprochement between Russia and
Egypt was consolidated during the year, as was the reconciliation of the
Gulf monarchies. Relations with Syria were stable, while the situation with
Turkey did not improve, despite an agreement on gas supplies. Iran cau-
tiously monitors the developments of the civil war in Afghanistan that cau-
sed tension to mount at the border in late summer, and does not rule out
the possibility of intervention. This situation, together with the appeal for
dialogue with Washington launched by President Khatami at the summit of
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference—to which the US secretary of
state responded favourably, praising the Iranian president for apologising
for taking hostages in 1979—seems to confirm that Mr Khatami, against
the will of the Ayatollah, wants to bring Iran out of isolation. There is thus
a lot at stake for America and Europe, since if the sanctions continue, the
religious autocratic parties will be strengthened at the expense of esta-
blishing the rule of law. The fact that Washington has struck Iran off its list
of drug producers may be considered positive.
The new climate, unthinkable only two years ago, was witnessed in
April, when intellectuals and the media held a debate on the country’s
future, questioning the subordination of politics to religion and demanding
the separation of the institutions. In this connection, the arrest of the
mayor of Teheran, charged with financing Mr Khatami’s electoral campaign
with public funds, made the news. He was tried and sentenced to five
years’ imprisonment and barred from holding public office for twenty
years. His trial was, in fact, a blow directed at the reformists.
An unforeseen event was the appointment of the minister of the inte-
rior as deputy prime minister and his dismissal hours later by parliament,
who accused him of supporting the mayor of Teheran during the latter’s
trial. However, that same parliament approved by a majority the appoint-
ment of another of Mr Khatami’s right-hand men as interior minister.
The Afghan Taliban managed to conquer Kabul and other parts of the
country in previous years thanks to the obvious support of Pakistan,
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whose designs for Afghanistan entail the establishment of a friendly
regime and, to an extent, a vassal. Another contributing factor was Was-
hington’s discreet turning away its gaze by supporting UNOCAL’s project
to build an oil pipeline linking Turkmenistan and Pakistan, and the implica-
tion that the Taliban occupy only the east of Afghanistan. These victories
moved the Taliban to ask the UN to recognise them as a legitimate govern-
ment, since, so far, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates
have acknowledged their status, while the rest of the world, including the
UN, supports the legitimacy of the deposed President Rabbani.
The application of strict fundamentalism and the refusal to eradicate
opium poppy cultivation gave rise to concern in 1998, as did Afghanistan’s
taking in of certain radical Islamists whom Washington accuses of encou-
raging and funding many attacks on US interests. Fear of total victory of
the Taliban, who were already in control of 85% of the country and rea-
ched the border with Uzbekistan in August, spurred Russia to change its
tactics with regard to Tajikistan, fearing that the Taliban would destabilise
its southern flank in the medium term.
Although the Taliban and their adversaries signed a truce in April in
order to begin talks in Islamabad under the aegis of the UN, the process
was suspended a month latter, as the two sides proved incapable of set-
tling their differences, lacking the will to negotiate. The extreme tension
with Iraq, which led Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to step in as mediators to
prevent armed conflict, was due largely to mutual religious and ethnic mis-
givings between the two regimes, since Teheran’s Shiite fundamentalists
feared that their status as regional power was under threat and also, in a
sense, the future oil pipelines from Central Asia which will have to cross
Afghanistan.
During the year King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who suffered a stroke in
1995, underwent surgery. Although he is officially the head of state, the
task of governing the country falls to his brothers of the Suderi clan.
Toge-ther with Pakistan, the country acted as mediator in the crisis bet-
ween Iran and Afghanistan. Iran ultimately fears it may find itself trapped
in a complex situation as Russia was years ago. Both countries sponsor
religious studies and although Riyadh has distanced itself somewhat from
the Taliban, it continues to send them arms and money, and both Iran and
America accuse it of having engendered a monster that has got dange-
rously out of hand. The summit of the Gulf Council focused on regional
security issues.
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FROM THE RISE OF REGIONALISM IN INDIA 
TO THE COLLAPSE OF INDONESIA
In India both the 14-party government coalition and the most traditio-
nal parties failed in the general elections held in the first quarter of the year,
thus indicating the population’s growing rejection of the political class. The
regionalist parties emerged as the true victors, in a proliferation of names
which could be a sign of pluralism and, therefore, democracy, if they prove
to be coherent and stable.
But the surprise India had in store was its three underground nuclear
tests, the first it had conducted since 1974, followed two days later by a
further two sub-kiloton blasts in the desert of Rajasthan, allegedly marking
the completion of its nuclear programme. The international community
was unanimous in condemning the tests and while China argued that they
jeopardised peace in the region, the United States announced sanctions
and asked Pakistan not to respond with similar tests. It became clear that
al-though the former bipolar world had vanished, the risks of limited
nuclear war were greater. Ten days later Pakistan carried out five tests with
fission bombs, just as India had done, and was similarly condemned for
such acts by Spain, among other countries.
India claims that its failure to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty is due to
the discriminatory nature of the treaty, which enshrines the monopoly of
the five major powers. It therefore advocates linking the ban on this type
o f
testing to total disarmament, although there is doubt as to whether this is
what India really wants or whether this argument is merely an excuse for it
to enjoy its own nuclear option, as Pakistan has, for in September it sta-
ted its intention to sign the treaty, which needs still more signatures in
order to come into force.
Both countries’ tests showed that if the UN merely condemned, the
West was incapable of halting the arms race between enemies with little
stability. Mr Clinton was heavily criticised in his own country for the Uni-
ted States’ loss of influence in Islamabad, which had been a faithful,
loyal ally during the cold war. However, this was due to Congress, which
put an end to military collaboration in order to go ahead with its nuclear
programmes.
The tests are a reminder that, although we are immersed in a process
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of globalisation, certain geopolitical realities can damage this professed
universality. Furthermore, it is a well-known fact that other countries aspire
to equip themselves with such weapons in the knowledge that condem-
nations and sanctions have little effect and because they feel threatened
by more powerful neighbours with bigger resources and populations, and
see building such an arsenal as a means of survival, since it can provide
them with a credible deterrent.
The tension between India and Pakistan escalated to dangerous ex-
tremes in August, with very violent outbreaks at the Kashmir borders. This
violence suddenly died down after a month, though the two sides conti-
nued to issue declarations that fuelled their opposition, despite the sub-
sequent meeting of their respective heads of state.
Further eastwards, in Indonesia, the serious fires in Sumatra, econo-
mic turmoil and the drought caused by El Niño gave rise to famine in the
western part of the archipelago, while the ageing president was re-elected
in March for the seventh time. Mr Suharto appointed his protégé Bucha-
ruddin Jusuf Habibie vice-president in a move that was interpreted as
defiance of the IMF and the scheduled reforms and led to an escalation in
social tensions, while the rupee plummeted to its lowest level since 1987.
It was paradoxical that in January the government should have turned to
the international institution and announced the cancellation of 150 pro-
jects, dismantling public companies controlled by relatives and friends,
cutting subsidies and establishing an adjustment policy only to back out
and reject the January agreements, presenting an unrealistic budget with
artificial exchange rates. As a result, the country was expected to end
1998 with inflation soaring above 50% and negative growth.
A new agreement signed with the IMF in April—the third in six
months— included 117 measures to ward off social chaos. As proof of the
government’s good will, 14 banks were closed, though such measures
would not prevent the social explosion, which began on 4 May and rea-
ched a climax on the 12th, when the army fired at rioting students from Tri-
sakti university in Jakarta, killing six. The following day violence flared in
the capital, taking a death toll of over 500, particularly among the Chinese
community, who account for 3.5% of the population and control 70% of
commercial assets. Meanwhile, President Suharto attended the summit of
the G15 in Cairo. These events, which rapidly spread to the other islands,
led the students to invade parliament, at which point the army and the US
forced the president to resign, which he did on the 21st. The loyal Mr
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Habibie took over from him, but the powerful figure in the background was
General Wiranto, the head of the military, who set about organising a purge
of the armed forces. Some of the victims were General Subiarto, the for-
mer president’s son-in-law and head of the intervention forces. The
atmosphere again reached boiling point in November, leading to investi-
gations of Mr Suharto’s fortune and the announcement of elections in June
1999.
In February the King and Queen of Spain visited the Philippines to take
part in the celebrations to mark the centenary of Philippine independence.
The king reiterated Spain’s commitment to the future of the archipelago.
Three months later the presidential elections were won by the populist Mr
Estrada, a well-known film actor-turned politician with a huge talent for
attracting popular support.
The bloody-handed Pol Pot, responsible for the death of a third of
Cambodia’s population between 1975 and 1979, died in a remote corner
of the jungle to which he had been confined by his former comrades for
life. It was thought that they had assassinated him in order to avoid the
public trial that the United States insistently called for, fearing they would
be implicated in the genocide. In the elections held late in August—trans-
parent and honest, according to observers—the opposition complained
that the results had been rigged, sparking off fears of a fresh outbreak of
civil war.
In February, the Constitutional Convention of Australia declared itself
in favour of severing the historic ties that link the country to the United
Kingdom and making the country a republic by 2000. The prime minister
promised to hold a referendum to this effect in 1999, stating that the pre-
sident would be elected by parliament. However, the majority of the popu-
lation want the choice of head of state to be decided on at the polls, other-
wise they would prefer the country’s current status.
THE QUEST FOR NEW MODELS IN THE FAR EAST
After 23 years of steady growth, Japan officially slid into economic
recession in 1998, its annual GDP falling 0.7% in financial year 1997-98,
which ended in March. This was only to be expected, since the Japanese
economic model, which had been outworn for some years, was further
debilitated by the serious financial crisis that swept across Southeast Asia.
The crisis was of both an economic and a structural nature, with problems
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inherited from the speculative period adding to the adjustments caused by
the chaotic state of the financial system. The reasons for the negative
growth rate of the second biggest economy in the world were thus plain.
The economic stimulus package presented in March, with a cost of
1.16 trillion yen, was accompanied by a request to parliament for lower
taxes. This petition was challenged by the opposition, who called for strict
adherence to the budget. It was therefore feared that if the package failed,
the yen would be further devaluated, triggering a new financial crisis that
would drag down the rest of the Asian currencies.
However, it was in June when banks’ bad loans and plummeting share
values put the financial system on the ropes. To remedy this chaos, it was
agreed to launch a new restructuring plan that included setting up a bank
rescue agency.
Having failed to resolve the financial crisis, prime minister Hashimoto
stepped down in July in favour of foreign minister Obuchi. The yen conti-
nued to slide to its lowest level against the dollar for eight years, pushing
up unemployment and giving rise to new crises in sectors such as real
estate, while domestic consumption slowed down. The IMF’s recommen-
dation that the government take a bolder stance to combat the recession
and consider that boosting demand was the only way of halting the crisis
was to no avail, as when internal demand slumped, companies’ invento-
ries grew and many enterprises collapsed.
Over the summer it became clear that the medium-term solution would
require Japan to speed up its structural reforms, as called for by the Uni-
ted States and the governors of central banks, among them that of Spain
as a member of the Bank for International Settlements, since the measure
adopted in July to nationalise the banking sector temporarily through
state-supervised bridging institutions was proving insufficient. But as well
as the reform packages, Tokyo needed aid from the IMF, the World Bank
and the Federal Reserve or G7, all of which made their support conditio-
nal on Japan’s solving its financial problems, particularly those relating to
the banks’ burdens of bad loans, and a tax cut to stimulate consumption
and revive the economy.
The uncertainty hovering over the Japanese political scene worsened
the situation of the foreign exchange markets and the world stock ex-
changes, causing the yen to depreciate further and recession to set in.
Analysts contended that all Japan could contribute to the Asian crisis was
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more problems. In October a further—10 billion yen were injected into the
extraordinary budget for 1998 when it became known that the economy
would shrink 1.8%. The year ended without any concrete agreements for
giving the economy a proper boost, though the World Bank and the IMF
believe that the recent measures taken by Japan can improve the situa-
tion, thereby helping East Asia achieve economic growth of 4.8% in 1999.
However, with no cold war or threats from China and North Korea in the
short term, Japan seeks a weightier role in the region than one of mere
subordinate to American strategy. While the dispute with China continued
over the oil-producing island of Sankaku, and Japan refused during Jiang
Zemin’s state visit in November to sign a statement apologising for occup-
ying China from 1931-1945, it also fears North Korea’s possible nuclear
arsenal, which made the news in summer when a long-range missile flew
over Japanese air space. As for Russia, the conflictive issues have been
mentioned earlier.
In 1998, America pondered cautiously over China’s future, asking itself
when it would take Japan’s place as commercial superpower and become
a major military power. There is no doubt that China is currently attemp-
ting to secure itself international prestige and world power status in the
political, economic and military spheres by implementing a growth model
based on a shift from a system based on agriculture and small enterprises
to a so-phisticated industrial model with leading-edge, dual purpose tech-
nologies such as aerospace, electronics and computing, which are the
basis of a military capability. In order to achieve this, it needs to turn to the
big western multinationals, realising that they can become useful pressure
elements. General Electric, Ford or Boeing are capable of standing up to
the protectionist whims of Congress and of neutralising the objections of
the human rights advocates, supporters of non-proliferation and ecolo-
gists, as well as providing China with technology and experience in return
for access to the huge Chinese market. This could even lead to the crea-
tion—if there is not one already—of a lobby group similar to the Israeli one
in Washington. Nonetheless, there is still a long way to go and it seems
reasonable to think that China will not fully close the economic gap and
totally overhaul its structures until at least 2050, a century after the Peo-
ple’s Republic came into being.
As for its role in the international scene, in 1998 Beijing continued to
diversify its relations so as to ensure that Washington—with whom rela-
tions have improved considerably following the visits of Al Gore in 1997
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and President Clinton the following year—is not its only interlocutor. It
regarded the Tokyo-Washington axis with suspicion and kept the issue
with Taiwan on hold, even though, paradoxically, trade with the island
increased sharply. As far as Tibet is concerned, China will never negotiate
its independence. Under Chinese control this area enjoys greater deve-
lopment than it did during the times of Dalai Lama, with a per capita
income of nearly 3,000 dollars, above the national average. A further pro-
blem is the Muslim region of Sinkiang in western China, where mass colo-
nisation has led the Uigur ethnic minority, of Turkmen origin, to be pushed
into the background, thus fuelling separatist movements.
In March the National Assembly approved the restructuring of the cen-
tral government, trimming the number of ministries from 40 to 29 in order
to streamline the complex bureaucracy and guarantee the effectiveness of
decisions and the full development of a market economy, having realised
that the huge and useless communist structure was expensive, difficult to
control and a breeding ground for corruption.
During those sessions the hitherto prime minister Li Peng, known for
his suppression of the students’ protests several years ago, was appoin-
ted President of the Assembly. He thus became the second in power, after
Jiang Zemin was ratified as President of the Republic for a further five-year
term, Secretary-General of the party and President of the Military Com-
mission, while Zhu Rongjin, Jiang Zemin’s technocrat protégé and likely
successor, became Prime Minister. His programme promised to deepen
the reforms begun by Xiaoping and to eliminate the last traces of central
planning; to restructure public companies, cutting eleven million jobs; to
reform the administration he himself had built; to industrialise the country
as Korea had done; to give priority to the reform of the banking sector, eli-
minating the current dispersion—a measure that will come up against
resistance from the political bosses of the provinces who control the local
banks; to trim inflation; and to achieve the parity of the yuan and have the
currency join the WTO. He will no doubt try to create a modern socialist
government, far removed from past models, though the appointment of Li
Peng shows that the reformists have not been able to weed out the last of
the hardliners who hanker after the past.
Mr Clinton’s visit in June, nine years after Tiananmen, marked the end
of the political and commercial boycott Washington wanted to apply to
China. Indeed, improving these relations was one of the re-election objec-
tives of Mr Clinton, who stated that «we cannot isolate China». In his visit,
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the American president underlined shared responsibility in shaping the
future of the world, «cordially» reminding Jiang Zemin of human rights, fre-
edom of religion and the situation in Tibet. The trip ended in a 47-point
agreement in which security and defence are priority issues.
The problem of the two Chinas will undoubtedly grow more acute in the
near future, since the influence of the Kuomintang is waning in Taiwan,
while that of the progressive democratic party, which groups together Tai-
wanese and supporters of independence, is growing. Nonetheless, the
visit of a delegation to Beijing in November to renew the talks that were
broken off in 1995 was a positive development; and even though both
sides, deep down, wish for reunification, they have different ideas regar-
ding how to go about it. The Kuomintang’s relative victory in the Decem-
ber elections will be conducive to the reunification that Beijing is pressing
for.
The opposition won the elections in Hong Kong, though, because of
the complicated electoral system, the democrats did not come to power.
This shows that although China controls Hong Kong, the spirit of demo-
cracy is alive and could serve as a stimulus and an example to the rest of
China. However, the port is gradually losing its former international func-
tion and Shanghai is taking its place as the driving force behind China’s
development —a fact which became clear to our finance minister when he
visited the country in November.
At the beginning of 1998, President Kin Young Sam of Southern Korea
announced the sorry state of the country, which he described as at risk of
plunging into the most serious crisis since the 1951-58 war, and did not
conceal from his people the sacrifices they would have to endure. The cri-
sis may result in negative economic growth, subjecting the country to vio-
lent social tension, although parliament, which is controlled by the oppo-
sition, allows little room for manoeuvre. Relations with Northern Korea
continue to be difficult and the issue of territorial waters has yet to be set-
tled with Japan.
In January, Northern Korea acknowledged for the first time the
extreme situation of its people, who were stricken by famine as a result of
the major flooding of previous years and the typhoons of 1997. Moreover,
in March, Kin Jong II called for a renewal of quadripartite talks with a view
to reunification, after the previous ones held in Geneva had failed, alt-
hough he requires oil as a condition for terminating his nuclear pro-
gramme, as he had promised Mr Clinton. However, the provocative laun-
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ching of a ballistic missile, which flew over Japanese air space and plun-
ged into the Pacific, raises the fear that these good intentions will again
come to nothing.
GRADUAL CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
Although the greatest economic progress witnessed for a quarter of a
century was achieved in 1997, the same cannot be said for 1998. The end
of state protection and the arrival of foreign capital that favoured monetary
supply increased the risk of inflation, and at the beginning of the year the
overall current account balance showed a deficit of $60 billion. This down-
turn sparked off growing fears that the financial situation of the area was
very similar to that of the South-East Asian countries. As a result, unem-
ployment increased, adding to the tensions caused by guerrilla warfare,
drug trafficking and crime—factors which, undoubtedly, influence foreign
investors’ decisions. On the whole, it is estimated that the GDP for Latin
America and the Caribbean will grow by 0.6% next year, owing particularly
to the Brazilian crisis, versus 2.5% in 1998 and 5% in 1997.
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At the summit of the Americas held in Santiago de Chile in April, the 34
leaders confirmed their wish to give impetus to the setting up of a free
trade area from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. This led, in August, to a rene-
wal of talks in Miami with a view to creating the biggest trade zone in the
world around 2005, though the project will be kept on ice unless the US
Congress gives the go-ahead to Mr Clinton’s demands. Like the trade
unions and other sectors, it fears that such a treaty would have a negative
effect on US workers and companies, who would not be able to compete
with the cheap labour.
But it is thought that what Washington really wants is to transform the
hemisphere into a huge free economic zone, which would entail elimina-
ting the customs tariffs that still protect Latin American productive sectors
and the disappearance of Mercasur, which recently signed an agreement
with the European Union that was not to the United States’ liking.
In 1998, Mexico was shaken by a number of events, including fresh
outbreaks of violence in Chiapas, speculation on the peso with a fall in oil
prices and the end of the political monopoly of the PRI. To make matters
worse, cuts were made in the federal budget in January and many public
projects were cancelled.
The region of Chiapas is rich in timber, petroleum and mineral reserves.
Its proximity to Central America and the total marginalisation of the indi-
genous population make it a strategic enclave whose situation is characte-
rised by a combination of actions of the Zapatist guerrilla and paramilitary
groups, on the one hand, and the strategy of dialogue and negotiation
aimed at seeking peace and the re-establishment of order, on the other.
In view of the EU’s proposal to file a complaint with the WTO, in
January President Clinton once more delayed the entry into force of the
most controversial part of the Helms-Burton Act, promising to reconsider
the sanctions on Cuba if Mr Castro proved willing to respect human rights.
The law continues to be a source of tension between America, the Euro-
pean Union, Japan and Canada.
That same month witnessed an historic event—the visit of Pope John
Paul II to Cuba. Washington monitored the visit closely, while the Spanish
government announced that it would mark a «before» and an «after» and
that neither the visit of President Aznar nor that of the King and Queen
would follow immediately. By and large, Fidel Castro’s speech of welcome
was considered impertinent and inappropriate, as was the false version of
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the Spanish conquest of the Americas he portrayed, since it was not the
occasion either for remembering such events or for addressing the Pope
on the subject of the crusades, the inquisition or Galilee.
John Paul II naturally gave a suitable answer, furthermore criticising the
violation of human rights, asking for the release of political prisoners and
calling on the United States to reconsider the embargo. He reminded Mr
Castro that democracy was the most humane political option, that the
Church did not identify with any culture in particular and that the embargo
was not the island’s only hardship.
Although Spain had opened a cultural centre and appointed a military
attaché, it did not announce the appointment of a new ambassador until
April, thus putting an end to an abnormal situation which had been drag-
ging on for 16 months. After the Pope’s visit, our relations improved, as evi-
denced by Mr Castro’s meeting with a delegation of business people from
the Spanish Confederation of Business Associations; the stopover of the
training ship «Juan Sebastián de Elcano» at Havana from 2-5 June—such
a stopover had not been made since 1953 and Mr Castro even visited the
ship; the visit of the industry minister and the co-operation agreements in
the fields of energy and vocational training; Mr Castro’s meeting with King
Juan Carlos and the president of the government in Oporto during the 8th
Ibero-American Summit and subsequent visit to Madrid, where the recon-
ciliation was confirmed; and, finally, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs’
trip to Cuba to prepare for the visit of the King and President Aznar next
year.
At the 14th San José Conference of Central American Countries in
February, the role of the EU in supporting peace and reconciliation in the
region and fostering democratisation was underlined. Indeed, since 1984,
Brussels has granted the region over 1.5 billion dollars of non-reimbursa-
ble aid. The EU considers that political dialogue is an essential element of
these relations, since, as well as aid and opportunities, these countries
need just as much to find common ground in the issues over which they
are divided. For this reason, the European parliament requested that the
general system of preferences be extended to industrial products, taking
the first step in that direction by allocating aid for that purpose in its bud-
get for 1998. However, after suffering the devastating effects of hurricane
Mitch, the region is facing acute problems, particularly Honduras and
Nicaragua which have asked for their debt to be pardoned and urgent
international aid, since the damage has unfortunately set their develop-
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ment and welfare situation back 30 years.
In Nicaragua, one of the least wealthy countries in the area, tension
with Costa Rica mounted after San José ratified a border treaty with
Colombia recognising Colombia’s sovereignty over the Caribbean islands
of San Andrés and Providencia, which are claimed by Nicaragua; this dis-
pute came on top of another—the issue of navigation rights for the San
Juan River which flows along the border.
As for Panama, the main issue was the future of ownership and Ame-
rican presence in the canal. Since, by virtue of the 1977 Carter-Torrijos
agree-ment, Panama will regain control of the canal in 2000, the evacua-
tion of the US bases will leave 5,000 Panamanians jobless and deprive the
country of $30 million revenue per year. Furthermore, since the country has
no army, it cannot guarantee the security of this sea pass as laid down in
the treaty. In view of this, Washington has planned to set up an internatio-
nal counter-narcotics centre, but without paying any type of rent, even
though it would keep forces in the area. The Panamanian president reac-
ted by stating that he sees no advantages in the continuation of the Ame-
rican presence.
In Colombia the conservative candidate Mr Pastrana came to power
after winning the presidential elections. In his first statements, he offered
to meet the guerrilla and then go immediately to Washington, where he
would establish a new type of relationship.
For some time, the FAR, ELN and ELP had announced their intention
to negotiate a ceasefire, though without binding themselves to any condi-
tions, truces or promises to lay down their arms. Former president Sam-
per conveyed this possibility to our government during his visit to Madrid
in February which led to the signing of the Viana outline agreement a
month later, though it was immediately put on ice.
These contacts were renewed in Mainz as a result of the German and
Colombian Episcopal Conferences and, as expected, in July the paramili-
tary groups opposed to the guerrilla asked to take part in the talks. Alt-
hough more meetings took place in August and October and the ELM
tabled proposals to Congress to call a national convention as required by
the armed group before they will discuss peace, there were new outbre-
aks of violence towards the end of the year and no progress was made.
Indeed, it is thought that both the FARC and the ELN aspire only to conti-
nue to control much of the country.
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Throughout the year Venezuela witnessed growing social malaise
which led to the election of Mr Chávez, who had led a coup in the past, as
president of the nation. This evidenced the serious crisis of the traditional
parties and spread alarm across Latin America, whose democracies had
already seen the rise to power of Messrs Fujimori, Bucaran and Cubas.
In Peru, the peace accord with Ecuador continued to be a permanent
agenda item in talks during the first half of the year. The difficulties lay in Qui-
to’s request for free and sovereign access to the Amazon and in the border
adjustment laid down in the Rio de Janeiro Protocol of 1942. The precise
borders along this 78 km strip of land were never established and in 1995
violent clashes broke out on an alarming scale. The tension heightened
again in August and with it the danger of fresh hostilities. Fortunately, the
matter was settled in autumn, when the two presidents accepted the bor-
ders laid down in the aforementioned protocol, thus putting an end to the
historic dispute. The agreement was signed in Brasilia in the presence of the
King of Spain.
The other issue was related to the possibility—not provided for in the
Constitution—that the current president, Mr Fujimori, might be elected for
a third term in office in 2000. In view of the situation, it was surprising that
Prime Minister Valle Riera, who took up the post in June as an indepen-
dent following what was considered to be a bold decision on the part of
Mr Fujimoro bearing in mind that Mr Riera was a critic of his, announced
in July that the re-election of the president would be decided by referen-
dum and that the army would withdraw from the universities they had
occupied the previous years as a measure to strengthen democracy. He
also threatened to resign if his requests were not granted, which he did in
August once the second crisis with Ecuador had been overcome, having
realised that the president did not back his proposals for democratisation.
Congress eventually rejected the aforementioned referendum after an act
interpreting the 1993 Constitution was amended so as not to take into
consideration Mr Fujimori’s first term from 1990 to 1995.
In Brazil, where President Cardoso was re-elected amid economic
chaos, Spain’s Telefónica was awarded the most important fixed and
mobile telephony companies in the country.
In August, Mr Mahuad became president of Ecuador, while Mr Cubas
came to power in Paraguay. The latter’s decision to release General
Oviedo, responsible for a coup and a close friend, political ally and driving
force behind the president’s rise to power, was condemned by Congress
— 67 —
and gave rise to the comment that «Cubas governs but Oviedo rules». The
leader’s attitude was described as a «legal coup», and an appeal was
made against the decision on the grounds that it was not constitutional. In
December, the supreme court ruled that Oviedo return to prison, though
the president refused to obey the court order.
The struggle for the succession of President Menem dominated the
political scene in Argentina for several months, ending when the president
stood down.
In Chile, lack of support from the Senate prevented the constitution
from being amended to put an end to the influence of the armed forces,
which hold nine seats. But without a doubt, the biggest event of the year
was the arrest of General Pinochet in London at the behest of a Spanish
judge as a preliminary to his extradition. The arrest could, however, com-
plicate and even set back Chile’s transition. Although Britain’s High Court
ruled against extradition, the judicial committee of the House of Lords
decided that General Pinochet should be extradited to Spain and this
decision was ratified by the home secretary. The affair led to new pressure
being brought to bear on London. The outcome will be known in 1999.
Lastly, at the 8th Ibero-American Summit held in Oporto in 1999, sup-
port was given to the talks in Colombia and to the agreement between
Peru and Ecuador, though the event was clouded by General Pinochet’s
arrest.
POWER STRUGGLE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
A major event of the year was Mr Clinton’s tour of a continent to which
the United States had formerly paid little attention. The president visited
Uganda, Rwanda, Botswana, South Africa, Ghana and Senegal, following
in the footsteps of president Carter twenty years ago. The visit was mar-
ked by Congress’s approval of the Growth and Opportunities for Africa
Act, which establishes the possibility of signing advantageous treaties with
28 sub-Saharan countries and extending the free trade zone in the future.
The act will lift the trade barriers on 1,800 products from that continent.
During his visit, Mr Clinton announced his intention to boost imports,
step up technical assistance, offer incentives to US investments, cancel
the bilateral debt of the poorer states and set up an economic forum and
organise annual meetings with leaders, no doubt on realising that Africa
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offers a market of nearly 700 million inhabitants that is still largely unex-
ploited and has a great wealth of resources.
But the visit also had a political and strategic purpose—that of taking
over from France as traditional guardian of much of the continent. France’s
predominance was called into question when it proved incapable of pre-
venting genocide in Rwanda and Burundi and allowed Mobutu and Lis-
souba to remain in power, and was powerless to halt the devaluation of the
African franc. Suffice it to recall Mr Clinton’s statement that a new genera-
tion of Africans are trying to rid themselves of old policies that have not
achieved results, and his efforts to create an Inter-African peace force, or
the gradual establishment of US multinationals in the oil and mineral
industries in Angola, Cameroon, Gabon and Nigeria. Without this change
of roles, which is becoming increasingly pronounced, Mr Kabila’s victory
would have been unthinkable, as would Mr Lissouba’s falling into General
Sassou-Nguesso’s hands with Angolan support, as a chastisement for Mr
Lissouba’s support for the separatists of the enclave of Cabinda, Angola’s
great source of petroleum. However, Mr Clinton did not visit Angola, per-
haps because it was still in the throes of civil war with UNITA, although
Washington is aware that Angola has become an important geopolitical
element in the region.
It was, no doubt, this line of US action that led Mr Chirac to hold the
20th Franco-African summit in December, which was criticised since it
was attended by heads of state such as Mr Kabila, accused of genocide,
pre-cisely at a time when General Pinochet was being tried in London on
the same charges.
The United States currently regards Botswana, Ghana and Mozam-
bique as safe partners, some on account of their economic achievements
and others for their democratic efforts. Also on the list are some French-
speaking countries such as Senegal and Mali, owing to their strategic
importance, and Rwanda following the genocide. The US also has its tra-
ditional allies such as Uganda, whose President Museveni is one of its
main pawns in the area and has considerable influence on the policies of
neighbouring Eritrea and Ethiopia since he contributes to keeping the Isla-
mic regime of Khartoum in check, even though the countries are engaged
in a semi-open war. Of particular importance is South Africa, which Mr
Clinton aims to make a privileged partner, thereby enhancing the Was-
hington-Pretoria axis. Mr Kabila, however, who came to power with the
help of the United States but has proved to hold less democratic attitudes
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than the overthrown president of Zaire, is not included on the list, though
it is not forgotten that the former Zaire has the power to consolidate or
destabilise half of the continent.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE BUILDING OF EUROPE
THE BUILDING OF EUROPE
By JAVIER PARDO DE SANTAYANA Y COLOMA
AN ASSESSMENT OF 1998
1998 was a new milestone in the process of building Europe, in that it
marked the achievement by eleven of the fifteen EU countries of the level
of convergence needed to adopt a single currency on 1 January 1999.
Indeed, so great are the current significance and future potential of the
goal of a single European currency that every step taken in this direction
constitutes an historic landmark. Therefore, 1998, like 1997, will not be the
only year characterised by Europe’s efforts to achieve monetary union.
The importance of the step taken in 1998 has several facets, the first
of which is the crowning achievement of seeing such a large group of
countries rise successfully to the challenge of meeting the demanding
conditions laid down to ensure the feasibility of the project. The results are
significant in that they mark the completion of a stage in the process and
also the common achievement of convergence by Europeans. They are
thus an accomplishment of internal discipline and convergence capacity,
that is, of integration. Beyond our continent, the step taken lends the union
of Europeans considerable credibility and gives rise to reflection on the
possible impact of Europe as a major economic power with a well-defined
status in the world scene. As regards enlargement, the achievement is
timely in that it signifies the consolidation of an essential part of the vast
project of building Europe before new members join. In this respect, it sti-
mulates and strengthens the enlargement process. The presence of the
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Southern European countries—with the sole exception of Greece—among
the founders of the euro is a significant fact which ridicules the arrogance
of some countries of Central and Northern Europe and favours the group
as a whole in that it ensures a healthy balance on the continent.
In view of such a momentous event which, in itself, warrants our con-
sidering 1998 to be an extremely positive year, it seems out of tune to
mention disappointment of any kind. Nonetheless, it has to be said that
the success achieved in the economic sphere was once again clouded by
the scant progress made in the political ambit. The lethargy witnessed in
1997 and reflected in the outcome of the Amsterdam summit continued to
cast a shadow over Cardiff and a good part of 1998. Only towards the end
of the year did there appear to be a reaction to the problem of finding a
solution to the status of the WEU, and even some attention was paid to
finding a possible definition of a common foreign and security policy.
Outsiders have come to regard Europe as an area in decline, perhaps
owing to its rapidly ageing population and scarce demographic growth,
which contrast with the vigour displayed by other players. The adoption of
the euro as single currency and the fall from grace of the so-called «Asian
tigers» and even the ailing Japanese economy will undoubtedly have led
them to reconsider their opinion. Yet the lack of drive in the process of
political union will continue to be perceived outside Europe as a sign of
weakness.
Few criticisms could be levelled at this unhurried pace at which the
process of building Europe is advancing, were it not for two circumstan-
ces. One of these is the scheduled accession of new members, which
makes it advisable to carry on making headway so that the basic problems
referred to in last year’s edition of the Strategic Panorama are basically
resolved before the new problems deriving from enlargement emerge.
Another very important circumstance is the cancer eating away the Bal-
kans; this is seriously hindering the European project and calls for solu-
tions that appeal to our capacity to resolve the problem. The feeling of
urgency that this situation elicits is perceived by public opinion as a sign
of the European Union’s incapacity and could eventually damage the pres-
tige of the institutions and even that of the armed forces. NATO itself could
also suffer the consequences of the evident lack of drive in the European
political scene.
Not until just before year-end was any concrete progress made in
determining once and for all the role and structural position of the Western
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European Union (WEU), in order to ensure that Europe has an instrument
enabling it to take effective action in the field of security and defence with
its own identity, without damaging the Atlantic alliance. Little has been
achieved towards defining a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP-
PESC). The appointment of a «monsieur PESC» could give some impetus
to developing this measure.
The question arises of what could have caused this situation. Owing to
a variety of circumstances, relations between France and Germany—the
countries which have traditionally been «Europe’s driving force»—did not
live up to expectations. On the other hand, it may be the case that fasci-
nation with the euro and the fact that it is attributed the capacity of giving
fresh impetus to European union have led to much of the initiative being
left in its hands. Another possible cause of stagnation that cannot be ruled
out is the easygoing attitude towards the difficulties inevitably posed by
the measures required to achieve true political union. The most likely
explanation is a combination of all the above causes, plus the lack of con-
viction of certain countries. Whatever the case may be, it is clear that the
lack of drive stems from insufficient political will. In the eyes of public opi-
nion, this situation reflects a certain lack of sensitivity of the European
Union towards any issue that is not directly related to the economy.
The informal summit held at Pörtschach at the end of October was
aimed at relaunching some of the projects that had visibly come to a
standstill during the year. It is hoped that the conclusions of the meeting
prove to be more than just good intentions and soon materialise into con-
crete actions, so that the credibility of European’s political will is restored
and progress can be made in the important aspects of foreign policy,
security and defence.
This is precisely what led the Austrian presidency to organise a mee-
ting of the EU defence ministers in Vienna. Strangely enough, a meeting of
this kind had never been held until then. The meeting was significant in its
own right, since it points to the possibility of establishing an institutional
development that already exists in other areas of the EU, without having to
wait for a CFSP to be formulated in order to set it in motion. This was, pre-
cisely, the message Spain conveyed. Talks have thus been opened and
there is every intention of proceeding with them.
No decision was made regarding two proposals tabled by France and
the United Kingdom, respectively, on the role of the WEU in a future secu-
rity and defence «architecture». The two approaches display traditional dif-
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ferences, though France appears more willing than usual to acknowledge
the leading role of NATO. The foreign and defence ministers of the WEU,
who met in Rome only a few days after the meeting of the EU defence
ministers in Vienna, did not adopt a stance regarding either of the two pro-
posals. This was only to be expected, since choosing the UK’s proposal
would entail the disappearance of the WEU, and it would not be logical for
the latter to support its own elimination. Spain, which is in favour of the
WEU becoming the defence pillar of the EU and the European pillar of
NATO, stressed the idea of carrying on with the institutional development
of European defence in the terms set forth in Vienna. The final conclusion
of the Rome meeting was that Europe should not waste the opportunity
afforded by the NATO summit, to be held in Washington in 1999, to fina-
lise the organisation of its defence architecture.
Meanwhile, NATO has continued to forge ahead with its reforms. Dis-
cussion took place throughout the year on the new strategic concept,
which will be submitted to the aforementioned Washington summit. The
studies on the major issues—core and new missions, the NATO mandate
and the structure of the military forces—are currently at a very advanced
stage. The issue of streamlining the 4th level of command was resolved by
doing away with it, and the co-ordination agreement has yet to be develo-
ped between the NATO commands in Europe (SACEUR) and the Atlantic
(SACLANT) on the «Atlantic corridor» between the Iberian peninsula and
the Canary Islands, based on the concepts of supporting-supported and
cross boundaries. The co-ordination agreements between the Spanish
and NATO commands have been adjourned until the new military structure
is established. As for the CJTF, the results of the validation exercises are
being analysed, mainly those of «Strong Resolve», in which Spain played
such an important role.
After pulling out of NATO’s new military structure project, France
remains in a somewhat uncomfortable and confused position, as though it
had lost specific weight. The overall impression is that, owing to circum-
stances that are well-known, our neighbouring country wasted a good
opportunity and would be well-advised later on to seek another chance to
consider joining without paying an excessively high political cost. It
remains to be seen whether the new governments in Germany and Italy
introduce any major changes in those nations’ security and defence poli-
cies, though it is assumed that they will not adopt a very different line.
Special mention should be made of the so-called «neutral» nations,
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which are weighed down by the burden of tradition that is hindering their
possibilities of joining the European security and defence structure. Al-
though they are theoretically closer than the countries of the former War-
saw Pact to the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, the very factors
that in-spire enthusiasm among their eastern neighbours are, for them, a
source of difficulties. Thus Austria, which could be keen to shed the neu-
trality imposed upon it and to join a club as important as NATO, has rejec-
ted possible membership. It is, however, seeking a way of fitting into the
WEU and went as far as promoting the first meeting of EU defence minis-
ters in Vienna.
NATO has made some headway in the Mediterranean Dialogue. It has
already held a course for Generals at its Defense College, which was
attended by representatives of the countries on both sides of the Atlantic.
It became clear during this course that the North African countries basi-
cally have the idea that Brussels deals with money matters and that secu-
rity issues should be referred to in the framework of the Barcelona Pro-
cess. But the process begun in this Spanish city has made little progress.
The EU is coming up against many difficulties. It was expected that the
Peace Process in the Middle East would make dialogue feasible, though
this process came to a grinding halt in 1998. Algeria, Libya and the Middle
East are a major obstacle to that significant initiative bearing fruit in the
near future.
At the end of 1998, one has the impression that the accession dates
for the first wave of European Union applicants are being moved further
away. Talk of the possible dates currently refers to 2006 and 2009 rather
than 2002 or 2003, as initially proposed. To judge by the Commission’s
report, this delay is due to the fact that the candidates are making slower
progress than foreseen; furthermore, the new dates would be better suited
to the requirements of prior institutional reform and to existing concerns
about the burden of funding. Later accession would also make it easier to
solve the problem raised by Spain—which, despite its very positive atti-
tude towards enlargement, does not want it to be financed by the cohe-
sion funds—and Germany, which aims at all costs to reduce its current
contribution.
The Balkan area was rife with conflict during the year. The elections in
Bosnia proved that attitudes have not changed much and that foreign
supervision will be required for a long time. The Kosovo conflict and inci-
dents in Albania show that the area continues to be unstable and point to
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the advisability of taking determined preventive action in the region, as
well as to the need to bring pressure to bear in order to curb the designs
of the new «Saddam Hussein» who defies the international community
from the capital of Serbia.
Lastly, mention should be make of the EU’s participation in the ASEAN
Regional Forum and the renegotiation of the Lomé Convention in Brussels.
Both events evidence incipient efforts by the Union to work gradually
towards establishing a global policy.
THE EURO
The project of European union is based on the establishment not only
of a geographical identity but also, more importantly, a cultural identity, of
which disputes and variety are just some of the characteristics. Indeed, al-
though its history is a succession of internal conflicts and the main distin-
guishing feature of its natural and human geography is precisely its con-
trasts, Europe is aware of its own personality.
A characteristic of this European personality, especially if compared to
that of the United States—which is usually expressed in economic terms—
is that political debate tends to be expressed in social terms in our conti-
nent. It is therefore worth considering why, when giving an institutional
form to its identity, Europe should have opted for a structure based mainly
on economic organisation. This approach seems to indicate that Europe-
ans are aware of the value of the economy as the backbone of society and
as a factor that creates stimulating environmental conditions and genera-
tes initiatives in other spheres.
The lengthy process of economic integration reached a climax when,
on 2 May, the heads of state or government ratified the decision of the EU
Economic and Financial Affairs Council, which had given the go-ahead the
previous day to the list of countries that would join monetary union as of 1
January 1999. This decision will affect trade, investment and the move-
ment of Europeans most directly, though these will no doubt not be the
only areas to benefit from its repercussions.
Only one of the fifteen EU countries did not succeed in meeting the
macroeconomic conditions according to schedule, though it is also true
that in some cases «creative» accounting methods were applied to
achieve the objective. Only Greece failed to meet the criteria, and overw-
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helmingly so, as it did not meet a single one. However, it is hoped that the
recent incorporation of the Greek currency into the European Monetary
System and the effort the government is making to give a boost to its eco-
nomic pro-
grammes will enable it to join the second wave of Monetary Union.
Another three countries have been left outside the euro club, even
though their economies are thriving. Of these, Denmark, whose decision
not to join stemmed from a referendum held in 1993 that reflected, once
again, Danish wariness of European initiatives, later ratified the Treaty of
Amsterdam, also following a referendum. In Sweden, monetary union does
not have the backing of the majority of the population, who attribute the
economic crisis their country suffered in 1992 and 1993 to membership of
the EU. The truth is that Sweden did not expect the convergence opera-
tion to be as successful as it has turned out to be and the requirements it
failed to meet were the adaptation of its national bank to the common
bank and compulsory membership of the European Monetary System. The
situation in the United Kingdom is somewhat ambiguous since, while on
the one hand the country distanced itself from the operation in a gesture
of «euroscepticism», it has also expressed its intention to support the sin-
gle European currency. It is likely that both the United Kingdom and Swe-
den will eventually join Monetary Union towards 2002. The United King-
dom has specifically announced that it will be implementing a programme
of transition towards the euro. Whatever the case, the very nature of
events will make the new European currency imperative, since once it
comes into circulation it will be impossible to avoid using it within the EU.
The aforementioned cases are a good illustration of the difficulties
inherent in the process of European union. Although its flexible develop-
ment is precisely one of the keys to its success to date, one of the lines of
action it should adopt in the future is to endeavour to iron out exceptions,
in order to simplify the European «mosaic». This applies especially to the
field of security and defence.
An outstanding feature of this process is the valour that Europe has
displayed as a whole, which is matched by its confidence in its own pos-
sibilities. Little has been said about the unknown factors and risks to which
the fifteen EU countries are exposing themselves by taking such a revolu-
tion-ary step as adopting a single currency. However, what is clear is that
we can expect a future of work and sacrifice, and that we must be guided
along the path that lies ahead, as Germany has repeatedly stressed, by
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utmost rigour in economic affairs.
Fortunately, the fruits of the efforts made so far have already been
glimpsed, and it seems that the wait is not to be overly feared. The Euro-
pean nations are aware of the benefits they have obtained from obligato-
rily getting their economies into shape. The impact of the Asian crisis and
its repercussions on Latin America, Russia’s chaotic financial situation and
the consequent threat of recession have been lightened by the excellent
state of Europe’s economy. The effort to achieve the convergence criteria
could not have been more timely.
The process of European union is often criticised for lacking a human
dimension. This shortcoming refers to philosophical aspects relating to the
most deeply-rooted identity of Europeans, and also to a concern for social
justice. Spain is particularly sensitive to the latter owing to its high unem-
ployment rate. But the economic consolidation of Europe will also have a
beneficial effect on the jobless situation. The improvement in the European
economies is proving to be one of the keys to boosting employment. Fur-
thermore, the repeated appeals by public opinion to the community aut-
horities to pay more attention to this matter have given rise to different ini-
tiatives. It is gratifying to see that the employment scheme presented by
the Spanish government, together with that of France, has received the
most positive comments from the European Commission, and that Spain
is currently leading the rest of the European economies in creating jobs.
Other particularly important events which took place in 1998 were the
creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the appointment of its
president, as well as the debate on the establishment of measures to co-
ordinate members’ economic policies. The ECB, a key element in the intro-
duction of the euro, will play a leading role, since it will be largely responsi-
ble for giving a direction to European economic policy, mainly in areas such
as price stability and money market operations. It will also issue currency.
The designation of the first ECB president gave rise to a bitter dispute
between France and Germany, ending in the appointment of Mr Duisen-
berg, of the Netherlands. A formula was established whereby he would
hand over to a French president in 2002, thus avoiding the veto threate-
ned by the French prime minister. This regrettable episode proved detri-
mental to the electoral expectations of the German chancellor and
seriously dam-aged the Franco-German axis, in addition to bringing to
light some of the worst facets of traditional political practices.
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The possibility of representing the euro externally at forums such as the
G7 and IMF has been explored by the economic policy-makers of the Ele-
ven with scant success. Some countries believe that the figure of presi-
dent of the ECB is sufficient, while others consider that his presence as
representative would disturb the smooth running of some of these forums
or that the euro should be more geared to economic policy.
Monetary union will underpin Europe’s potential to consolidate the
union process and set new goals, and will shape the personality of a new
economic giant that will compete in second place with the United States.
Eu-rope’s population amounts to 372 million, and its GDP stands at
1.1256 quadrillion pesetas, compared to the United States’ 269 million
inhabitants and GDP of 991.2 trillion. Numerically speaking, Europeans
hold the advantage, though they do not enjoy the compactness afforded
by a highly consolidated political union such as that of the United States,
or the drive of its economy.
THE CARDIFF SUMMIT AND THE INFORMAL SUMMIT 
OF PÖRTSCHACH
The Cardiff summit in June conveyed an image of disagreement and
ineffectiveness. This was hardly surprising, since the two main issues—
funding for 2000-2006 and institutional reform—were postponed.
The meeting took place under the weight of the conditions imposed by
the proximity of the German elections. Mr Kohl, then Chancellor, adopted
a radical stance in favour of «fair return». The economic difficulties trigge-
red by the effort to integrate the former East Germany led the German
Chancellor to raise the issue of debit and credit and to call for a fairer dis-
tribution of the burden which, in his opinion, would be clearly damaging to
his country, since Germany would receive less than what it would obtain
from the system. Germany’s attitude was, from the outset, backed by Aus-
tria, Sweden and the Netherlands. These countries’ position, far from the
spirit of solidarity on which the building of Europe and the Structural and
Cohesion Funds are inspired, led to the introduction of new criteria which
were considerably damaging to the countries that currently benefit from
those funds.
From the beginning of the summit, Spain strove tirelessly to prevent the
adoption of partial decisions that the United Kingdom initially seemed to
favour, stressing that the modifications proposed by Germany would
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penalise the efforts of countries that are still far from achieving real con-
vergence, despite having met the criteria required for monetary union.
Spain proposed adopting a global decision and progressive approach, so
that the wealthiest countries would pay more. The basic problem is the
danger of a shift in the pro-European spirit from solidarity to cost-effecti-
veness, which would furthermore mean a return to nationalisation.
The decision adopted did not solve anything, though it did, at least,
give the countries more time for reflection and dialogue. It was hoped that
once the German elections were over and with Germany holding the EU
presidency, a formula more in keeping with the spirit and letter of the
Union would be arrived at through negotiation. But since the European
elections will take place a week before the summit in which this issue will
be decided, the heads of government will probably want to demonstrate
to voters that their own respective proposals have triumphed. The solution
adopted at Cardiff was to postpone the agreement on funding until March
1999, when a special summit would be held, with a view to finalising a
commitment at the summit in June that year.
At the end of November, as a solution to the issue of funding, the EU
Commission raised the idea of freezing expenditure until 2006, taking the
average of disbursements made between 1993 and 1999 as a ceiling. The
EU countries reacted differently to this idea. Spain rejected the proposal
since, although its government agreed with the principle of rigour, it con-
sidered it unacceptable to freeze expenditure at a level which, apart from
being low, would have to meet the cost of enlargement. Our country would
accept basing the ceiling on 1999 expenditure, provided that the develop-
ment of community policies were guaranteed and that appropriations for
enlargement were not included.
As for institutional reform, the influence of the electoral campaigns in
Germany also led the Chancellor to align himself more closely with the
more euro-sceptical countries, though it was finally agreed to hold an
informal summit in October to set up a group of «personal representatives»
to draw up a specific reform programme that was to be ready by the
Vienna summit in December—that is, in a very short time. This served to
neutralise France’s plan to set up a «comité des sages», which was sus-
pected as being a ploy to bring the former president of the European Com-
mission, Jacques Delors, into the picture.
In can be said that, although the main decisions were left up in the air
—indeed, in some cases precisely because of this—the results of the Car-
— 82 —
diff summit were beneficial to Spain, which wanted Agenda 2000 to be
addressed globally, without partial decisions being made in advance. The
most positive aspects of the summit were that it prevented certain unde-
sirable moves and served to set an agenda that would enable the process
to begin in an orderly manner. Nevertheless, it is worrying that Germany, a
country destined to be European leader, should speak in terms of cost-
effectiveness rather than solidarity and aim for enlargement to be financed
through funds that are transforming the least privileged areas of Europe.
The informal summit at Pörtschach, held at the end of October under
the Austrian presidency, served to gauge the stances of the new German
and Italian heads of government with respect to the major European
issues. In both cases, novel circumstances gave rise to certain doubts. In
the case of Germany, the incorporation of the Greens into the government
raised the question of possible deviations from the line traditionally follo-
wed by Germany. As for Italy, the summit marked the debut of prime minis-
ter D’Alema, a former communist, at an international forum. The Pörtsc-
hach summit proved to be a suitable occasion for both to demonstrate
that the European project is a meeting ground where ideological excesses
give way to common sense and reasonable and effective solutions. The
shared international environment and convergence in a long-term com-
mon task tend to temper and moderate national discourse in the interests
of consensus. In Spain’s view, widespread insistence on the need to fos-
ter a policy of growth, job creation and interest-rate cuts served to confirm
that the line being followed does not differ from the one hitherto advoca-
ted by the Fifteen. Moreover, this concurrence reveals just how far natio-
nal policies are coming closer in their approaches, whatever label the
governments bear. In this regard, the informal summit of Pörtschach sho-
wed that the current European leaders are very much in tune with each
other.
The conclusions of the summit refer to two major groups of issues. On
the one hand, there are the economic questions, some of the most impor-
tant being the appropriateness of cutting interest rates (though this aspect
should not be interpreted as interference in the decisions of the ECB and
the national central banks) and the intention of supporting the economies
of the Latin American countries, which are suffering the impact of the
international financial crisis. On the other hand, they address foreign policy
and security issues, with emphasis on the existing interest in reaching an
agreement over a visible figurehead who will embody European foreign
policy—«Monsieur PESC»—and in instilling some life into the «European
— 83 —
pillar» of defence.
These conclusions would seem to imply that the changes which have
taken place in the governments of some of the most important countries
in Europe not only should not entail a slowing down or change of direction;
rather, on the contrary, they can contribute to giving fresh impetus to some
decisions which, although already taken, had come to a standstill as
regards development. It remains to be seen whether such good intentions
become a reality and whether the more political aspects of the Maastricht
Treaty are indeed relauched.
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Back in the first quarter of 1998 a debate took place on the timescale
and procedure for preparing institutional reform. As mentioned earlier, Pre-
sident Chirac raised the idea of setting up a «comité des sages» with the
supposed goal of boosting the process. The President of the European
Parliament seemed to regard this as an ideal procedure for stepping up the
reform programmes; the European elections in spring 1999 would contri-
bute to overcoming the resistance that proposals for possible thorough
changes have come up against so far. But the French idea addressed the
building of a Europe of States, for which it was necessary to establish
which powers the national governments would keep for themselves. As
already mentioned, many suspected an underlying manoeuvre that in the
end did not come off.
In March, the President of the European Commission announced that
an inter-governmental conference would be held as part of a procedure to
ensure a well-planned institutional reform. From the outset, Mr Santer had
been in favour of adopting a cautious stance, based on experience, and of
allowing time for the Amsterdam Treaty to be ratified. The conference pro-
gramme was prepared by the institutional affairs commissioner and ad-
dressed the four classic topics: votes and vetoes—fair distribution of the
former between large and small countries and abolishment of the latter in
certain areas; definition and development of a common foreign and secu-
rity policy; ensuring the flexibility of directives in order to adapt them more
successfully to the circumstances and characteristics of each nation; and
lastly, perfecting the democratic nature of the European institutions. As
mentioned earlier, the specific decisions taken at the Cardiff summit were
to set up a group of «national representatives» and establish a working
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agenda.
This means that, once more, Europe chose to advance cautiously,
with-out forcing issues, even though this may make many people impa-
tient and risk to an extent the desirable development of some processes.
The conference will be held in 2000, by which time the ratification of the
Treaty of Amsterdam will have been completed. It is to be hoped that,
meanwhile, the appointment of a «Monsieur PESC» will ensure some pro-
gress in the field of common foreign and security policy, particularly after
the impetus it was given at the Pörtschach informal summit, though seve-
ral countries oppose the idea of making this an excessively high-profile
post and would prefer a senior official for the job. This is why the issue,
which in 1997 
seemed to be on the right track, has not yet been solved. What is more, it
remains to be seen whether the figure of «Monsieur PESC» will indeed ever
take shape.
The difficulties of dealing with the establishment of a common foreign
and security policy—an issue which, by nature, is complex—are undenia-
ble, even bearing in mind that in this case the aim is simply to reach con-
sensus on the outlines of this policy in certain areas, and not an exhaus-
tive agreement. Past events evidence a number of achievements in this
connection. For example, what was established at Barcelona was none
other than a common policy for achieving peace and stability in the Medi-
terranean; this was done so successfully that the implications of the resul-
ting decisions even affected the Scandinavian countries’ funding. As for
Kosovo, the European Union defined support for a solution of autonomy
rather than independence as the policy guideline to be followed.
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY
At its May meeting, the Council of Ministers of the Western European
Union issued a declaration (Rhodes Declaration) defining the WEO as an
integral part of «the development» of the European Union, which it affords
operational capacity, particularly in the context of missions such as
Petersberg. This statement about the relationship between the two Euro-
pean institutions, though still far from concrete, does however establish a
close link between them while the definitive status of the WEU is determi-
ned. The Rhodes Declaration addresses the issue of defining a common
defence policy with a similarly pragmatic approach. The EU supports the
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identification of «building blocks», such as aspects of the relationship bet-
ween the civilian and military spheres, already tried and tested in crisis
management, and advocates giving consideration to work that has already
been carried out, which can also be incorporated into the building blocks.
The Declaration praises the headway made in the exchange of classified
information between the two bodies, as well as other achievements of a
practical nature.
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In the military field, Europe is determinedly forging ahead thanks to the
efficiency of its general staff, in what is largely an upstream process, follo-
wing the natural development of the major units which have been created.
EUROFOR, for example, has become aware of its own identity and has
gauged its operational capacity in the «Eolo 98» exercise conducted in the
south of France in June. Thanks to the efforts of General Ortuño, the first
chief, the organisation of this unit is now at an advanced stage. Indeed, its
possible relations with the Eurocorps and NATO’s Allied Command Rapid
Reaction Force are currently being defined and the problems deriving from
force generation are being addressed.
In contrast to the determination witnessed in the military field and the
progress made, the WEU appears to be somewhat resigned to waiting for
circumstances and conditions to arise that are conducive to the decisions
required to rescue it from its current situation of relative inefficiency.
Also, as the Rhodes Declaration states, the WEU has taken on what is,
to an extent, a subsidiary role to that of NATO, since its operational capa-
bility is defined as being particularly in the context of the Petersberg tasks
and conflicts which do not require particular weight. This definition, which
is partly an acknowledgement of the European organisation’s limits, is in
itself an advance in that it comes closer to defining the scope of action of
the WEU. However, a doubt arises as to whether the seemingly slow pace
of the consolidation of the WEU as an integral part of the building of
Europe is living up to the requirements of reality, such as the dramatic
events in the Balkans, with unsettling TV images that have such an impact
on people’s consciences. NATO solves much of the problem, but there a
clear demand for a swifter and more weighty European response to the
conflicts that erupt in our continent.
This concern led the foreign affairs and defence ministers of the WEU
to try to give some impetus to this issue, which requires a definitive solu-
tion before the NATO summit in Washington. The greatest hindrance is Bri-
tain’s insistence that the organisation should be practically dissolved.
Relations between NATO and the WEU have continued to progress in
practical and operational aspects such as, for example, working proce-
dures and consultation concerning the preparation and directing of WEU
operations with NATO resources and capacities. This interesting work,
which provides a practical and concrete contribution to raising the profile
of the European identity within NATO, is due to culminate in a joint crisis-
management exercise in 2000. Similarly, the WEU’s participation in the
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NATO planning process and the WEU’s offer to supply it with information
from its Satellite Centre will help underline the importance of this contri-
bution and the benefits to be derived from it.
One of the facets of the European identity will be its defence industry.
In this regard, 1998 witnessed an important happening: in December 1997
the heads of state and government of France, Germany and the United
Kingdom had signed a declaration, backed by the heads of government of
Italy and Spain, aimed at facilitating the restructuring of the European
defence aerospace and electronics industries. On 20 April 1998, the
defence ministers of those five countries, broadening even further the
scope of that initiative, met to discuss the restructuring of the defence
industry. This meeting gave rise to a letter of intent expressing those same
aims, which was signed in July that year by the same authorities (though
on this occasion the under-secretary of state signed on behalf of the Uni-
ted Kingdom), as well as the Swedish minister. The letter establishes a co-
operation framework in considerable detail. The agreements deriving from
the letter of intent are expected to be finalised between July and Decem-
ber 1999.
Many nations regard these interesting initiatives somewhat cautiously,
fearing that their industries will be suffocated by the high-handed giants.
The latter must realise the need to respect the national interests of all the
countries.
Such is the case of the OCCAR armaments agency, set up in 1996 by
Germany and France and later joined by Italy, the United Kingdom and
Sweden. This agency has become consolidated over time, partly at the
expense of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). The fact
that membership of the OCCAR is subject to acceptance of the conditions
agreed previously by the current members and the suspicion referred to
earlier hinder the incorporation of new countries.
In any event, the idea of setting up a «European Armaments Agency»
as a possible definitive solution met with support at the meeting held by
the WEU in Rome in November, which has been mentioned in previous
paragraphs. The organisational multiplicity gives an idea of the difficulties
found in channelling the problem.
As for governments, these must recognise that the industrial and tech-
nological basis of defence is an asset of strategic importance and provide
a structural and legal framework to facilitate the survival and development
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of the industry, which is currently geared to establishing co-operation pro-
grammes and to a policy of privatisation and mergers.
THE US AND THE PROCESS OF BUILDING EUROPE
1998 witnessed a significant event as regards the United States’ atti-
tude towards our continent: President Clinton’s visit to Berlin in May,
where he defined Europe as a focal point of his foreign policy. The US’s
growing interest in the Pacific basin and the temptation of isolationism,
always present in the American political world, make this public statement
particularly valuable. Washington’s active diplomatic intervention in the
Kosovo conflict and continued military presence in the Balkan region bear
out the validity of the president’s definition.
In reiterating his country’s links with Europe—which is regarded as a
focal point of US foreign policy—president Clinton spoke of four points for
common action: the reform of NATO as the basis for common security, as
the organisation must defend wider frontiers and possess the necessary
means to face new challenges (whether regional or cultural conflicts, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.); enlargement, taking
into account the interests of Russia and Ukraine; increasing the prosperity
of the association with Europe; and the spread of democracy and foste-
ring of global co-operation in its many facets.
Relations between the US and the EU, hindered by the Helms-Burton
and D´Amato-Kennedy acts, were polished and clarified in 1998 thanks to
a skilful manoeuvre by President Clinton, who settled the issue of Europe’s
rejection of these acts without triggering opposition in his own country. As
is common knowledge, Europe does not accept the principle of «extrate-
rritoriality» enshrined in those laws, though it is sensitive to the principle of
defence of human rights on which they are supposedly inspired. The pro-
blem affects other areas of security and defence which merit Europe’s
concern, such as the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass des-
truction. If Europe has undertaken not to allow its enterprises to traffic in
properties confiscated by the Cuban authorities, Europe should also be
obliged to penalise the conduct of countries which could succumb to the
temptation of developing weapons of that type. This concern was height-
ened when India and Pakistan carried out nuclear tests in 1998.
America’s attitude to the creation of a European Monetary Union has
generally been low-key, though this does not mean to say that it welcomes
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EMU with enthusiasm; rather, the opposite is true. A noticeable exception
was when the speaker of the House published an article in the United 
States and the United Kingdom inviting the latter to join NAFTA instead of
European Monetary Union. The line of argument was a summary of the
risks the European adventure could entail, such as those arising from the
fact that this significant undertaking of adopting a single currency has
come at a time when structural reforms have yet to be carried out. It furt-
hermore pointed out that the economic success of the American states
was due to their having unified their currencies, tariffs, etc. when they alre-
ady had a considerable degree of political cohesion. Voices were also rai-
sed in Canada, stating that the United Kingdom has greater affinity with
North America than with the European nations. These ideas, which basi-
cally express an underlying rejection of the consolidation of Europe as a
major world power able to compete with America, contrast with another
more favourable line of thought now emerging on the other side of the
Atlantic, which, perhaps now that European Union and its single currency
are a fait accompli, prefers to point to the benefits.
RUSSIA AND THE BUILDING OF EUROPE
In 1998 some of the more pessimistic hypothesis regarding develop-
ments in Russia’s democratic process were confirmed. It is only fair to
assume that these negative developments did not come as a surprise to
anybody. Unlike most of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, Russian
society has no historical memory of a time of freedom. The mental adjust-
ments and changes of attitude required by democratisation cannot take
place in the space of a few years; rather, they will undoubtedly take seve-
ral generations. Therefore, the fact that as time elapses the situation has
not erupted with an explosion can in itself be regarded as good news. The
huge capacity of the Russian people for enduring hardship is their main
assurance in the long trial that lies ahead of them.
Two events in 1998 revealed just how serious Russia’s situation is. The
government crises not only showed the huge difficulties the country is
coming up against in resolving some very basic problems such as how to
pay its civil servants and soldiers, but also, and particularly, its leaders’
inability to bring the situation even slightly under control and pursue a
determined coherent policy that could lead them to solve the core pro-
blems. The steps taken have reached the point of incoherence and have
revealed the worst aspects of the grave crisis in which the country is
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immersed, such as the survival of old ways of thinking, the spectacle of
the clash between the president and the Duma, self-seeking motivations
of parliamentarians more concerned about holding on to their posts than
for the good of the nation and a chaotic government policy torn between
the overriding need for efficiency so as to free itself from the maelstrom
and the alarming temptation to follow long-established practices.
Another significant event closely linked to the aforementioned govern-
ment crises is the country’s financial crisis, the most regrettable aspect of
which was the way Russia reacted to a such a grave problem. Despite the
widespread interest of the international community in helping it overcome
the situation and the specific efforts of the International Monetary Fund to
support its recovery, Russia reacted disappointingly, coming up with a set
of largely counterproductive measures as the internal solution to the prob-
lem. The situation continued to deteriorate, reaching rock bottom in
August, when the country abandoned the only reform programme that had
proven to be coherent and returned to practices which should by then
have been superseded permanently. The rouble then plummeted to disas-
trous levels, causing a negative impact on the world financial markets,
even though the Russian economy’s influence on them is not as great as
might be supposed. As a result, Russia now faces a new problem on top
of the different crises—the loss of prestige of its institutions.
The practical implications of Russia’s situation for the building of
Europe and the new spirit of international relations advised the European
Union to consider supporting the democratic development of Russia a
priority, though this support was not greeted with the expected response
by the political class of the country, where nostalgia for, and the corruption
of, the times of communism appear to prevail. Under the current circums-
tances, support should be accompanied by a necessarily firm stance
The Russian crisis should to an extent prompt the countries that aspire
to EU membership, whether firm candidates or mere aspirants, to speed
up their preparations. The very nature of the problems Russia is experien-
cing should encourage them to abandon practices and customs inherited
from communism. Furthermore, Russia’s weakness should ease certain
pressure. The country’s current dependence on international attention and
generosity for the stability and progress that are beneficial to, and desired
by, all is leading the Slavic giant to seek a good and fruitful relationship
with Europe and the US in all spheres. The building of political union and
its future security and defence machinery—in itself a difficult task—cannot
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come up against excessive resistance from Russia. This circumstance
should make it easier to establish a system that Europe and the US wish
to build not against Russia, but rather in harmony with it. The fact that
democratisation promises to be a lengthy process makes it likely that the
building of Europe will have progressed substantially by the time it is back
on the right track. In any event, this consideration also calls for a more
determined effort to define the European security and defence identity and
translate it into concrete terms.
Russia’s attitude throughout the conflicts that erupted during the year
was reasonable, bearing in mind that an open and enthusiastic adherence
to US policy on each occasion could hardly be expected, even if only to
keep up its image of major power. It should be stressed that the signing of
a Partnership Charter between the United States and the Baltic States in
January led immediately to the establishment of a military agreement bet-
ween Russia and Belarus. In the dispute between the United States and
Iraq, not to mention Iraq and the United Nations, Russia’s position did not
differ greatly from that of France; it emphasised the need for negotiation,
thus coming out on the «serene and civilised» side and distancing itself
sufficiently from the US without causing a split. As it was, subsequent
events prevented the firmness of its stance—due undoubtedly not only to
a question of principle but also to its own interests—from being put to the
test.
Moscow adopted a similar attitude towards the Kosovo conflict. In this
case, its lack of support for NATO intervention was more unsettling and
contrasted with the co-operation—albeit only to be expected—it has
shown in OSCE operations. Russia’s position in this issue has been in kee-
ping with Moscow’s interest in promoting its apparent role of protector of
Belgrade. This did not prevent it from posting troops to Albania to take
part in the manoeuvres carried out there in August, though the size of this
force made it merely a token gesture.
In any event, the situation in Russia should be of considerable concern
to Europe from the security point of view and logically calls for the need to
keep on the alert. Not even the worst possible scenario—the return to
power of the communists and the subsequent reappearance of old cus-
toms and practices—would make the country a true threat, though it
would pose some risks. But the nation is currently in such a deep depres-
sion that not even in the latter case would the risks be excessively worr-
ying from the military point of view. Moreover, regression would undoub-
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tedly plunge the country into an even deeper recession and a simple return
to the past is unthinkable. Nevertheless the European and «Euro-Atlantic»
political and security institutions must take suitable precautions against
any unpleasant eventuality, while holding out their hands and offering their
support to that great nation.
As things stand, Russia’s nuclear capacity—however much it may have
deteriorated—is all that is preserving its status of major military power. It
does not therefore seem logical to expect Moscow to make many con-
cessions in this area.
CONFLICTS IN EUROPE
Shortly after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, NATO began to point out
the new risks that were emerging from the new strategic situation, many
of which were a logical consequence of the turmoil of the transition period,
when the deterioration of institutions and economic crisis gave rise to
areas of semi-darkness and obscure corners. Some indications of the rea-
lity of these risks, which had erupted in previous years, were witnessed in
1998. Not only cultural or religious risks emerged: the danger of the proli-
feration of weapons of mass destruction, known to experts in security and
defence issues but scarcely perceived by the public at large, made the
headlines when India and Pakistan got involved in a demonstration of their
nuclear capacity by carrying out a series of tests. This led to the re-emer-
gence of the spectre of the threat that had Humanity on tenterhooks for
over forty years and had ostensibly been buried under the rubble of the
famous Berlin wall. But there were other threats that briefly surfaced in the
form of news which, though short-lived, reminded public opinion of the
possibility that we may at some point witness the unpleasant appearance
of some items from the new collection of weapons. The problem of mafias,
international crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
received special attention at the NATO Assembly meeting in Barcelona in
May. When Britain raised the alarm about the possible introduction of
anthrax, the «New Yorker» published an article by a Soviet expert on bio-
logical weapons pointing out just how worrying the diaspora of Russian
scientists can be. This same concern can be applied to the cases of ille-
gal exportation of radioactive substances.
Terrorist attacks on American installations placed the US at the fore-
front of current affairs. Europe took an important institutional step when it
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decided that Europol would also engage in combating this debilitating and
destabilising scourge which is a contradiction in a democratic society and
a source of conflict that can be exported and exploited by certain groups
or nations that wish to undermine the strength of the prosperous, advan-
ced or powerful countries.
For Europe, however, the observation that the peace we long for is still
a distant prospect in today’s world continued to stem mainly from the Bal-
kan region, not only because the Bosnian conflict continues to smoulder
beneath the peace that has been imposed, but also because new fissures
have appeared which reveal the magma of problems lying beneath the
crust of that conflictive area of Europe. The negative influence of this rea-
lity on the building of political union in the continent is a factor that has to
be borne in mind constantly and is a heavy burden to bear—a physical
burden, which drains resources and absorbs a good part of our efforts,
and a moral burden, which damages Europe’s prestige and appeals to our
consciences as Europeans.
The results achieved in Bosnia in 1998 certainly do not measure up to
the objectives, particularly because the elections held there under the
aegis of the OSCE showed that attitudes have scarcely changed. While
the fact that these elections were able to be held and progressed relatively
normally constitutes in itself a quantum leap, the victory of the nationalist
hardliners, although foreseeable, marked a huge disappointment. The out-
come of the polls ruled out the possibility SFOR had been toying with of
reducing the forces posted to the region. Only the continuance of Mr Izet-
begovic and the presence of the moderate Mr Radisic, together with some
a b s e n c e s ,
served to alleviate slightly the fiasco. Neither can it be said that even suf-
ficient progress has been achieved in the return of refugees, despite the
commendable effort made in all aspects by NATO and OSCE and by the
European Union, whose High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, has
made some significant headway, particularly in introducing measures with
considerable symbolic meaning for unification.
Kosovo hit the headlines throughout the year. Since the region’s poten-
tial for instability is well known, it is legitimate to ask why Europe had not
taken suitable measures earlier to prevent the conflict; and some might
interpret the duration of these problems as a sign of inefficiency on the
part of Europeans and even Americans. Some of the shortcomings to
which these effects can be attributed have been mentioned earlier, though
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on this occasion it should be borne in mind that the intervention amounts
to interference in internal affairs for humanitarian reasons. Furthermore,
although the initial reaction was quite swift, diplomatic action was imme-
diately complicated by the adoption of a more radical stance by the Koso-
vars, which translated into guerrilla warfare and weakened the position of
the logical interlocutor, Mr Rugova, who was judged unsuitable by part of
the population owing to his moderate nature. Russia’s opposition to mili-
tary intervention by NATO did not make things any easier. The tenacity of
the alliance, which overcame the loss of credibility triggered by the tempo-
rary halt follow-ing the «Determined Falcon» deterrent operation, even-
tually humbled the Serb president.
From this conflict, and indeed from the crisis in the Gulf in the begin-
ning of the year, an extremely positive and interesting lesson can be infe-
rred: a combination of dialogue and force is effective against fanaticism
and is a formula that is known and accepted by the international commu-
nity. Such were the words of UN Secretary-General Mr Annan following his
success in Iraq. The problem that now needs to be solved is mandate; it
would be desirable for any intervention of this kind to be authorised by the
United Nations, though it is necessary to prevent this important formality
from lead-ing to inefficiency.
An interesting aspect of the Balkan conflict in 1998 is the interaction of
the different security and defence institutions: United Nations, NATO, EU,
WEU and OSCE, all of which played a useful role, each within its own
ambit. The aforementioned conflict thus became a testing ground for what
has come to be called the «European security architecture». It is also ser-
ving to establish a co-operation association with Russia in these affairs,
even though co-operation has been difficult on some occasions.
An event which can be characterised as «historic» was Germany’s
offer, for the first time since the second world war, to provide NATO with
combat forces, with a view to possible military intervention in the Kosovo
conflict. The fact that it was backed by the new German chancellor who
had to team up with the Greens to form a government makes this ges-
ture—which points to a normalisation of Germany’s attitude—even more
significant.
Bosnia and Kosovo were not the only sources of conflict in the Bal-
kans. The rioting in Montenegro and Albania provided fresh evidence of
instability, although preventive action in the latter managed to contain the
conflict within certain limits. It is a well-known fact that the EU allocates
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substantial resources to the reconstruction of the country, where the
MAPE (Multinational Advisory Policy Element) is based. OSCE has joined
in this effort, performing its characteristic functions, as have other nations
through bilateral arrangements. NATO backs the reorganisation of the
Albanian armed forces under democratic control.
The Balkan region will no doubt cause Europe many more headaches.
Isolation of conflicts to prevent them spreading will continue to be a poli-
tical priority. The healing of the wounds inflicted by the surgeon’s knife and
recovery will be long, painful processes. The area would stand to gain con-
siderably from the establishment of a European common foreign policy.
Beyond the Balkan region the situation has improved. The countries
which aspire to membership of European or «Euro-Atlantic» institutions
have continued to strive to become deserving applicants, weeding out the
causes of possible future conflicts. Suffice it to cite as an example the his-
toric visit made by the Romanian president to Hungary in January, in a spi-
rit of reconciliation, and the agreement between Hungary and Slovakia to
put an end to the dispute which had dragged on for fifteen years over the
Danube. Another positive event of 1998 which deserves special mention is
the peaceful settlement of the problem of Northern Ireland. And the han-
ding over of East Slavonia to Croatia, political changes in Malta and Slo-
vakia, and the outcome of the referendum in Latvia boosted these coun-
tries’ accession possibilities. However, relations between Turkey and the
EU remained stagnant in the same situation described in last year’s Stra-
tegic Panorama.
SPAIN’S STRATEGIC YEAR IN THE FRAMEWORK 
OF BUILDING EUROPE
Although it may sound clichéd, the year could well be described as his-
toric. The celebration of the hundredth anniversary of 1898 and the fourth
centenary of the death of king Philip II provided some interesting impres-
sions with which to gauge the tone of Spain and the concept we Spaniards
have of ourselves a century after losing the last colonies of our empire and
with the new millennium just around the corner. The mood is one of opti-
mism, of greater confidence in our possibilities and also willingness to take
on the role and related responsibilities that fall to our nation. This seems
to be the aftertaste of the rehabilitation of the figure of Philip II, which can
be interpreted as the consequence of Spain’s determination to shake off,
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simply with the truth of history, the ominous presence of the Black Legend.
One has a similar impression from the strong Spanish presence in Latin
America a century after the famous events. This presence—characterised
by a modernity which makes the traditional reproaches that Spain’s rela-
tionship with Latin America is mere rhetoric a thing of the past—is backed
by concrete, practical, expressive and comforting data such as the fact
that Spain has become the leading European investor in Mercosur and,
what is more, in significant industries such as energy, banking, construc-
tion and telephony. Latin America accounted for 52.5% of Spain’s total
foreign investments in 1997.
In Europe, Spain regards its inclusion among the group of countries
that met the demanding requirements of monetary union as having arrived
on time, thus breaking with the deep-rooted tradition of nearly always
being a latecomer to progress or joining in a particular or different way. In
addition to scoring a brilliant achievement on this occasion, even faring
better than several of the European heavyweights, Spain secured the
added prestige of having demonstrated a notable level of development
and capacity to undertake ventures which require vitality, organisation,
discipline and rigour. Our nation therefore won the deserved respect of the
international community and is currently among the lead group.
The historic moment of convergence cannot and must not be regarded
merely as the attainment of a goal, but above all as a good point of depar-
ture for accomplishing a task: that of stabilising and making customary a
set of economic parameters which should become consolidated in the
future. This means that the hardest part is yet to be done, and we should
therefore not let up. What has been achieved is a good starting point ra-
ther than a goal.
Perhaps the importance of the European project for our country’s sta-
bility is not sufficiently valued. Inconstancy and see-sawing will no longer
be possible in economic policy. The objectives are known and the met-
hods, in order to be considered appropriate, must be aimed at achieving
them. The experience gained and the successes achieved will rule out pro-
cedures that are utopian, revolutionary or opposed to those which reaped
such good results.
1998 witnessed a number of internal EU battles in which Spain defen-
ded its interests tenaciously. Its reaction to some of the «rich» countries’
plans to renationalise funding has been dealt with earlier. As regards farm-
ing, an area which is losing economic importance yet provokes a special
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sensitivity among the population, the problem of olive oil subsidies was
debated. Although the formula finally agreed on did not fully satisfy Spain’s
desideratum, it was much nearer to the latter than the European commis-
sioner’s initial proposal. Our government’s protests to the EU and to the
French government about French attacks on Spanish lorry drivers—anot-
her problem with particular impact on Spanish public opinion—brought
about radical changes in the situation during the year. By and large, al-
though it might seem that conflicts of this kind show the EU in an unfa-
vourable light, they do not outweigh the huge benefits the Union affords.
Suffice it to recall the situation of the Spanish olive groves before we joi-
ned the European Community or the progress made in infrastructure. It is
thus not surprising that Spaniards are among the most ardent supporters
of the introduction of the euro as single European currency. Nonetheless,
we will have to come to terms with the idea that it will be necessary to
accept some degree of national co-financing of farming subsidies given
the difficulties of raising more than the current ceiling of 1.27% of GDP and
the accession of new EU members.
Spanish territory continues to be of strategic interest both currently and
vis-à-vis new army missions. This was evidenced by the US request—well
received by the Spanish government in principle—for nuclear-powered
vessels to be authorised to dock at the port of Tarragona. Further proof is
America’s interest in strengthening the base at Rota, which plays an
important role within the NATO alliance, unlike the Gibraltar base which
now has practically no military significance. 
In the sphere of foreign policy, Spanish politicians, military and diplo-
mats have acquired considerable prestige, while our businessmen and
scientists are going from strength to strength. Spaniards continued to be
appointed to international posts involving great responsibility. The exce-
llent results of the convergence effort enabled a Spanish economist to be
included among the few board members of the European Central Bank. All
the surveys carried out in 1998 reveal the Spanish population’s growing
aware ness of Spain’s increasingly important role in the international
scene.
The vitality the polls reveal is reflected in the degree of initiative that
can be observed on that same scene. In striving to protect Spain’s natio-
nal interests, our representatives proposed a general, constructive for-
mula, seek-ing fairer solutions to the future funding of the EU, including
elements of progressivity. The European Parliament’s rejection on 19
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November of Germany’s attempt to withdraw the Cohesion Funds from
the countries that achieve Monetary Union backed Spain’s position consi-
derably. Our nation reacted promptly to the financial crisis, proposing a
global response to the International Monetary Fund, the European Union
and the United States, and provided an example of solidarity by increasing
its contribution to the IMF by 3 billion dollars to cope with emergency
situations. However, Spain was particularly belligerent and played a truly
leading role in bolstering the economies of the Latin American countries.
It proposed that the G7 set up a fund to support the economic stability of
those countries. At the Pörts-chach summit, in addition to proposing that
a special summit on terrorism and organised crime by held in Madrid in
1999, it promoted the idea of exercising solidarity with Latin America to
prevent it being affected by the international financial crisis. The Spanish
proposal, which was crowned with success, served to cause Europe´s
interest in that region to become evident. But above all Spain’s role should
be stressed as champion among the EU countries of the initiative of eco-
nomic aid to the Central American countries affected by hurricane Mitch
and the proposal of condonation or relief of their external debt. These
interventions were backed morally by the Spanish government’s decision
to contribute 27.5 billion pesetas, including the condonation of 8.43 billion
pesetas in debt until 2001. This measure is in line with the rapid and gene-
rous reaction of the Spanish people, who once more showed signs of their
sensitivity and deep sense of solidarity. This energetic effort, which inclu-
ded an interesting military contribution and was embodied by the pre-
sence of the Prince of Asturias accompanied by the deputy president of
the government in the disaster-stricken area, is also proof of the vitality
and sense of history of Spanish people as a whole.
The proposal regarding Gibraltar, which evidences Spain’s ongoing
determination to settle the dispute with the United Kingdom, deserves
special mention. The anachronistic nature of the situation—the survival of
a colony on Spanish territory—is even more striking and surprising at the
turn of the century and bearing in mind that the two countries, Spain and
Britain, are allies. It is even odd that the situation of Gibraltar and the
regrettable episodes that characterise the history of the colony, such as
the artful appropriation of the isthmus, should not cause Britain’s cultured
society to blush now that the 21st century is just around the corner and
Europe is on the way to achieving political union. 
Spain proved that it has good reflexes in the conflicts that flared in our
continent in 1998. It likewise displayed a sensible attitude during the Gulf
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crisis at the beginning of the year. The successful outcome of the episode
for the United Nations Secretary-General bore out the appropriateness of
Spain’s formula of solidarity with the allies combined with faith in the pos-
sibility of a solution proposed by the international organisation. In the
Kosovo conflict, our nation did not hesitate to advocate a combination of
diplomacy and force. Spanish aircraft played a major role in the aerial
demonstration «Determined Falcon» and a marine infantry company took
part in the NATO manoeuvres carried out in Albania in August. The interna-
tional contingent charged with the task of ensuring that Serbia complies
with the conditions imposed on it will include a group of Spanish obser-
vers. When the possibility of an intervention in Kosovo arose, Spain offe-
red to provide four F-18s and a C-130. However, it did not go along with
the United Nations’ request for blue helmets for Lebanon. This decision,
seemingly out of keeping with the interest the president of the government
showed in the problems of that area during his visit to Israel, was justified
by the fact that it coincided with the Kosovo crisis, which could eventually
require ground forces to be sent.
As for Bosnia, in June the Spanish council of ministers extended
Spain’s participation in SFOR for a further twelve months. Spain continues
to achieve high levels of military efficiency and performance in these exter-
nal operations.
Spain’s offer to NATO’s Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) to head
a Multinational Division to which it would supply a Brigade is being put on
hold until the organisation embarks on the restructuring of its forces once
that of its command headquarters has been completed. NATO took note
of this offer and will bear it in mind when designing these new forces.
Spain’s announced entry into the NAEW (NATO Airborne Early Warning)
force came at the end of the year through an agreement of the Spanish
council of ministers. In 1998 the country contributed to the cost of opera-
tions, maintenance and modernisation of that force, establishing its pre-
sence though a contribution of some 50 officers and NCOs. It is assumed
that this contribution to the NAEW will be conducive to the establishment
of orbits over our territory in the event of a crisis in north Africa and is
therefore an interesting deterrent and support element.
Work to form the Southeast Subregional Command in Retamares
(Madrid) continued in 1998. The difficulties concerning the funding of the
infrastructure that arose from Greece’s and Turkey’s failure to agree on the
capacity package of the Southern command structure were overcome by
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Spain’s determination to forge ahead with this programme, which currently
looks set to be completed according to schedule. The draft of the terms
of reference has been prepared and the Spanish lieutenant general
appointed in charge. The strong international demand for sending person-
nel to this command headquarters reflects our allies’ interest in this com-
mand.
Considerable headway was also made in 1998 in co-ordinating the
Manoeuvre Force. The efforts to reorganise the army, which have been
tirelessly pursued since the beginning of the eighties, enabled lost time
to be made up for and, in some aspects, even spurred Spain to adopt
fairly advanced positions; this is quite an achievement bearing in mind
the many difficulties stemming from the budgetary constraint that has
affect-ed the armed forces in recent years. One of the tasks carried out
by the armed forces in 1998 was to define and negotiate the posts to be
held by Spanish commanders at the NATO command headquarters.
Some of the most recent legal requirements will facilitate this operation
owing to their flexibility and clarification of international equalisation. As
we approach year end, the possibility remains of endowing the Spanish-
based Subregional Command with a certain level of CJTF capacity. This
possibility stems from the advisability of balancing response capacities
in the South-ern Region, as there is a noticeable lower command den-
sity in the west-ern part.
The Spanish-Italian agreement to organise a multinational amphibious
force between the two countries has been brought to fruition, coming into
force in Barcelona on 23 November. Spain, France and Italy, whose spe-
cial concern about the Mediterranean has given rise to different units and
a variety of initiatives (in which Portugal, now a member of EUROFOR, will
be taking part) are now joined by Germany, which has shown an interest
in the area.
Of the exercises in which Spain participated in 1998, special men-
tion should be given to «Strong Resolve», since it was conducted in our
country, and also on account of its size (it is the biggest exercise NATO
has carried out to date), importance in validating the CJTF concept 
and because once again it reaffirmed Spain’s Host Nation Support
capacity.
This year the ministry of defence decided to integrate higher military
education, which will be provided at the centre for national defence stu-
dies (CESEDEN). The coming courses will incorporate the new formula.
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CHAPTER THREE
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
By RICARDO ÁLVAREZ-MALDONADO MUELA
INTRODUCTION. FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY
For reasons stated in the 1997-1998 edition of this «Strategic Pano-
rama» it is considered that Central Europe comprises Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania, while Eastern Europe
encompasses all the European republics of the former Soviet Republic—
including Russia, naturally.
Owing to its geopolitical importance, most of this article must neces-
sarily be devoted to the Russian Federation, particularly since its current
internal instability is a risk factor with worldwide implications and calls for
an in-depth analysis of the situation in 1998. And as European Russia can-
not be dissociated from the rest of the Russian Federation, we must con-
sider this vast country as a whole, although a good part of it stretches into
Asia.
CENTRAL EUROPE
As mentioned above, this region is defined as the four Visegrad coun-
tries—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia—and also Slo-
venia and Romania, even though geographically speaking they are predo-
minately Balkan states.
This mosaic of states inhabited by heterogeneous populations is set
inside artificial borders that enclose minorities from neighbouring states.
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This situation has given rise in the past to grievances, some of which have
not yet healed.
The disorientation caused by the series of surprising changes which
begun in 1990 led all these countries to branch out in different directions
until they finally decided that their future lay to the West. The return to
Europe, of which they felt themselves to be a substantial part, separated
only by the vicissitudes of recent history, was the slogan launched by their
political leaders. The radical change of situation was conducive to the re-
encounter of the divided Europes and, as a corollary, eastward enlarge-
ment of the European geopolitical area.
All these countries set their sights on Europe’s most consolidated insti-
tutions—the European Union, and the Atlantic alliance with its European
pillar and American backing.
In the first, they seek a solution to their economic problems and in the
second sound guarantees of their security, apart from the political advan-
tages belonging to both organisations entails.
These are the chief foreign-policy objectives of all the countries and as
such have priority over historical claims.
The condition of «good neighbourly relations», required both by NATO
and the EU of their members, has prompted adjacent nations to sign a
series of treaties and bilateral agreements aimed at settling pending dis-
putes over borders and minorities.
Despite this, the problems have not yet been solved—not even in Transyl-
vania which has l.7 million inhabitants of Hungarian origin, or in Slovakia
where 600,000 live. Slovakia has yet to enact the laws protecting the Magyar
minority as laid down in the treaty signed with Hungary. In Transylvania, Hun-
garians and Romanians are on the defensive and regard each other with sus-
picion. The city of Cluj, whose Magyar university remains closed in order to
prevent conflicts, is a sensitive issue which causes clashes between the two.
While official relations between Bucharest and Budapest are «better
than ever», and it has been decided to build a motorway linking the two
cities, there continues to be tension among the people. Romanian natio-
nalists complain that the government is fostering the «magyarisation» of
Transylvania by allowing bilingual signposts.
All the Central European nations are currently parliamentary democra-
cies with a variety of parties that run the full political spectrum—a situation
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which generally makes for coalition governments. Communist parties with
a more moderate ideology and political leaders from the former regime
persist in almost all of them.
The establishment of a true democracy is coming up against most
resistance in Slovakia. In May 1998 prime minister Vladimir Meciar cance-
lled the referendum called to elect a president of the republic and decla-
red himself head of state. Mr Meciar is a former communist who has con-
verted to radical nationalism. A question mark continues to hang over
Slovakia’s candidacy for both the EU and NATO, since the country does
not acknowledge certain rights of the opposition and, as mentioned ear-
lier, has yet to apply the laws laying down respect for minorities. Mr
Meciar’s opponents won the legislative elections held in September 1998,
which could mean a shift to a policy that is more acceptable to the West.
The following political events are also worthy of mention:
The government crisis which erupted in Romania in March 1998 lasted
for three months. It caused a negative impact on the country’s economy
and conveyed a counterproductive image of instability to the outside
world.
The prime minister of the Czech Republic was forced to resign in
November 1997 owing to a scandal over illegal financing.
Poland approved its first constitution as a democracy. Although the
constitution takes into account the weight and influence of the Roman Ca-
tholic Church, the latter is not satisfied about the ambiguous treatment of
abortion. The Polish clergy do not seem to find the non-denominational
democratic regime to their liking. In this connection it is worth considering
the work of the Polish Pope John Paul II who, from behind the scenes, 
played a major part in Poland’s rapprochement with the West and used his
influence to overthrow the communist regime.
Following the election of president Milan Lucan in November 1997,
democracy in Slovenia is continuing to become consolidated, though
with-out a sound economy to underpin it, the political stability of a demo-
cratic regime is difficult to maintain.
From 1985 to 1995 the GDP of all these countries except Poland fell
steadily. Economic recovery began six years after the start of the transition
from a state-controlled to a free-market system. The cost of this process
has mainly been borne by workers and civil servants, who now feel disap-
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pointed and yearn in part for the previous regime. The loans granted by the
IMF and the World Bank to some of these countries have imposed an eco-
nomic discipline that is stoically endured by the impoverished populations,
who find some relief in parallel economic activities.
The most thriving nations are Slovenia, whose per capita income in
1997 was slightly lower than that of Greece, and the Czech Republic.
However, the latter recorded a slow-down in 1998.
The weakest economies are Romania and Slovakia. All the other coun-
tries had higher per capita incomes than Russia in 1997. Even so, Slova-
kia has proved that it is economically viable as a new state separate from
the Czech Republic.
Central Europe’s main supplier and customer is the EU and, of the
member states, the Federal Republic of Germany. Russia is its main sup-
plier of energy resources.
The Czech Republic joined the OECD in 1995 and Poland and Hungary
followed suit in 1996. This is interpreted as recognition that their econo-
mies are in good shape, although the Russian crisis of summer 1998 could
slow down their progress.
All the countries except Hungary earmarked over 2% of their GDP to
defence. A higher percentage will be required for the countries to update
their military equipment—which is mostly Soviet-produced—and those
who join NATO will need to make it compatible with that of their future
allies.
According to the results of referendums and opinion polls, the goal of
NATO membership, fervently pursued by almost all the region’s political
leaders, does not arouse much enthusiasm among the people of some
Central European nations, mainly the Czech Republic. They show more
support for accession to the EU, where their representatives have been
able to express their opinions at the Council of Ministers since 1994
though they are not entitled to vote.
The future accession of all these countries to both NATO and the EU
will be analysed in detail later on.
THE BALTIC STATES
In 1998 Estonia’s and Lithuania’s border problems with Russia remained
unsettled, as did those of the Russian minorities living in those countries.
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Serious problems arose in Latvia over the naturalisation of the Russian
minority (who no longer have Russian passports) since, in order to be
granted Latvian citizenship, it is necessary to master the Latvian lan-
guage—a requisite which prevented 700,000 inhabitants (28% or so of the
population) of Russian origin from obtaining that nationality. The referen-
dum held in October 1998 in favour of integrating the Russian minority
marked a step towards a solution.
By 1996 the three countries were on the road to economic recovery,
particularly Estonia whose performance greatly satisfied the IMF as its
GDP grew over 3% while inflation fell. These results led Estonia to be
included in the first group of six applicants to begin membership nego-
tiations.
Estonia’s main customers and suppliers are the EU and Finland. The
EU, and particularly Germany, are those of the other two. Russia takes
third place overall with a much lower volume of trade.
The three republics rejected a Russian security model in exchange for
relinquishing NATO membership. Although the organisation claims that
they would have to settle once and for all the problems of borders and
Russian minorities in order to qualify for membership, it in fact is hesita-
ting over the advisability of expanding as far as the Gulf of Finland.
On 16 February 1998 the three presidents of the Baltic republics sig-
ned a Partnership Charter with the USA in Washington. Although this
document does not contain explicit military guarantees, it does support
these three states’ candidacy for joining NATO and establishes the setting
up of a «Defence Council», in addition to other political and economic
bodies.
Since only two of the sixteen allies currently support the applications
of the three countries, the «Partnership Charter» is merely a substitute for
membership, however much «these countries’ concern about Russia and
their legitimate wish to join western institutions» are understandable.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)
Of the twelve states which make up the CIS, only four are located in
Eastern Europe—Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia, although three
quarters of Russian territory are in Asia.
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The three Slavic states—Russia, Ukraine and Belarus—share the same
ethnic group, culture and history, a fact which makes their people more
inclined than the rest of the CIS to support a project for a shared future.
This is particularly the case of Russia and Belarus.
Ukraine is divided among Russians and pro-Russians on the one hand,
and nationalist western Ukrainians on the other. In Ukraine, homing ins-
tinct towards big brother Russia is offset by the attraction of the West and
this balance prevents the state being torn into two.
Russia, in its role of big brother, astutely brandishes its energy resour-
ces to lure the two smaller states towards it.
Moldova, formerly part of Romania and with a Romanian majority, is
hesitating over whether to return to the mother country. Such a move is
strongly opposed by its pro-Russian population and by the Ukrainians of
Transdniester.
The five Central Asian countries, the former Russian Turkistan and the
three Transcaucasian republics will be dealt with later on when the Rus-
sian Federation’s foreign policy is analysed.
In the CIS, outside Russia, there are some twenty five million Russians
—the so-called «red-feet». Russian culture and the Russian language
dominate the commonwealth. Migrations of Russians to Russia mainly
from Central Asia have recently been detected.
The economic situation of the CIS is as critical as that of Russia which
is attempting, with varying success, to hold on to its influence. Russia’s
objectives in what is termed the «near abroad» will be addressed in grea-
ter depth later on.
Ukraine
This country, which has the biggest area and population of the CIS
after Russia and Kazakhstan, has managed to settle its differences with
the former, including the thorny issue of the sovereignty of Crimea, as well
as reach-ing favourable economic agreements.
Since Ukraine gained its independence, its GDP has fallen by an ave-
rage of 10% annually. Its per capita income is well below that of Russia,
al-though the World Bank reckons that the statistics do not take into
account a very high percentage of its real GDP.
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The existence of a hidden economy and the fact that surplus state
employees are continuing to receive a salary explain to an extent the lack
of serious social tension, although the miners of the Donets Coal Basin,
whom the government is usually late in paying, have staged a series of 
strikes. In 1996, Ukraine’s economic policy appeared to conform to the
IMF’s recommendations, though Pavel Lazarenko, then prime minister,
who was forced to resign in July 1997, gradually switched to slower, less
drastic measures and halted privatisation.
Russia’s economic influence in Ukraine is mainly evidenced by the acti-
vity of the powerful Gazprom which controls no less than 25% of world
gas production and exports to Ukraine, where it has government support.
In addition, many of the oil and gas pipelines which supply Central Europe
run through Ukraine.
Ukraine’s political regime is markedly presidentialist. The president of
the republic, Leonid Kuchtman, has progressively strengthened his power,
and has the foreign, defence, interior and information ministers under his
personal sway.
The communist party won the most votes in the legislative elections in
May 1998, with the result that the current parliament is much more left-
wing than the previous one.
By and large, Ukrainians believe that the IMF-imposed reforms could
rescue the country from its plight in the long term, but in the short term
only bring hardship and suffering to the neediest. Hence the result of the
latest elections.
1997 was a particularly hard year for Ukraine’s economy and the
results of 1998 could be even worse. In September 1998, the IMF lent
Ukraine $2 billion to help it fend off the financial problems Russia faced the
previous month.
The Ukrainian government recently announced it was starting up a new
programme to get its ailing economy back into shape. As on other occa-
sions, whether or not it is properly implemented will depend on how the
people accept its societal costs.
Belarus
The strong man in Belarus is Alexander Lukashenka, president elect since
1994. Two years later, through a referendum which the opposition criticised
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as being antidemocratic, Mr Lukashenka managed to amend the Constitu-
tion so as to grant himself wider powers and thus extend his mandate until
2001. The Supreme Soviet was replaced by the House of Representatives,
the seats of which were largely occupied by those who had not opposed the
president’s designs. An authoritarian, Mr Lukashenka has not hesitated to
use the police expeditiously to crush anti-government demonstrations.
Mr Lukashenka aspires to reunite Belarus and Russia. The first step
was to set up the so-called «Union of Sovereign Republics of Russia and
Belarus», followed by bilateral agreements which strengthened even fur-
ther the ties between these two CIS states.
Mr Lukashenka heads the customs union that has grouped together
Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan since March 1996.
Of all the CIS members, Belarus is the only one whose GDP has shown
a slight growth over the past two years. It also has the lowest unemploy-
ment rate and its per capita income in 1997 was similar to Russia’s, hig-
her than that of all the CIS countries. Since Russia is Belarus’s main sup-
plier and customer, the Russian crisis of summer 1998 will undoubtedly
have had a negative impact—yet to be evaluated—on its economy. 
Boris Yeltsin and Alexander Lukashenka responded to the «Partnership
Charter» signed in Washington by the USA and the three former soviet Bal-
tic republics by meeting in Moscow to agree on the beginnings of a com-
mon military policy and organisation of Russian-Belarussian defence in the
event of external aggression. Belarus is the CIS country nearest the Rus-
sian enclave of Kaliningrad, where Russia has a military presence.
Moldova
In the December 1996 elections the pro-West candidate was defeated
by the current president of the republic, Petru Lucinski, a renowned Rus-
sian speaker.
After the problem of the secessionist republic of Transdniester was set-
tled, relations between the latter and the rest of the country returned to
normal, and Moldova was left with its 1990 borders. 
In the economic sphere, hopes of recovery have faded: Moldova’s GDP
has slumped, its standard of living has fallen and unemployment has risen.
Given Moldova’s dependence on Russia and its Russophile ruling
class, only the unlikely event of Ukraine’s withdrawal from the CIS and rap-
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prochement with the West could drag Moldova in this direction.
Moreover, in the legislative elections in March 1988 the most votes
were polled by the communists, followed by the Democratic Convention,
which advocates a pro-Russian independent sovereign state.
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Makeup and political organisation
Although it is called a «federation», the Russian state governed by the
1993 Constitution is not strictly speaking a federal political unit since its 89
autonomous units (republics, territories, regions and districts) do not have
the same powers and also vary greatly in size, wealth and population.
Of its population, 80% belong to the Russian ethnic group and 20%
are of varying origin. The net demographic balance of the Russians is
negative, despite the return of many from states belonging to the former
Soviet Union.
The differences in wealth between the different federal entities are vast.
The GDP of Dagestan, the poorest republic, is seven times smaller than
that of the oil-producing region of Tyumen. Many of the republics that are
rich in raw materials are reluctant to help those that lack them.
Owing to the shortcomings of the road network, the least accessible
regions are becoming increasingly marginalised. This is particularly the
case of the Far East, where poverty is largely due to isolation. Central
government, much weakened since the dismantling of the USSR, is pro-
ving incapable of correcting the regional imbalances.
The bad example provided by the break-up of the USSR has streng-
thened the centrifugal forces at work in the Russian Federation since it
came into being. A centralist tendency has recently emerged as a reaction.
The autonomous entities have been granted different powers in tax
matters. Of the 89, twenty or so have different economic arrangements
with Moscow whereby they are allowed to withhold and levy taxes. This
gives them greater political clout and hinders the collection of federal
taxes.
The economic crisis of August 1998 was followed by a change of
government, with the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov as prime minister.
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The new premier denounced the «economic separatism» of the regional
governors who had adopted measures that did not comply with federal
laws, such as refusing to pay the taxes owed to the central government.
Mr Primakov even asked the Duma to enact a law enabling regional aut-
horities who defy federal legislation to be dismissed. Many governors
replied that, instead of threatening with coercive measures, what the fede-
ral government needed to do was take coherent action to put an end to
the crisis and prevent taxpayers’ money being squandered by corrupt civil
servants in Moscow; since this was not the case, they were duty bound to
ensure their fellow citizens’ survival.
Unlike the Soviet constitution, the 1993 Russian constitution does not
grant the autonomous entities the right to self-determination and, there-
fore, secession. Hence the importance as a precedent of the definitive
solution to the dispute over Chechnya, which has harboured an inextin-
guishable desire for independence for many years. As is well-known, the
solution has been postponed until 2001.
Chechnya’s current president elect, Asian Masjadov, who signed the
armistice in 1996 as representative of the Chechen rebel army, displays an
increasingly conciliatory stance, though he is under pressure from guerri-
lla leader Shamil Bassev. However, all Chechen politicians with high-ran-
king posts are conditioned by the inescapable need to rebuild their
country from the rubble and their only salvation is to exploit the pipeline
which conveys oil from the Caspian to the Black Sea across Chechnya.
The Chechen company Yunko has a hand in the business, together with
the Russian oil companies.
Moscow is confident of being able to wield sufficient economic pres-
sure to dissuade the Chechen governors from obtaining independence
and make them settle for wide autonomy within the constitutional frame-
work of the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, a security zone has been set
up at the border to prevent guerrilla groups from operating in, or influen-
cing, the nor-thern Caucasus, particularly Dagestan, which has a Chechen
minority. Law and order in Chechnya itself is disrupted by radical Islamic
groups such as the one which attempted to assassinate President Masja-
kov in July 1998. The president was miraculously unharmed.
A new threat of separatism emerged in November 1998 in the republic
of Kalmykia, whose President Kirsan Iliumjinov stated he was in favour of
«partial» separation from the Russian federation, making Kalmykia a «part-
ner member». Mr Iliumjinov claims that Kalmakyia has already ceased de
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facto to be part of the Russian Federation, since it has not received its allo-
cations from the federal budget for many months.
The so-called «economic separatism» of the most prosperous regions
of the Federation is one of the main problems Mr Primakov faces.
Internal situation
The political, economic and social situation of the Russian Federation
did not improve in 1998. On the contrary, the hopes of a «moderate» eco-
nomic upswing were dashed. This was mainly due to two external factors,
apart from internal causes—the financial turmoil in Asia and the fall in
hydrocarbon prices. In late 1997 the IMF predicted the beginning of Rus-
sia’s economic recovery. This forecast turned out to be wide off the mark.
It could be said that the political year in Russia began on 19 January
1998 when Boris Yeltsin returned to his Kremlin office after forty days’
absence due, once again, to health reasons. As on previous occasions,
the President of the Russian Federation did not resign his powers as laid
down by the Constitution, but took with him his briefcase containing the
keys to the «nuclear trigger».
Having returned to the political arena, he promptly chastised his prime
minister Viktor Chernomyrdin for the government’s failure to keep its pro-
mise to civil servants, FAS members and retired persons that their wage
and pension arrears would be paid off by 31 December 1997.
The tension between President Yeltsin and Mr Chernomyrdin who, as
well as prime minister, was the leader of the Russian government party
«Our Home is Russia» and presidential candidate in the forthcoming elec-
tions, came to a head when Mr Yeltsin decided to sack the premier and the
rest of the government, appointing in his place— much to everyone’s sur-
prise—Sergei Kiriyenko, a young 35-year old technocrat recently raised to
the post of energy and fuel minister.
Although the Duma (dominated by Guennadi Zyuganov’s communists
and the nationalist extremists led by the ill-tempered Vladimir Zirinosky)
initially refused to approve Mr Kiriyenko’s appointment, it eventually yiel-
ded. The Duma thus acted as usual, backing down at the last minute, fea-
ring the political suicide entailed by early legislative elections and the pos-
sibility of losing their privileges.
According to Boris Yeltsin, Mr Chernomyrdin was dismissed because
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of the people’s malaise on finding their situation did not improve and
owing to the government’s lack of drive in carrying out the programme of
reforms outlined by Mr Chubais—strict financial control, industrial restruc-
turing, mainly of the gas and oil monopolies, payment of overdue taxes
and a balanced budget.
The interpretation of this government crisis was that Mr Chernomyrdin,
deterred perhaps by the high social costs, had not dared implement the
radical reforms with the firm hand the situation required.
Mr Kiriyenko formed a government in April 1998, keeping some of the
former cabinet members such as defence minister General Sergenev and
foreign minister Primakov, thus implying continuity in foreign and defence
policy.
Mr Kiriyenko’s rise to power, as champion of reform, was welcomed by
the IMF, which had frozen a $670 million tranche of a total sum of $10
billion lent to Russia for 1996-1998. The IMF used the failure of the Rus-
sian executive’s fiscal policy to justify holding back this payment, but gave
the go-ahead when change was promised. However, this brought only
slight relief. Russia needed much more. Hence negotiations for a new,
substantial bail-out package.
This hefty $22.6 billion loan, which was granted by the IMF and World
Bank in July 1998 and was intended to be paid out over a period of 18
months, was made conditional on Russia’s implementation of a reform pa-
ckage that the Duma did not agree on.
In August 1998 the economic turmoil heightened: Russian banks were
offering loans at 150%; most workers and civil servants had not been paid
their wages for over six months; the rouble, although protected by
exchange-rate parity, fell to half of its 1996 value and a twentieth of what
it was worth in 1992; accumulated inflation since January 1998 stood at
35%; and, despite the money the Russian central bank had poured into
sustain-ing its currency, it was forced de facto to devaluate the rouble by
widening its exchange rate band by over 30%.
The $4.8 billion of the first tranche of the $22.6 billion loan granted by
the IMF and the World Bank to rescue Russia from its economic standstill
evaporated in the Russian issuing bank’s vain endeavour to sustain its
currency.
On 24 August 1998 Boris Yeltsin sacked Sergei Kiriyenko, who had
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struggled to carry out the reforms that his predecessor Mr Chernomyrdin
merely delayed. Paradoxically, the latter was entrusted by Mr Yeltsin to
form a government.
Although Mr Yeltsin is unpredictable by nature, his way of handling the
crisis surprised even the most expert analysts, who could not have fore-
seen a change of mind regarding the reasons for replacing Mr Cher-
nomyrdin by Mr Kiriyenko five months earlier.
It is suspected that the new capitalist oligarchy had a hand in triggering
this crisis, particularly the leading finance and media mogul Boris Bere-
zovski.
Entrusted with the task of forming a government, Mr Chernomyrdin
negotiated an economic rescue programme that envisaged nationalising
the banking sector and strategic companies, state protection of raw mate-
rials monopolies and other stabilising measures that represented an about
turn in the economic policy followed by the previous government. To think
that the IMF would authorise the second payment of the loan granted in
July 1998 amounted to squaring the circle.
Mr Chubais, who had negotiated the IMF loan, was sacked despite his
undeniably successful handling of affairs.
Apart from the aforementioned anti-crisis plan, a political agreement
was also negotiated with the two houses of parliament in order to grant
them greater control over the executive and to limit the powers bestowed
by the 1993 Constitution on the president of the Russian Federation,
among them the power to order and approve the formation of govern-
ments, to dismiss ministers, to dissolve the Duma if it refuses third time
around to ratify the appointment of a prime minister proposed by the pre-
sident and to intervene in economic policy management.
Despite all these concessions to strengthen the political role of the
Duma, on 30 August its communist, extreme nationalist and reformist
deputies refused to approve the choice of Mr Chernomyrdin as head of
government. Mr Yeltsin’s persistence in keeping Mr Chernomyrdin as his
candidate led to another refusal from the Duma a week later.
Fear of a third failure, which would have resulted in the dissolution of
the Duma and an inadvisable power vacuum in very difficult economic and
social circumstances, called for a compromise solution.
The solution was Yevgeny Primakov, a 70-year old who had been
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foreign minister since 1996 and a member of the former Soviet Commu-
nist Party and the Politburo when Mikhail Gorbachev was in power.
Indeed, it was Mr Gorbachev who promoted him as a politician within the
party. Mr Primakov is, above all, a good diplomat and skilful negotiator,
and is able to cope with even the most difficult situations.
Being forced to yield to the Duma for the first time marked a painful
setback for the omnipotent Mr Yeltsin, whose loss of power was evident.
His acceptance of Mr Primakov as a candidate on 12 September 1998
was a response to the need to find a compromise solution to fill the power
gap left by Mr Kiriyenko the previous 23 August.
Although Mr Primakov obtained the majority vote of the Duma (317
deputies out of the 450), he found it difficult to form a co-ordinated
government. On 27 September the recently appointed deputy premier Ale-
xander Shojin, of the «Our Home is Russia» party resigned. The commu-
nists were also reluctant to offer Mr Primakov unconditional support.
The policy Mr Primakov has pursued so far can be called ambiguous:
he promises reform outwardly, but inwardly, in order to cope with the
social and economic realities, he has had to authorise the issuance of
paper money without cover in order to pay wage arrears, unfreeze bank
accounts and subsidise part of the disastrous industry. He has also
embarked on the path of renationalisation without raising alarm: the new
subsidies available are for debt relief, and the state acquires the equiva-
lent share capital of the subsidised companies.
To make things worse, shortly after Mr Primakov came to power irre-
gularities were discovered in the management of the loans granted by the
IMF, a fact which did not precisely encourage the Fund to unfreeze the
$4.3 billion of the second tranche of the latest package.
If the economic outlook is unpromising, the social picture is bleak—
millions of citizens are still waiting to be paid what the state owes them.
According to different sources, over fifty percent live in worse than mini-
mum subsistence conditions.
On the social front, the salient features of 1998 were the repeated
strikes staged by the miners of the Kuznetsk Basin (western Siberia) and
the Russian Far East, who blocked freight traffic along a number of essen-
tial railway lines such as the trans-Siberian and the trans-Caucasian 
routes. On 7 October 1998 the communist party managed to mobilise
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several million workers across the country, who protested at Mr Yeltsin and
demanded the wages they were owed.
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Although, contrary to predictions, Russian society has not yet erupted
and continues to display its proverbial resignation, its faith in reforms and
reformers is waning. This could translate into a large percentage of votes
for the communists in the next legislative elections.
It should be added that uncontrolled privatisation in the difficult and as
yet incomplete transition to a multiparty democracy has enabled many for-
tunes to be amassed and given rise to a powerful oligarchy who form
corrupt political parties involved in private businesses. Moreover, bureau-
cracy has still not managed to shake off the heavy burden of Soviet times
and much of the administration is corrupt and organised crime activity
omnipresent.
In order to engage in any professional activity one needs to have one’s
back covered by an official or private «protector». Rumour has it that the
best protector in Moscow is the mayor of the capital, Yuri Luzhkov, one of
the candidates for president in the 2000 elections.
In view of the harsh winter that is approaching, with food shortages
that are partly due to this year’s grain harvest—the worst for forty years—
the US has granted Russia a $600 million loan at 2%, repayable over 20
years, to purchase staple foods from US farmers. Part of this amount will
be paid in kind. Washington has undertaken to send 1,500 tonnes of corn
and 100,000 tonnes of other foodstuffs free. In 1998 the US had huge sur-
pluses of cereals.
To Russia’s many problems should be added the attacks on politicians.
The liberal party deputy Galina Starovoitova was assassinated in St
Petersburg on 21 November 1998, the sixth member of the Duma to have
met such a fate since 1994. Mrs Starovoitova was an enthusiastic refor-
mer and anti-Communist.
Owing to the lack of personal security, there are currently thousands of
private security companies, in addition to the state, regional and local law
enforcement bodies.
Russian foreign policy
It would seem that the prime objective of Russia’s foreign policy is to
consolidate its influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States set
up after the break-up of the Soviet Union. This would be the first step
towards establishing a confederation of nations with a predominantly Rus-
sian culture and political affinity.
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Nostalgia for the past is powerful. As Mikhail Gorbachev writes in his
memoirs, «Russia is the legitimate heir of the USSR and should be the
nucleus of a new union». According to him, «reintegration will only be pos-
sible if we find an idea that enables the peoples to rise above their natio-
nal identity. We realise we are different from Europe and the West and feel
the need to join together again». Mr Gorbachev, who maintains that the
union could and should have been saved, was in favour of commencing
reunification with the three Slavic republics and Kazakhstan.
The presidents of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan seemed
to have Mr Gorbachev’s model in mind when they agreed to deepen their
economic and cultural integration on 29 March 1996, paving the way for
future reunification. Ukraine, reluctant to forsake an ounce of sovereignty,
did not take part.
Shortly afterwards, Russia and Belarus created the so-called Union of
Sovereign Republics and continued to strengthen their links. The treaty esta-
blishes common citizenship, the regrouping of the two countries’ armed for-
ces and a convergent foreign policy. The president of Belarus, Alexander
Luka-shenka, has even stated that the countries should be reunified. In
January 1998 Russia and Belarus went one step further, developing the basic
principles of a common military policy and defence organisation for the
Union.
The signing of this agreement on 22 January 1998 coincided with an
important summit of Baltic states attended by the Russian prime minister.
The agreement was undoubtedly a response to the United States-Baltic
charter signed in Washington several days previously, which can be inter-
preted either as a consolation prize or as a step towards the future NATO
membership of the three republics.
As for Ukraine, Russia managed to solve the deadlocked problem of
the distribution of the Black Sea soviet fleet and the status of the Sevas-
topol naval base as well as the thorny issue of Ukrainian sovereignty of the
Russian peninsula of Crimea. The May 1997 treaty signed by Boris Yeltsin
and Ukranian president Leonid Kutchman marked the recognition of Ukrai-
ne’s present borders. Apart from a brief period during the 1917-1921 civil
war, Ukraine has always been close to Russia and was considered by
most Russians to be an integral part of Russia. Important trade agree-
ments highly favourable to Ukraine were also signed by the two countries
in 1997. All this has contributed to a rapprochement of the two principal
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states of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine is undoubtedly the most impor-
tant piece in the Eastern European geopolitical chessboard.
Russia has signed trade and bilateral military agreements with all the
countries of Central Asia, thus securing de facto control over all the stra-
tegic installations in the region, among them, the space launch and moni-
toring centre at Bailakur, in Kazakhstan, whose President Nursultan Nazar-
bayev is a fervent supporter of consolidating the CIS. In the Asian
republics, Russia furnishes military assistance in creating new armed for-
ces by providing advisors and keeping commanders of Russian origin in
key posts. In Tajikistan, Russian military intervention brought peace and
now supports an unpopular government with ideas close to Russian inte-
rests.
Russian peacekeeping troops continue to be stationed in Georgia and
Armenia in the Caucasus under the aegis of different international organi-
sations.
However, despite Russia’s efforts to bring together the CIS countries at
the summits it periodically organises for the heads of state and govern-
ment of all these countries, there are clearly deep differences of opinion as
to the concept and scope of future integration. Ultimately, all the states
doubt the sincerity of their «big brother» when there is talk of a union bet-
ween equals.
To counteract the pressure exerted by NATO in the West, Russia has
endeavoured to strengthen its relations with China, putting an end to exis-
ting border disputes and signing agreements to curtail the military forces
deployed on both sides of the borders. Furthermore, the so-called «stra-
tegic partnership» between Russia and China has boosted armaments
sales and technology transfers from the former to the latter.
Despite the high-flown official declarations, the real scope of this part-
nership has yet to be defined. Although the two countries are reluctant to
accept US hegemony indefinitely and advocate a multipolar world, they
have both shared and clashing interests which are not easily overcome.
Their interests in Central Asia concur. Russia, with China’s consent, took
advantage of the four plus one border negotiations between Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Tajikistan, on the one hand, and China on the
other, to consolidate its geopolitical position, offering in exchange to pre-
vent ethnic activism and propaganda campaigns launched from these CIS
countries against the inhabitants of the Chinese province of Sinkiang,
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where 50% of the population are Turkic-speaking Muslim Uighurs and there
are some Kazak and Kirgiz minorities. The linguistic and ethnic affinities
between the people on each side of the border are cause for concern for
China.
In eastern Siberia the Russian autonomous authorities are opposed to
Moscow’s aim to cede land to China in order to comply with the border
agreements. They fear the contraband activities of Chinese traffickers
across the long common border and illegal emigration to sparsely popula-
ted territories which are losing their Russian inhabitants, while the Chinese
border provinces are witnessing steady demographic growth. The popula-
tion of Vladivosstok, the former Russian port by the Sea of Japan, could
come to be largely Chinese in a few years’ time if the current trend conti-
nues. Some governors in this region are threatening to defy the commit-
ments undertaken at central government level between Moscow and Bei-
jing. The most vociferous and radical of these is the governor of Primorsky,
who has threatened not to cede territories that are «full of Russian soldiers’
graves».
The new deposits of hydrocarbons discovered in the Asian republics of
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and the Caucasian country of Azerbaijan
could, according to experts, come to produce more than Saudi Arabia in
ten years’ time. As a result, these states are now coveted by the western
oil companies. The main task of the US embassies in Baku (Azerbaijan)
and Tashkent (Uzbekistan) is to ensure that these regions remain open to
free trade. Western influence in general—and particularly that of Ame-
rica—in both the Caucasus and Central Asia arouses Russian suspicions.
In spite of Russian and Iran, Azerbaijan has signed contracts with western
companies concerning the exploitation of the new deposits in the Caspian
Sea, while Chevron and Mobil, among other multinationals, are now ope-
rating in Kazakhstan. Russia has the advantage that almost all the trade
routes and oil and gas pipelines from those countries run through Russian
territory. This ensures it is not left outside the oil trade—at least provided
that alternative routes across Iran and Turkey are not used. Russia can
also raise customs tariffs, mainly with Kazakhstan.
China, Russia’s ally in Central Asia, may well become the biggest con-
sumer of energy resources in the region. Kazak oil is currently transported
by train to China along the Alma Ata-Beijing railway line. Russian exports
to China are rising sharply.
Apart from the border disputes with China, in the Far East Russia has
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yet to settle the issue of the Kuril Islands which were ceded to Russia after
the second world war and are claimed by Japan. The Kuril islands enclose
the Sea of Okhotsk, where the Nikolayev North naval base and the port of
Magadan are located, both of which are much less important than the
Russian nuclear submarine base of the Pacific Fleet in the Kamchatka
peninsula, which has access to the Pacific. The Japanese prime minister
Ruyturo Hashimoto did not achieve his aims at the April 1998 meeting with
Boris Yeltsin. Russia and Japan are technically still at war, since they have
not yet signed the treaty of peace, amity and co-operation that Russia is
asking for. Russia may return the Kuril Islands in exchange for substantial
economic benefits which crisis-stricken Japan cannot afford in the short
term.
Russia remains determined to realise its ambitions in space aeronau-
tics, whatever the cost, and despite its huge financial constraints. Howe-
ver, the successive hitches in the MIR space station are proof that it no
longer enjoys supremacy in this technology. The huge satellite, which has
been in orbit for over twelve years—seven more than initially planned—is
expected to fall into the sea in June 1999. This will mark the end of an his-
toric period in the space race and usher in the era of the international
space station, a project in which Russia’s disastrous economic situation
will not allow it to participate on an equal footing with the US.
Russia’s interest in continuing to play a leading role in the international
scene is evidenced by its unilateral stance and disagreement in the Iraq
and Kosovo crises. With respect to the latter, in October 1998 Russia
opposed NATO’s military intervention in Serbia on the grounds that UN
Security Council Resolution 1199 did not provide legally for an armed air
attack. The Russian foreign minister even insinuated that his government
had in mind the possibility of offering the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) military aid if NATO attacked, and that its need for western
aid would not cause it to change its foreign policy.
Russia’s military capacity
Despite the reductions made in recent years, Russia’s armed forces
and other military organisations—home office troops, border guards, fede-
ration protection forces and the federal security service, among many
others—currently employ over three million people. 
The military reform now under way entails a drastic cut in the numbers
of troops and the abolishment of compulsory military service. This reform
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is not progressing at the expected pace for a number of reasons, such as
the shortage of financial resources and the political struggles between the
ministries and public authorities affected.
All agree that the economy cannot sustain the current numbers of
armed forces without endangering training levels, equipment maintenance
and procurement of more modern armaments needed to replace those
that are becoming obsolete.
Despite the much-trumpeted «Glasnost», opacity continues to be the
distinguishing feature of Russian military policy, and it is not known for cer-
tain what the real operational capacity of the Russian armed forces is,
though everything seems to indicate that it is very low.
As for the Nuclear Deterrent Force, the Kremlin remains determined
that Russia should continue to be the second nuclear world power, with an
arsenal of some 6,000 warheads which would be reduced to a third if it
ratifies the START II treaty. In any event, Russian nuclear power will conti-
nue to be greater than that of China, India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom
and France put together.
The Russian general staff, in view of the unavoidable curtailment of the
armed forces’ conventional operational capacity, relies mainly on its
nuclear capacity to deter the US, NATO or China from any aggression,
whether nuclear or conventional. While it realises that such a hypothesis is
highly unlikely today, it does not rule out the possibility that it could be less
so in the future.
If it is assumed that Russian forces would be incapable of suppressing
a localised peripheral conflict using conventional weapons, Russia could,
in the first instance, resort to nuclear arms to prevent defeat.
The Russian general staff sees NATO’s eastward enlargement as a
threat to the country, since it brings the alliance’s military forces nearer its
borders and leaves Russia’s main command, administrative, industrial and
urban centres within the operational range of allied tactical air power. At
present, such a threat merely undermines the deterrent effect of Russia’s
nuclear capacity, given the huge differences between Russia’s and NATO’s
conventional capacity. This is one of the reasons why the Duma have so
far refused to ratify START II.
Russia’s military capacity includes communications and reconnais-
sance satellite systems, as well as electronic warfare and precision navi-
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gation systems. In this field, Russia is second only to the United States.
Al-though many of these systems are shared by other CIS states as esta-
blished by treaty, Russia controls them all, just as its owns the groupings
of satellites.
The military industry continues to be extremely important to Russia’s
economy, even though production has slumped in recent years and wor-
kers have been laid off. Even so, sales of arms to foreign countries earned
Russia $4 billion in profits in 1997. However, it was unable to match this
figure in 1998 owing to the economic recession of the Asian markets.
In any event, arms sales will continue to be a good source of income
for the ailing Russian economy. Some of these arms are the medium-range
missiles to which the USA and all its western allies proved particularly sen-
sitive following the experience of the SCUD missiles launched against
Israel during the Gulf war. Russia is constrained by its membership of the
so-called «Missile Technology Control Regime», though, according to its
own interpretation, this does not apply to sales to certain customers.
The military in the Russian Federation’s domestic policy
The cutbacks in troops and defence allocations following the break-up
of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces left the officer corps, accusto-
med as it was to privileges, dissatisfied and traumatised.
Today, the perceptions and leanings of most of the officers on active
service can be summed up as follows: they consider themselves to be dis-
regarded by all the political institutions and are highly critical of Boris Yelt-
sin, whom they hold responsible for the currently instability of the Russian
armed forces; they are more concerned than civilians about lack of respect
for law and the precariousness of public order; they yearn for the Soviet
Union and call for the restoration of a new union, basically formed by the
Slavic republics of the CIS. They see the West—particularly the US—as a
potential threat and should therefore not lower their nuclear guard.
In general, Russian officers fall into two categories: on the one hand,
moderate reformists and, on the other, radical conservatives, many with
extreme nationalist leanings, who believe that Russian foreign policy should
be aimed at winning back the status of superpower enjoyed by the USSR.
Though none of the general staff commanding officers seems to har-
bour Bonapartist ambitions, they could intervene with the forces obeying
their orders in favour of a prestigious politician with an appealing pro-
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gramme.
Former General Lebed, owing to his past, ideology and political ambi-
tion, could, ultimately muster the support of the armed forces and a mul-
titude of desperate civilians willing to cling on to a new saviour.
Mr Lebed has stated that he would oppose NATO enlargement and
would restore Russia’s pride and power—clearly a utopian promise in the
medium term.
Mr Lebed could come to power through legal means were he to have
the backing of the new oligarchy headed by Boris Berezonsky. In this con-
nection, the ORT television channel controlled by the Russian magnate
and his partners tends to present Mr Lebed in a very favourable light.
NATO ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE
The NATO summit held in Paris in May 1997 paved the way for east-
ward enlargement, when applications were invited from all the Central and
Eastern European countries willing to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty
and able to meet the entry requirements.
This policy line is in keeping with NATO’s aim to be the greatest gua-
rantor of security and stability in Europe. Now that the Warsaw Pact has
ceased to exist and the Soviet Union has broken up, NATO needed to
define a new objective to justify its survival, since military treaties tend to
last only as long as the threat that gives rise to them.
Taking part in «out-of-area» peacekeeping and mediation operations
did not seem to be acceptable as the alliance’s chief raison d’être: it need-
ed to identify a goal with greater political implications—to set up an orga-
nised institutional framework that would guarantee European security with
the participation of the US. Its sound and experienced political and mili-
tary structure could serve the purpose.
The eastward expansion of the alliance to take in states seeking secu-
rity and stability is consistent with this new goal.
Nonetheless, the foregoing is only part of the European security pic-
ture. Russia, the other part, needs a special co-operation link so that it
feels less left out and threatened. Hence the signing of the «Founding Act»
establish-ing relations between NATO and Russia.
Some, mainly in Russia, think that the role NATO has assumed could
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be played by the OSCE which has, undoubtedly, a history of important
achievements. However, despite its new name, the OSCE is not an orga-
nisation but a conference and its organic structure consists merely of a
secretariat. Furthermore, the OSCE is made up of fifty four sovereign 
states of Europe, Central Asia and North America, all of which have right
of veto. It is not easy for countries of such different regions and with such
distinct interests to reach a consensus on conflictive security issues.
Therefore, contrary to what Russia maintains, it cannot serve as Europe’s
chief security institution.
The United States managed to impose its view that NATO’s enlarge-
ment should initially be limited to three states—the Czech Republic,
Poland and Hungary. Since these are relatively far from Russia’s western
border, this first eastward step could be less provocative to the Russians.
The United States is fully aware that Russia, which does not share the the-
ory that European stability should be guaranteed by NATO, is wary of
enlargement and regards eastward expansion as no more than a policy
hatched by America to spread its influence in Central and Eastern Europe
and secure itself a more advantageous geostrategic position, taking
advantage of Russia’s current weakness.
NATO’s negotiations with the three applicants are under way, as are the
processes whereby the respective national parliaments must ratify what
has been agreed on. The three may well become members in 1999, which
is the 50th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. That year
a new group of candidates will be designated, with Slovakia and Romania
topping the list.
The enlargement of NATO is less difficult than that of the EU since the
cost is much lower and because it does not require NATO to make any
institutional changes, though the alliance is currently reorganising its inte-
grated command structure to which the new members will belong.
The United States has proposed that the enlargement costs be divided
among the new partners, itself and the European allies, though the latter
have not yet agreed to accept the proposed distribution. Since the amount
is not large and would be paid over a period of ten years, the basic pro-
blem is not finding an acceptable solution but rather the United States’
insistence on more equitable burden-sharing between allies.
The issue of funding enlargement has been debated at length in the US
Senate with a view to approving the proposal. The United States has al-
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lowed for defence expenditure to increase only by the amount needed to
offset inflation over the next five years. This means it cannot finance all the
investment programmes submitted and the additional cost of expanding
the Atlantic alliance eastwards could lead to the delay or cancellation of
a p -
proved programmes regarded as higher priority.
Therefore, in the opinion of the American senators, the NATO allies
should bear a higher proportion of enlargement costs. They contend that
investing US resources in Europe to make up for what the allies fail to con-
tribute could jeopardise the United States’ security interests.
It is obvious that the gap between the United States’ military capacity
and that of all the other NATO allies is widening and that the United Sta-
tes is increasingly dependent on its allies’ capacity.
Although the US Senate approved enlargement by a majority, some
senators were against it, not only because of the cost—the required
investments are put at between $40 and 60 billion in aerial defence and
communications systems and in making armaments interoperational—but
also because it is pointless to invest in the new partners’ armed forces
now that the Soviet threat has ceased to exist and Russia is a friendly
country. Others reckoned that expansion would spark off unnecessary
tension with Russia and within Russia. However, the reasons that carried
the day were that enlargement had been an American initiative, the vote of
the Slavic population would be very important in the legislative elections
of November 1998, and the country’s armaments industry would obtain
considerable benefits.
For reasons mentioned earlier, Russia has signed with NATO the so-
called «Founding Act» governing relations between the two sides. Despite
the supposedly far-reaching implications of this document, its real content
is in fact rather scant. It is not a «treaty» that is legally binding according
to international law, as Russia intended, but merely an «agreement» at
government level. Russia’s representative sits on a permanent joint coun-
cil together with those of the NATO countries, but the alliance may make
decisions without Russia’s assent, since Russia was not granted right of
veto as it wished. It is no secret that Mr Yeltsin’s government signed the
Founding Act with misgivings, pressured by influential financial and indus-
trial circles interested in strengthening Russia’s links with the West.
The Founding Act establishes that NATO shall not deploy nuclear wea-
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pons in the territories of the new members or station «substantial (foreign)
combat forces» in them. What is meant by «substantial» and other ambi-
guous wording could give rise to future controversy. Russia has already
complained that NATO has made important decisions without informing it.
In this connection, it is worth mentioning that Russia’s NATO represen-
tative left Brussels on 16 June 1998 in protest against the airpower
demonstration carried out by the alliance over Albania and Macedonia as
a warning to the Serbs. According to the Russian Federation’s defence
minister, General Igor Sergueyev, the Atlantic alliance did not inform Rus-
sia duly in advance of these flights and had therefore defied the spirit of
the Founding Act.
Other concessions made to Russia are the revision of the CFE treaty in
accordance with its wishes and the proposal for a new START II treaty
which would not only curtail nuclear arsenals even further but would also
eliminate the disadvantages perceived by Russians in the existing treaty,
which are preventing it being approved by the Duma.
Although Russia has been forced to accept the fait accompli of NATO
enlargement to take in the first round of applicants from Central Europe, it
has made clear its position regarding future admissions. In this connec-
tion, the Russian foreign minister warned at the Madrid summit that his
country would cease to co-operate with NATO if the latter began entry
negotiations with any of the former Soviet republics. Russia has thus cle-
arly defined what it intends its sphere of influence in Europe to be—in
addition to the European CIS countries, the three Baltic states which aim
to free them
selves completely from Russian protection by joining both the EU and
NATO.
Ukraine has also signed a preferential agreement with NATO granting it
bilateral status similar to that of Russia and distinct from that of the other
states that belong to the «Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council» or are «Part-
ners for Peace». The co-operation charter envisages the setting up of a
permanent consultative body, the establishment of a permanent Ukrainian
representation in Brussels and the holding of regular high-level meetings.
Ukraine has allowed combined manoeuvres by the Partners for Peace to
be carried out on its soil and on its waters.
This policy of co-operation with NATO has not prevented Ukraine from
signing important—and, as mentioned previously, favourable—agree-
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ments with Russia.
During the state visit by the Ukrainian president to Russia in February
1998, the purpose of which was largely economic, Moscow saw to it that
the major trade agreements between the two countries were pushed into
the background, raising instead the issue of NATO enlargement.
According to the Kremlin, Ukraine’s President Kutchma had promised
Mr Yeltsin that Ukraine would not apply for membership of the Atlantic
alliance. Kiev has neither confirmed nor denied this statement.
In the West, NATO enlargement has its supporters and opponents. The
former argue that it will generate stability in a historically unstable geopo-
litical area, while the latter fear the impact on Russia’s internal situation of
the powerlessness and humiliation it could feel on seeing countries of the
former Soviet Union—whose dissolution many Russians still regret—join
NATO, and the internal insecurity it would trigger as to the future integrity
of the Russian Federation.
Russia advocates the establishment of an area of neutral states bet-
ween NATO and the European CIS countries, whose neutrality would be
guaranteed by both NATO and Russia, as proposed by Mr Yeltsin in 1993.
The attitude of the Central European and Baltic states which have
applied for NATO membership as the only means to remedy their security
and stability contrasts with other traditionally neutral EU states. For exam-
ple, the white paper on defence submitted to the Finnish parliament on 17
March 1997 states that «Finland does not constitute the target of any mili-
tary threat, the prevention or rejection of which obliges us to possess the
guarantees of security provided by military alliances». Similar statements
have been made by Austria which, for the time being, despite being
surrounded by NATO countries, is continuing with its traditional neutrality.
The Austrian Chancellor Kilma declared on 7 April 1998 that «it would not
be appropriate, in terms of security policy, to establish as of today the
objective of our membership of NATO».
With new admissions restricted and drawn out over time, everything
would seem to indicate that the problem lies in determining the options left
to the countries that do not become NATO members. Belonging to the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace pro-
gramme, which many regard as a way of getting in the alliance’s good
books for future membership, is clearly unsatisfactory, since it does not
afford them the security guarantees they believe NATO provides. Neither
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are they completely satisfied at the prospect of joining only the EU, whose
CFSP has yet to be fully developed and whose military arm, the WEU,
lacks the muscle NATO has.
Of the former republics of the extinct Soviet Union, the Baltic states, as
mentioned previously, could feel particularly disappointed if their ardent de-
sires are not satisfied. This perhaps explains why the United States was
quick to sign a «Partnership Charter» with these three states in January
1998.
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There is no doubt that Belarus is inclined towards Russia, at least while
its current political leaders remain in power. Ukraine’s loyalty to Russia is
harder to predict. It has promised not to apply for membership of NATO,
though it should be considered that a strongly pro-NATO policy could
endanger Ukraine’s territorial integrity, given the existing differences in this
new independent state.
The enigmatic words uttered by President Clinton in Berlin in May 1998
are significant. When referring to NATO enlargement, he asked that the
interests of neither Russia nor Ukraine be forgotten, stating that the
current collaboration with both should be maintained and strengthened.
In this connection, in October 1998 the Russian defence minister, Igor
Sergueyev, reiterated Russia’s opposition to NATO enlargement and 
warned that if it crossed the «red line» separating the former Soviet repu-
blics (the Baltic states, to be precise), Moscow would reconsider the whole
framework of its relations with NATO.
Weighing up the advantages and disadvantages, it seems advisable to
proceed with caution when considering further enlargement, at least until
Russia’s grim and difficult political, social and economic situation beco-
mes clearer.
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Accession to the EU is provided for in the articles of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, which establishes that any European country can apply for
membership and that the conditions for admission shall be agreed on by
the EU and the applicant state.
In June 1993, the European Council of Copenhagen agreed on the
admission criteria which were thenceforth known as the «Copenhagen cri-
teria». These are European identity, a democratic government system and
respect for human rights.
Over time, the legal, economic and political framework of the EU has
been broadened, leading to reconsideration of candidates’ capacity to
apply the criteria. Therefore, now that the EU is going to begin its eastward
enlargement, the conditions for admission can be summed up as follows:
stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights
and the protection of minorities; an established market economy able to
cope with competition and the commercial pressure exerted by the EU;
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and ability to assume the obligations of all the members, including econo-
mic and monetary union.
The golden rule of any membership negotiations is that the candidate
must accept the entire acquis communitaire—the treaties signed, legisla-
tion enacted, jurisprudence established by the Court of Justice, resolu-
tions approved and international agreements to which the Union is party.
Candidates must accept all of this. A la carte integration is not possi-
ble, However, temporary exemptions and transitory agreements may be
established, but never permanent ones.
At the Luxembourg summit in December 1997 it was decided to begin
negotiations with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia
and Cyprus. These are currently under way after the degree of prepared-
ness of these nations was assessed, and the first round of accessions is
likely to take place in 2003.
While the doors are open to a second group of applicants, formed by
Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania, negotiations with the
EU will be begun at a later stage. Meanwhile, they have signed associa-
tion agreements.
If the EU were to expand by taking in all these countries, its area would
increase by 34% and its population by one third, though the Community
GDP would grow by a mere 8%.
Russia has also sought to join the EU but, although its sights are set on
Europe, three quarters of its territory belong to Asia. Its demography, vast
size and, particularly, its political instability and current economic crisis do
not favour the EU membership that Mr Yeltsin has insistently proposed.
Even when Russia is over the crisis, the membership of a country of its
geopolitical characteristics and particular mentality that is so different from
that of western Europe would upset the balance of the EU and would
endanger its very existence.
The advantages of extending the EU as far as the borders of the CIS
are obvious: this would be a major step on the geopolitical road to a uni-
ted Europe with a more prominent role in international relations, greater
security and stability across the continent and a bigger market.
The disadvantages are cost and the need for the EU to undergo sub-
stantial institutional reforms, which are a controversial issue.
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The European Council commission which has studied the cost of en-
largement reckons it could amount to 75 billion ECUs. Indeed, it is a sort
of «Marshall Plan» for new members.
The European conference held in London in March 1998 brought toge-
ther twenty two states—the fifteen members and eleven candidates. Tur-
key was a notable absentee. Some of the reasons for its self-exclusion
were the problem of Cyprus, where the process has begun to integrate the
northern part, inhabited by Turks, into Turkey. Cyprus, which is in the lead
group of applicants, could complicate enlargement, since the Turkish
Cypriots refuse to take part in negotiations. They are only willing to repre-
sent their area as an independent state.
So far, the national interests of both poor and wealthy countries have
prevailed over the primary geopolitical goal in the battle between the EU
members over the future funding of enlargement.
If the ceiling for members’ contribution to the EU coffers is kept at
1.27% of GDP, the EU has two options—to enlarge on the cheap, sharing
the scanty resources among a larger number of countries, to the detriment
of the structural and cohesion funds, or to reach a compromise solution
between rich and poor partners, delaying the accession of new members.
Institutional reform poses just as many, if not more, difficulties: the
weighting of votes in keeping with the population of the states, number of
commissioners, and defining decision criteria for issues that require una-
nimous agreement (it is not the same to get fifteen to agree as it is twenty
six) and for those where a simple or qualified majority is sufficient.
Four countries currently contribute 71.8% of the EU’s expenditure: Ger-
many 30%, France 18%, Italy 12.4% and the United Kingdom 11.4%.
Therefore, if it were established that expenditure should be decided accor-
ding to relative-majority criteria, this could give rise to situations where
those who contribute the least and, in addition, are entitled to the cohesion
fund, could impose decisions on those who contribute the most to the bud-
get.
To all these obstacles to new admissions should be added certain
member states’ views on enlargement. Greece, for example, is threatening
to veto applications from any Central or Eastern European country if that
of Cyprus is held up. President Chirac of France, for his part, has stated
his opposition to enlargement without prior institutional reform and does
not agree with the common agricultural policy. Regarding CAP, in October
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1998 the European Commission rejected German’s proposal, backed by
the Ne-therlands and Sweden, that each country finance jointly from its
own budgets a quarter of the direct farming subsidies.
Germany, which considers that its own contributions are too high, con-
tends that the countries which have met the convergence criteria have got
their economies sufficiently into shape and no longer need any help.
However, it fails to take into account the differences in income of countries
such as Spain, which is 25% below the European average.
Everything seems to indicate that certain countries want enlargement
to be funded largely at the expense of the poorer countries that receive the
structural and cohesion funds.
Enlargement also arouses fears of a possible unstoppable influx of eas-
terners seeking jobs in more prosperous EU countries, and the conse-
quent unemployment problems. The argument generally used to allay
such fears is that the improvement in the standard of living in Spain and
Portugal after they joined the Community led to a decrease in the amount
of cheap labour from these countries in their richer EU neighbours.
Since the current ceiling of 1.27% of GDP will be insufficient to keep
up the current solidarity programmes in a bigger EU, Spain finds itself in a
tricky position: while it firmly supports the consolidation of the EU and its
enlargement to take in countries that identify with the idea of a united
Europe capable of closing the gap between this continent and the United
States in all respects, it cannot make concessions that depart from what
could be an equitable funding of enlargement.
Paradoxically, the countries which stand to gain the most economic
benefits from an enlarged EU are those set on not footing the cost or even
saving money.
In general, the obstacles which are hindering the achievement of this
attractive geopolitical goal or, at least, are setting it back, are mainly the
self-seeking attitude of the rich countries, the nationalism of members who
are not prepared to yield further areas of sovereignty and the resistance of
the out-and-out NATO supporters to strengthen the European CFSP.
The British presidency of the EU in the first half of 1998 was followed
by that of Austria, which is preparing the so-called «Agenda 2000» that
addresses sensitive issues such as institutional reform, the composition of
the European Commission, the votes to which each country is entitled on
— 136 —
the Council and financial contributions.
In November 1998, the European Commission submitted a proposal
which would require the structural and cohesion funds to be trimmed by
18%. It reflected the aims of several of the richer EU countries keen to
reduce their contributions, going against the solidarity policy they had hi-
therto pursued, and appeared to be designed to induce Spain to accept
the ceiling of 1.27% of GDP. Spain will not agree to this until it is assured
that such an amount will be enough to pay for all the current community
policies and, in addition, meet all the costs of enlargement.
There is every sign that the accession of the first-wave candidates will
be delayed owing both to the pace of progress of the aspirants and to
internal problems of the EU.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Not all experts agree on the causes of the economic collapse of Rus-
sia, whose GDP has been sliding year after year since the Soviet Union
broke up.
Russia’s macroeconomic indicators show that the reforms undertaken
have not achieved the hoped-for results, despite the substantial foreign
aid received mainly from the IMF and the World Bank to help the transition
from a state-controlled economy to a free-market system. Russia has pro-
ved to be a bottomless pit.
This failure tends to be attributed to the erroneousness of the gradual
approach, of a progressive shift to a market economy. It is argued that in
cases like Russia, reforms need to be radical. Thus, countries where shock
therapy was applied, such as Hungary and Poland, have come through
their transitions with flying colours, whereas those that opted for a gradual
approach—Russia, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria—have not improved
their economic situation.
Mr Chernomyrdin pursued a policy of gradual transition during his five-
year stint as prime minister and Mr Primakov seems to be following suit. A
radical approach was taken by the ousted Mr Kiriyenko, a champion of far-
reaching reforms in Russia’s economy. But the application of free-market
rules entails a social welfare cost that the government cannot always
meet.
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As a result, the Russian people now blame their plight on the
reforms and not on governments’ hesitance to go about them in a deter-
mined way.
Moreover, not all Russia’s problems are due to its ailing economy.
Indeed, they stem basically from the shortcomings of a highly imperfect
rule of law. A state that lacks due respect for current laws, whose con-
tractual legislation is woolly and has no effective tax system is putting its
very subsistence at risk.
State, regional and local bureaucracy in Russia have not yet succee-
ded in unravelling the web woven in Soviet times. Corruption is rife across
the administration and in all power spheres, and organised crime activities
are omnipresent. But the most serious problem is not the existence of
corruption, but rather that the politicians are corrupt and are in contact
with the new oligarchy. 
The West believed it could export its democratic system to Russia, but
Russia is not the West and only an erudite minority seem to want Russia
westernised. Many citizens even regard the West as the source of many of
their ills.
The creation of political parties and the holding of free elections have
not been sufficient to establish a true democracy, since there is no aware-
ness of its values or a sense of responsibility among the people. Indeed,
these qualities of citizens cannot be conjured up overnight and for the first
time in the history of Russia. Furthermore, the ruling class lacked expe-
rience of democracy and, indeed, those who took it upon themselves to
build the new order were not opponents of the old system but rather part
of it, such as Mr Yeltsin and current Prime Minister Primakov in Russia,
Ukrainian President Kutchman and Mr Lukashenka of Belarus.
Thus, the elections saw the rise of candidates who display autocratic
behaviour once they have assumed power, while most voters look on pas-
sively and indifferently.
Insufficient control over the privatisation of state companies in Russia
has led to the emergence of an oligarchy that is not however a new busi-
ness elite but rather the old system converted to capitalism—a capitalism
based on cronyism, shared interests and political influence. Rather than a
market economy strictly speaking, what Russia has is a market controlled
by speculators linked to the oligarchs. The result is a slim minority who are
becoming richer and richer and an increasingly poverty-stricken majority
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who yearn for the communist system.
The western countries in general, and America in particular, made the
mistake of erecting Boris Yeltsin as a retaining wall to fend off a regression to
communism. To his credit, Mr Yeltsin had dismantled the Soviet Union, was
a rival of Mr Gorbachev and had blasted the Soviet Supreme to smithereens.
Impulsive, bold, ill-humoured, not very educated, a drinker and, for some
time, seriously ill, he has not succeeded in bringing political and economic
transition to fruition, despite having all the powers required for such a
momentous task. As democratic president of the Russian Federation elected
through a referendum, he again won the fiercely-disputed and rigged presi-
dential elections in 1996. Earlier, in 1993, he managed to get a tailor-made
presidentialist constitution approved—the one currently in force. After impo-
sing his will time after time on a Duma dominated by communists and
extreme nationalists, he was finally defeated and humiliated when, in Sep-
tember 1998, he did not dare dissolve it fearing an extreme situation as in
1993. Today, his loss of power and prestige is patently clear, as is his physi-
cal incapacity.
The present Constitution—though attempts will be made to amend it—
vested the executive with powers as opposed to the legislature, which has
been responsible for paralysing the reforms over the years.
In addition to the foregoing, winds of disintegration are battering the
Russian Federation. The autonomous bodies oppose any measure from
Moscow that they regard as centralising. Many refuse to pay the collected
taxes owed to the Federation and some, in view of the food shortage, have
even banned foodstuffs from being sent outside their regional boundaries.
The regional politicians display greater cohesion than their federal coun-
terparts and are more aware of collective interests.
Russia’s situation at the beginning of 1999 could be summed up as
follows:
— Economic crisis that is difficult to contain, with high inflation and
lack of foreign private investments for a long time following the
recent flight of capital.
— Danger of the Russian Federation breaking up and ultimate inter-
vention of the army to crush any serious secessionist outbreaks.
— State and administrative structures in need of thorough reform.
— Large, aggressive Communist party which wants to return to the old
ways and currently has more representatives in Mr Primakov’s
government than the reformist and liberal parties.
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— Most underprivileged sectors of society yearn for «Soviet welfare».
— An extreme nationalist movement that is trying to gain ground,
taking advantage of the malaise caused by the devastating econo-
mic crisis, and has the support of some members of the armed for-
ces.
— Growing unpopularity of Boris Yeltsin, who is branded the West’s
puppet.
With legislative elections slated for 1999 and presidential elections for
2000, it can be said that few countries have put their future at such great
risk in such a short space of time.
Mr Primakov’s options are very limited. If from now until the election
date Russian citizens do not perceive any beneficial effects, the country is
likely to begin the new millennium by pointing itself towards the past to a
lesser or greater degree. The problem Mr Primakov’s government faces is
that in order for it to be able to implement the reforms, the situation needs
to worsen before it can improve. A significant example is that if the essen-
tial tax reform is carried out and the companies with debts pay off their ar-
rears to the state, in order to survive they would have to trim their work-
forces by making staff redundant.
The question of who will succeed Boris Yeltsin is uncertain and wo-
rrying. The candidates for president are, so far: Mr Chernomyrdin, who
was rejected by the Duma and halted reform; Mr Zyuganov, a demiurge
communist who is capitalising on people’s dissatisfaction; Mr Luzhkov, the
populist mayor of Moscow, an opportunist who favours a protectionist
policy against «western dictates»; and former general Lebed, who aims to
restore the nation’s order and dignity vis-à-vis the concessions made to
the West.
Despite its precarious situation, there is no hint that Russia has given
up trying to reclaim the role of super power played by the Soviet Union
before its break-up. Hence its disagreeing stance in the Kosovo and Iraqi
crises in 1998.
On the international front, Russia has the advantages of being second
biggest nuclear power, the right of veto in the United Nations Security
Council and the remains of a defence industry capable of producing and
exporting sophisticated tactical and long-range weapons systems. Its
inexhaustible natural resources (new gas deposits have been discovered
in Siberia) have enabled it to attend the G7 meetings as an observer, such
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CHAPTER FOUR
STABILITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
STABILITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
By Pedro López Aguirrebengoa
GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
The situation in the general area of the Mediterranean did not undergo
any substantial changes in 1998, and evolved in a very similar way to that
of the previous year. This was analysed in the 1997-98 Strategic Pano-
rama.
It is necessary in Mediterranean geopolitics to bear in mind the realities
that obtain in this area, which extends to the Black Sea, the Gulf periphery
and the rest of the Arab world. The presence of global strategic forces that
lie outside the region must also be considered.
On this plane, the United States is the major military power in the area,
in which it has interests that it considers vital. Its attitude plays a key role
in any negotiations on disarmament and security in the region, as well as
in respect of the strategic resources of the Middle East where it has a
dominant influence in the Peace Process. It can be said that this is also the
case with Russia, whose presence and potential, however, have tempora-
rily declined.
The United States has been taking a greater interest in the Euro-Medi-
terranean process. In this connection it is worth recalling the visit made by
the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Mr Eizenstat to Tuni-
sia and Morocco. He made a proposal on this occasion for an economic
and trade partnership with the countries of the area. However, his scheme
appears to be limited for the time being, and in Washington’s basically
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bilateral approach to its relations with the region (the strong points of
which are Israel and Egypt), the horizontal viewpoint bears more weight
than the vertical and multilateral dimension characterising the European
perception. The United States’ physical remoteness means that its pro-
blems are different from those of Europe (that are intrinsic to its proximity)
although both coincide in the general lines of Western thinking.
For its part, the Russian Federation is following this process with atten-
tion, and has expressed the wish to see its role as a guest at the Euro-Med
Ministerial Conferences enhanced.
In global terms, the conflicts and tensions that still persist in the area
remain either active or dormant, and the processes for solving them have
still not been channelled towards a definitive solution.
The Middle-East Peace Process (MEPP) has been at a standstill for the
past 18 months, notwithstanding the efforts by the United States, secon-
ded by the European Union and backed by Egypt and other countries of
the area. Only in the Israeli-Palestinian track, with the Wye Plantation talks
(15-23 October) and the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding
and other associated documents, was it possible to achieve a significant
relaunching, although it was differently assessed in Israeli, Palestinian and
Arab circles. Its true importance will depend on the ability of the parties to
implement and fulfil it.
Something similar is occurring over the Cyprus issue, while the volati-
lity in the Balkans persists. The latter was demonstrated by the Kosovo cri-
sis —which at last is fortunately being contained by NATO action—as well
as tensions in Albania, which appear to have found a means to solution in
the international conference held there on 30 October.
In the Maghreb, the development of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
has stopped short in its tracks. The Algerian situation and the underlying
tensions with Morocco, together with the isolation of Libya, are not hope-
ful signs that it will soon start up again, although Tunisia and Mauritania
are showing themselves particularly intent that it should. The process of
the Western Sahara, as we shall see, continues its unsteady course in the
implementation of the United Nations Settlement Plan, which was revitali-
sed by the mediation of American ex-Secretary of State James Baker. Pro-
gress has been made in identifying voters with a view to holding the 
planned referendum, but the whole process is subject to worrying delays
and is still beset by many unknown factors.
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At the political and economic level, something to be borne in mind is
that a drop in oil prices creates budgetary problems for the oil-producing
countries of the area.
In the surrounding areas of the Mediterranean, the Iraqi question con-
tinues to generate tension and conflicting positions, although the Arab
world is showing itself increasingly inclined to sever the links between the
invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent conflict—i.e., compliance by Iraq
with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, on which the basic
consensus is maintained and the policy of containment applied by the Uni-
ted States to Iraq, Libya and Iran.
The absence of decisive progress in the MEPP has rekindled Arab and
Islamic mistrust of the United States and the feeling that it is carrying out
a two-sided policy, being concerned first and foremost with upholding the
interests of Israel. Although this was to a certain extent modified by the
achievements of Wye Plantation, it continues to be perceived particularly
in respect of the attitudes of the American Congress and Senate. In any
event, the conviction persists that the role of the United States is still vital,
both because it is currently the only superpower, and also because it is
presumed to be the only one capable of persuading Israel.
The climate of Arab impatience in view of this state of affairs has added
weight to the request for greater and more resolute political involvement
by the European Union in the MEPP, since it is already the largest contri-
butor to economic assistance for the Palestinians. But—and in this there
is an element of realism on the part of the Arabs, as well as of paradox—
the dominant feeling is that it should do so while collaborating with the
American initiatives and its leading role in the process. The European
Union, linked to the United States by the strong ties of the Trans-Atlantic
relationship, backs this scheme, although it hankers after a political role
more in consonance with its interests and efforts in the Peace Process.
Washington and Israel, each for its own reasons, would like to see the
European contribution enhanced in respect of the economic aspects and
the process’s multilateral tracks, but their reticence regarding a more
active political role persists.
Another latent focus of attention, which has heated up, is that of the
relations between Syria and Turkey. Together with historic factors and
Syrian feeling about the amputation of the province of Iskenderut in favour
of Turkey, conducted in 1939 under the French mandate following a con-
troversial referendum, elements of the recent political past in the time of
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bipolarity still weigh heavily (i.e., Turkey as a NATO outpost versus the Eas-
tern bloc from which Syria drew support in its struggle against Israel), as
well as basic strategic interests, such as water supply from the Euphrates.
More recently, Turkey’s rapprochement to Israel, which took the form of a
military agreement in 1996, has intensified Syria’s suspicions, and—to a
large extent—those of the Arab and Islamic world. Jordan, which has been
striving to maintain satisfactory relations with Israel after the signing of the
peace agreement, has had, however, to keep its distance, following an ini-
tial apparent movement towards participating in designing this new regio-
nal axis, which, it is assumed, was inspired by the US. It is a reminder of
the CENTO, although the objective this time is not to hem in the ex-USSR;
rather, it is concerned with the Islamic East and the Arab South, and also
—probably—the energy interests connected with the crude oil from the
Caspian.
Against this background, Turkey is accusing Syria of providing shelter
and material support to the Kurdish rebels of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK). A similar imputation has in the past been levelled by Turkey against
Greece, whose PASOK socialist government always maintained a rela-
tionship of affinity with Syria, ever since the beginning of the deceased
Papandreu’s time. It is believed that in both cases the Kurdish issue is
exploited as a means of putting pressure on Ankara.
On 2 October last, President Demirel delivered a serious warning to
Damascus, in which he accused Syria of inciting the Arab countries
against Turkey and actively supporting the PKK. He did not exclude the
«right to reprisals». This tension came to the surface at a time when the
Kurdish question had once more become a burning issue after the agree-
m e n t
signed by the leaders of the Iraqi opposition, Barzani and Talibani, in Was-
hington where, moreover, a bill was being tabled and passed in Congress
(the Iraq Liberation Act) clearly aimed at bringing about the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein. The Syrian reaction to Turkey has been one of tempori-
sing moderation, with a call for dialogue to resolve the pending bilateral
issues and reiteration of its wish to maintain good relations with Ankara.
Nevertheless it continues to ask it to reconsider its strategic ties with
Israel. The signing of the Syrio-Turkish Adanha Agreement (20 October),
supported by Egypt and Iran and in which Damascus met the demands of
Ankara, especially with regard to the PKK, finally put an end—at least for
the time being—to dangerous tensions which, if they had flared up, would
have resulted in serious consequences for the whole region.
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In Iran, on the other hand, the new leadership appears to confirm gre-
ater moderation and a more positive attitude in the country’s relations with
the Western world. However, the strained relationship with the Afghan Tali-
ban could open up a new and dangerous breach in the stability of the area.
Nor must the factor introduced by India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear initia-
tives be ignored. If they are seeking parity between themselves, as well as
India’s strategic equilibrium in respect of China, they must also be viewed
through the prism of the Middle East scenario, where the need to conclude
effective agreements aimed at setting up an area free of nuclear weapons
and weapons of mass destruction is becoming increasingly urgent. The
Israeli attitude is determinant in this connection, given that its alleged
potential—whether real or a ploy to be used as an instrument of dissua-
sion—together with its defensive doctrine (backed by the US) of maintain-
ing strategic military superiority over its neighbours, constitutes an ele-
ment conducive to the proliferation of conventional and non-conventional
weapons in the region. Thus Syria’s policy of pursuing parity by means of
an arms build-up, which it has now had to renounce because the material
support afforded it by the ex-USSR has come to an end, was prompted by
the probably justified belief that any negotiation with Israel without this
backing would be unbalanced. The danger of non-conventional weapons
falling into the hands of radical groups exacerbates the terrorist threat and
the concern about the future.
Nevertheless, it can be said that although not much progress has been
made in stabilising the Mediterranean, the situation has not deteriorated
significantly and, for the time being, there are no signs of new armed con-
flicts between states. The security risks are mainly centred on the subsist-
ing focal points of tension and on South-South relations, as well as on the
domestic situation of some countries of the area, while there is no per-
ception of serious and direct military threats to Europe.
It can be concluded that the Mediterranean, as a unitary space that
encompasses the two shores, continues to require a framework for stabi-
lisation that provides security in a comprehensive form, bearing in mind
the political, economic and social factors necessary to address the dan-
gers stemming from the interactive nature of all of them, and allowing for
in-depth progress to be made in confidence-building and the gradual
construction of co-operative security and joint development.
The Barcelona Process and the principles incorporated into its
Declaration constitute an innovative framework whose revitalisation, as we
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shall see, offers renewed hope in the long term. At the same time, the dif-
ferent Mediterranean dialogues opened by NATO, the OSCE, the WEU and
other institutions such as the Council of Europe itself, offer parallel and
supporting courses, each one consonant with its own identity and speci-
fic perspective, capable of complementing the others and of contributing
its own experience. The Mediterranean is, moreover, in our immediate vici-
nity and constitutes one of the priorities for the construction of the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union, although
until now this policy has not achieved the necessary consistency and
determination. The Union’s coastal countries, including Spain, have as a
result of their historic vocation, their proximity to each other and their sha-
red interests, an important promotional role to play, as occurred with the
inception of the Barcelona Process.
The OSCE, for its part, in its operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Albania, and its work in Croatia, has demonstrated its ability to respond
effectively to large-scale political challenges, while NATO has taken on an
important role that has been instrumental in organising the operations
aimed at containing the Balkan conflict and restoring peace.
The Luxembourg European Council (12-13 December, 1997) took deci-
sions of unprecedented magnitude for the future of the European conti-
nent, launching the accession process of 11 candidates, among which
were the Mediterranean countries of Bulgaria and Slovenia. This will fore-
seeably enlarge the scope of the Barcelona Process.
THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MAGHREB
As this area forms part of Spain’s immediate surroundings, interest in
its stability has been a constant of our policy there, as is the case with
France and Italy. This has led to growing dialogue and collaboration with
our North African neighbours, thereby originating the process that finally
brought about the broader framework of the Barcelona Declaration.
Our historic polarisation in the Maghreb has lost its exclusiveness, al-
though its importance has greatly increased; our global co-operation has
also expanded to the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans; likewise
our political potential in the entire Mediterranean basin was undoubtedly
heightened and its future prospects confirmed at the 1991 Madrid Con-
ference.
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Today, the Maghreb is collectively immersed in a process of rapid
change that requires urgent political, economic and social adaptation.
Thus a period has opened up in which hope goes hand in hand with the
uncertainty attendant upon any transition. We are confident that the former
will prevail and that the latter will eventually disappear, as long as both
shores show themselves to be equal to the challenge.
THE ARAB MAGHREB UNION (AMU)
The AMU has been called upon to address the aspirations of all the
Maghreb peoples and translate their aspirations into reality. It has the
necessary potential to make a very valuable contribution to the Euro-Medi-
terranean Association if, with the backing of its members, it is able to com-
plete the integration of its southern dimension.
This scheme of regional integration that includes Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania has been paralysed for the time being, for
the reasons indicated. Such paralysis is good neither for the Maghreb
countries, nor for the European members, given the integrating potential
that the organisation could bring to the Euro-Mediterranean Association,
in which the South-South facet is essential. The integration of the southern
economies is an inescapable imperative, wherefore it would appear desi-
rable that it be carried out by the signatories of the Treaty of Marrakech,
completed by the dynamics of the Association in which each one is indi-
vidually connected to the EU.
The relations between Morocco and Algeria have been at a low point
ever since 1994, following the terrorist attack in Marrakech and the suspi-
cions of Algerian implication. Rabat imposed visa requirements for Alge-
rian nationals, and Algiers immediately responded by closing the land fron-
tiers with Morocco—a situation that remains unchanged today.
MOROCCO
In the nineties Morocco embarked decisively on a new and promi-
sing phase in its history: it widened the scope of its institutions to ena-
ble an increasingly plural society to make its aspirations known, and to
consolidate the political regime on broader and institutionalised foun-
dations. A basic element of this process was the constitutional reform—
passed in a referendum on 13 September 1996—introducing the two-
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house system. The reform also established a decentralised state, with
the region as the main administrative body. The Regions Act of April
1997 set up regional councils (each a kind of regional parliament with
important powers, including financial powers among others) for the six-
teen regions into which Morocco was divided; of these, three are loca-
ted in the Territory of the Western Sahara. Another of the basic goals of
the constitutional reform is the incorporation of the opposition into the
work of government. The election to the House of Representatives of 14
November 1997 was won by the Socialist Union of People’s Parties. By
blocs, victory at the polls went to the Kutla, followed by the Wifaq and
the Centre, albeit by a narrow margin. In the election for councillors of
the upper house, on 5 December, the Centre won. However, the com-
plexity of the electoral process and the lack of adequate political edu-
cation continue to cause voter dispersion, wherefore the political sce-
nario is significantly fragmented.
The King entrusted the leader of the UFSP, the former opposition lea-
der and political exile, Abderraman Youssoufi, with forming a government.
The result was a coalition government basically structured around the
Kutla (the UFSP, Istiqlal, PPS and the parties close to this coalition, the
FFD and the PSD), reinforced by two centre parties (RNI and MNP). At the
first cabinet meeting, on 25 March 1998, the criteria were laid down for
priority action by the government: the strengthening of the foundations of
the rule of law and democratic practice, with greater attention to be paid
to human rights; the taking of action guided by ethical parameters; the
pursuit of public administration efficiency; and the adoption of a develop-
ment policy based on job promotion, an increase in investments and the
establishment of true social solidarity. A more nationalistic component was
also perceived, mostly in connection with the Saharan issue.
The Budget Act, passed in August 1998, is an interim instrument, in-
spired by standards of austerity. Its forecasts are that the public deficit
ceiling will be 3% of GDP; growth for 1998 is estimated at 6.8%, and 7%
for 1999 (as long as there is a good harvest); and the goal for inflation is
2%. Although emphasis is placed in the aforementioned Act on the fact
that the fight against unemployment and social inequality will receive pri-
vileged treatment, with an increase in allocations to the social ministries




The celebration of the quincentenary of Melilla in 1997 saw an increase
in the number of Moroccan public claims to the two Spanish self-gover-
ning cities. Different demonstrations took place which, however, were not
official, and nor did they get much popular support. The moderation of
King Hassan II tempered the reactions of the political parties considerably.
The statements made by the new Moroccan Government on Ceuta and
Melilla could indicate a reactivation of the issue in the future. At the 53rd Uni-
ted Nations General Assembly, the Moroccan delegation brought up its
usual arguments in favour of opening a joint process of reflection with
Spain.
The well-known Spanish position of principle goes hand in hand with
the idea that, within the framework of fundamental, positive and intense
bilateral relations (complemented by the fact that the two Spanish self-
governing cities of Ceuta and Melilla are joint parties to the Barcelona Pro-
cess and other initiatives within the Mediterranean framework), these two
cities should not be a reason for conflict between the two countries, but
rather a factor for co-operation. There are many contacts between both
Spanish cities and the neighbouring Moroccan towns that are conducive
to their development.
ALGERIA
The process of institutional building carried out by the country’s autho-
rities has been taking place in a climate of intolerable violence that is dis-
turbing to international public opinion. It casts a shadow over the imple-
mentation of the political project that Spain and the EU support and that
has crystallised, for the first time, in a parliament where Islamists share the
space with lay members and representatives of the traditional Algerian
political class. At the same time, the government of this country has stri-
ven to meet its commitments to the International Monetary Fund, by pro-
moting the opening up of its economy and a liberalisation whose results
justify a degree of optimism when it comes to envisaging the medium—
and long-term future.
However, Algeria’s long-drawn-out internal problem has continued to
run its zig-zagging course, with no prospect of a solution achieved through
domestic consensus in sight. Its roots are complex, and throughout the
past years of crisis have been subject to many different and contradictory
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interpretations.
In synthesis, it has a common background with the identity crisis that
has affected a large part of the Arab world in the wake of the post-colonial
age. Already in 1975 Anwar Abdel-el-Malek pointed out in his work on
contemporary Arab thought that all the emancipation rhetoric, laboriously
formulated in the wake of national independence, had been discredited.
The consequent social breakdown spread to politics and many marginali-
sed segments resorted to Islam as a means of channelling their grievan-
ces and restoring their vanished sense of community.
In the case of Algeria, it can be surmised that its scant historic struc-
turing as a state in comparison with that of its two Maghreb neighbours,
together with the legacy of the French occupation that concluded with its
annexation as a department at the beginning of this century without the-
reby integrating the Muslim population at an equal level of citizenship,
contributed to deepening this identity void. The unity created by the war
of independence in support of the FLN (National Liberation Front) and its
nationalistic political doctrine, which at the beginning was markedly lay in
tone, eventually became diluted by the change in the international envi-
ronment in which Algeria moved, as well as its inability to provide a struc-
tured and effective response to the challenge of development. A return to
the religious perspective, in a society in which religion plays a prominent
role, gradually came to dominate the political philosophy of large sectors
of the population. However, this use of religion by political groups in their
struggle for power has undermined its value. Indeed, since the mid-eigh-
ties, political power in Algeria has entered a phase of spiralling decompo-
sition.
The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which was initially backed by the
government as a means of debilitating other political groups, turned
against it. The 1991 elections were won by the Islamists, but the military
did not accept them and the process of democratic transition was thereby
compromised and fundamentalism strengthened. This gave rise to a spi-
ral of violence, in which two forms of authoritarianism confronted each
other, incapable of introducing a democratic power-sharing arrangement.
A retrospective view induces us to think that the only real power that
has existed in Algeria since its independence has been that of the military
establishment, which in the current crisis has shown itself to be opposed
to any compromise with the radical groups. The response to its policy of
eradicating them has been one of increasingly spectacular actions by the
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GIA (Islamic Armed Group). The negotiations between the military power
and the FIS (an organisation with prestige in wide-ranging segments of the
population) were aimed at doing away with the political justification of the
GIA’s actions. The GIA itself has become fragmented as a result of the
internal dissension that has arisen since 1996. Its powerlessness to attack
military installations or lay ambushes for the security forces, as in the past,
has led it to focus its action against the civil population, in a campaign of
terror.
It may be asked whether the Algerian situation has politically benefited
the relative position of other countries in the area, on decreasing the
potential for foreign action and leadership formerly held by the Algerian
government. But even if this were true, the difficulty of controlling it in the
short term is a matter of great concern, as is the danger that it might lead
to more widespread destabilisation if an internal negotiated solution is not
reached with the sectors that reject violence. At the same time, it prevents
the functioning of sub-regional co-operation through the Arab Maghreb
Union.
The degree of normality that returned to Algeria this year, after a blo-
ody month of Ramadan, was again disturbed at the beginning of the sum-
mer by indiscriminate violence in urban areas. This shows that, despite the
effectiveness of police action and offensives by the army in rural areas, the
terrorist groups, albeit increasingly isolated and fragmented, still retain
sufficient operational capability.
The new Algerian parliamentary institutions must show proof of their
democratic disposition in the coming debates on subjects as important as
the Family Code and the Information Code, the reform of which is deman-
ded by a society in rapid process of change and which expects answers
from institutions that, for the first time, it has had an opportunity to elect.
A new and significant step in the process of political and economic
reform carried out by the Algerian government this year has been the deci-
sion by President Zeroual to shorten his term of office, call presidential
elections for the beginning of 1999, and not present himself as a candi-
date. The government proposal to provide greater transparency, without
excluding the presence of international observers, and to enter into dialo-
gue with representatives of different political parties, is a positive sign, not-
withstanding the initial dismay caused by the president’s announcement.
The dialogue between Algeria and the EU was practically at a stands-
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till until the summer, for several reasons—among them the fact that the
Commission for Human Rights in Geneva was addressing the situation in
Algeria—an issue that arouses very strong feelings. If, on the one hand, the
search for a solution to the violence in Algeria must be based on dia-
logue with all the political parties that reject violence, on the other, care
must be taken to avoid any measures that would discredit the Algerian
authorities in their fight against terrorism. Algeria participates actively in
the Barcelona Process, and is currently negotiating the Association Agre-
ement with the European Union.
Now added to the effects of the lengthy domestic crisis, are circums-
tantial or external factors that complicate the economic situation. It appe-
ars that the Algerian economy, contrary to all expectations, grew by only
0.5% per cent in 1997 (or showed negative growth of up to—1 percent;
the facts vary according to the source), while unemployment, according to
official figures, continues at 28-29 percent. Agricultural output dropped by
24 per cent in 1997, which was attributed to the drought that affected the
country, while industrial output in 1997 fell by 7.2 per cent, except in the
gas and hydrocarbons sector, which recorded growth. Nevertheless, the
downward trend in the petroleum prices, as in other producing states,
means that the future situation may be affected, ultimately hampering the
process of economic transition.
TUNISIA
With the prospect ahead of presidential and legislative elections in
1999, there is nothing to indicate that they will bring about major changes
or alarms in Tunisian political life. Formally, there is political pluralism, and
the regime has undertaken constitutional reform to increase the number of
opposition seats.
Economic and social rights are considered more important than politi-
cal rights, in respect of which the regime’s attitude leans very much
towards a strategy of stability aimed at addressing the problem of Islamic
fundamentalism. Therefore, the human rights situation in the country con-
tinues to be the main cause of friction with the EU. Tunisia’s attitude is one
of only wanting to touch on the general principles of human rights within
the framework of the political dialogue under the Association Agreement
with the EU—and not individual cases, which it considers to be internal
affairs not subject to outside interference.
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With an increasingly diversified economic structure and reasonably
satisfactory macro-economic co-ordinates, Tunisia is an important trading
partner for the EU in the Maghreb, and the greater part of this North Afri-
can country’s trade flows go to it. Moreover, Tunisia has a large middle
class and the highest per capita income in North Africa, except for Libya.
All this makes Tunisia a country with good expectations and very valuable
political and economic stability within the context of the Maghreb. Tunisia,
together with Morocco, is the only Maghreb country that until now has sig-
ned an Association Agreement with the EU (1995); this entered into force
on 1 March 1998.
The consolidation of political pluralism and democratic values should
enable its development to proceed with favourable prospects for the
future.
The framework for Hispano-Tunisian relations is the Treaty of Friend-
ship, Good Neighbourliness and Co-operation, signed in 1995 and secu-
red with the strong anchorage forged by history, our current community of
interests and a similar outlook towards the future.
The Tunisian Republic has set its course towards Euro-Mediterranean
association with commendable determination that leaves no doubt about
the position that it wishes to occupy in the international community of the
21st century.
LIBYA
A global scheme for the Mediterranean region must count on the sup-
port and collaboration of all the coastal countries. In the long term the defi-
ciencies of any integrating mechanism that does not include the Libyan
component will become apparent. Its co-operation with the United
Nations in favour of the resolution of the outstanding conflicts and the end
of the international sanctions (which prevented Libya from participating in
the Barcelona Process) would allow for Libya’s rapid return to all the fora
in which the fate of our region is decided.
Through Security Council Resolution 1192 of August 27, the United
Nations accepted the proposal made at the time by the Arab League and
Libya itself that the two suspects who perpetrated the bomb attack on the
Pan-Am plane over Lockerbie should be handed over to a third country
and judged in it by a Scottish court under Scottish rule of law.
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The possibility of reaching an agreement over the holding of a trial of
the Lockerbie bombing suspects in a third country amounts to a conside-
rable change of course in the policy relative to this matter upheld until now
both by Washington and London in recent years. It means a substantial
relaxing of the demands (probably induced by the lack of results from this
policy and the growing difficulties of maintaining the UNSC sanctions in
the face of ever-growing opposition to them from the Arab and African
countries, together with the greater flexibility shown by other Western
capitals, within the bounds of full respect for UNSC decisions).
The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Arab League (Cairo,
15 and 16 September) endorsed, less vigorously than expected, the Lib-
yan demand for greater pressure to be exerted on the US and the United
Kingdom. In any event, the Arab partners of the Barcelona Process have
insistently repeated that Libya should be incorporated as soon as the
international situation permits.
THE WESTERN SAHARA
According to the United Nations Settlement Plan for the Western Sahara
and the Houston Agreements (September 16, 1997), the voter-identification
process was completed on 2 September last. 147,350 people were regis-
tered in the census, not counting applicants belonging to controversial tri-
bes and several hundred people resident abroad. It is hoped that progress
will be made in registering the latter, and that at the same time the applica-
tions of those belonging to non-controversial tribes will be processed. A
compromise was reached in Houston: individuals belonging to controver-
sial tribal groups (identified under the code numbers H41, H61 and J51/52)
may come forward individually for identification even though neither of the
two parties (Morocco and the Polisario Front) sponsors them, nor actively
prevents them from presenting themselves to the MINURSO (United
Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara). Also to be
borne in mind is the fact that an identified applicant does not automatically
acquire voter status, but is interrogated by the competent Identification
Commission in order to determine his eligibility to participate in the referen-
dum.
The issue of the members of controversial tribes continues at a stand-
still. The Moroccan demand that the 65,000 members of these tribal
groups be identified is interpreted by the Polisario, which is sceptical
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about it, as a means of gaining time and perpetuating the status quo, since
it would make it obligatory to conduct an exercise almost impossible to
implement: that of splitting up the groups into hundreds of sub-fractions.
The UN Secretary-General has expressed his concern about this matter in
his latest reports to the Security Council, on account of the risk that it
would entail of blocking the whole process if it is not resolved.
The conclusion of the voter-registration process will bring the most dif-
ficult moment for the parties nearer—that of undertaking the following sta-
ges of preparation of the referendum.
In the event that the difficulties surrounding the registration of contro-
versial voters are overcome, the following stages will not prove simple eit-
her. The UNHCR is continuing with the preparatory work of repatriation of
refugees in accordance with the Settlement Plan, although not without dif-
ficulties. The operation of repatriation, the duration of which was initially
estimated as 15 months, could be prolonged for several additional
months. Nor has the matter of settling the refugees once they have been
repatriated been resolved. All this makes it probable that there will be sub-
sequent delays in the deadlines planned for carrying out the referendum.
Insofar as the conflict in the Western Sahara is concerned, Spain has
always maintained that it is a problem arising from decolonisation, which
can only be solved definitively when the Saharan people are allowed to
decide their destiny in a referendum on self-determination that is free, fair
and subject to all due international guarantees. Spain upholds its position
of total neutrality and unreserved backing for the work of the UN. This neu-
trality does not imply indifference, and therefore Spain remains willing to
collaborate with the UN whenever requested to do so, as long as it has the
agreement of both parties.
Different acts of collaboration have already been implemented (the sen-
ding of experts on an exclusively technical voter-identification mission last
May, and the making of Las Palmas Military Hospital available to MINURSO
members). Moreover, Spain has given $4 million to the UNHCR as a contri-
bution to repatriation work within the framework of the UN Settlement Plan.
In any case, the important thing is the complete implementation of the
Settlement Plan, so that the referendum may finally be held under condi-
tions of freedom, transparency and justice. The mediation of the UN secre-
tary-general’s personal envoy, James Baker, can only be meaningful if he
is able to persuade the parties, with the support of the international com-
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munity, to proceed with the application of the Settlement Plan and the
Houston Agreements.
GIBRALTAR
Notwithstanding Spain’s reasonable proposals, the status of this con-
flict is one of virtual stagnation. The Spanish position is well known. Gibral-
tar’s situation constitutes a colonial anachronism stemming from the
dynastic wars at the beginning of the 18th century, to which we should put
an end. Decolonisation can only be carried out, according to the Treaty of
Utrecht and United Nations doctrine, by returning the territory to Spain.
This is particularly relevant in view of the recent unilateral attempts to alter
the current status of Gibraltar by amending its constitution, granted in
1969. Therefore Gibraltar is a destabilising element, not only for bilateral
relations between the United Kingdom and Spain, but also within the EU
itself. This is because of the continuous efforts by the Colony’s local aut-
horities to assume powers to which they are not entitled, under article
227,40 of the European Communities Treaty, thus attempting to become a
quasi Member State. They also refuse to implement agreements conclu-
ded between the United Kingdom and Spain—for instance, concerning
joint use of the airport.
In December 1997, Spain made a political proposal, within the Brussels
Process, aimed at solving the dispute. The Gibraltarian local authorities
rejected it outright. For London, however, it continues to be under review
and a valid negotiating factor.
In his speech to the 53rd United Nations General Assembly, the Spa-
nish Minister of Foreign Affairs recalled that the Organization’s historic
work of decolonisation cannot be considered complete while situations
like that of Gibraltar still persist. Every year the General Assembly renews
its ap-peals to Spain and the United Kingdom to continue their nego-
tiations with a view to putting an end to Gibraltar’s colonial status. The
current negotiating process began with the 1984 so-called Brussels Joint
Communiqué, in which the governments of Spain and the United Kingdom
undertook to establish a negotiating process. During the 1997 Round of
Negotiations, the Spanish side made a proposal that would enable Spain
to recover sovereignty over Gibraltar, while maintaining the present advan-
tages for its inhabitants, granting them a degree of political autonomy wit-
hin the framework of the Spanish autonomous state, greater than that
which they currently enjoy, and accepting—as an additional guarantee of
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Spanish good faith—the maintaining of shared sovereignty by the United
Kingdom and Spain for a long interim period. This proposal should be able
to form the basis for an agreement that, once and for all, would settle this




At the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the principles which were to
provide inspiration for the Peace Process were laid down. Among them
were United Nations Security Resolutions 242 and 338, providing for Isra-
eli withdrawal from the territories occupied during the Seven Days’ War in
1967 and, in short, confirming the principle of «land for peace». Likewise,
the architecture of the Peace Process was formulated, through the ente-
ring into of direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and each of the
Arab States (Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) and between Israelis and Pales-
tinians.
At the same time, a structure for multilateral negotiations was devised
in order to address issues of regional interest in five working groups (secu-
rity and disarmament, refugees, regional economic development, and
water and the environment).
In this way the Israeli demand for bilateral channels was combined with
international coverage. Although the central issues of the peace agree-
ments had to be negotiated by the parties, the role of the joint sponsors
and other international contributors, working in the multilateral track and
acting as catalysts, was essential. It is fair to think that it would have been
very difficult for the parties, on their own, to meet such a complex cha-
llenge, while sustaining its momentum. The philosophy of Madrid was
based on a gradual approach that would allow for progress towards a final
solution of the Palestinian problem and that, in the meantime, would pro-
mote confidence between the parties. The so-called «Oslo Agreements»
(1993 Declaration of Principles and 1995 Interim Agreement) came into
being in this way. They established a provisional phase, or one of self-
government for the Palestinian Territories, during which the withdrawal of
Israeli troops from these territories would take place and civil power would
be transferred to the Palestinian Authority. According to the Agreement,
this provisional phase would last for five years and the Final Statute would
then be negotiated, covering such issues as the future of Jerusalem, the
refugees, the settlements, and the borders.
The Middle-East Peace Process advanced rapidly during the first five
years notwithstanding the intrinsic difficulties, thanks to the determination
of many political leaders of the region, including Prime Minister Yitzak
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Rabin, who paid with his life for his brave bid for peace.
Ever since the Likud Party Coalition came to power in May 1968, com-
prising nationalist and religious parties, the government led by the prime
minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, has adopted a more rigid and intransigent
policy that, until the recent Wye Memorandum, obstructed further pro-
gress in the Peace Process beyond the troop withdrawal from Hebron
carried out in January of last year. The current Israeli prime minister insists
on the absolute priority of guaranteeing Israel’s security, on terms in which
the territorial component takes precedence. At the same time his coalition
rejects the possibility of a Palestinian state. Since last year, however, this
option has not been ruled out by the Israeli Labour platform.
The EU has continued in 1998 to express its extreme concern about
the lack of progress in the Middle-East Peace Process and the threat that
this poses for peace and stability in the region. Through the efforts made
by its Special Envoy for the Middle East, Spanish diplomat Miguel Angel
Moratinos, as well as through its diplomatic relations with the involved and
interested parties and its financial contribution, the EU has striven to sup-
port the relaunching of the process, by suggesting ideas and proposals.
The contacts with the United States and the backing for its initiative,
whose successive steps it has followed attentively, have been significant.
Among other things, we should remember the London meeting in May and
the visits to the Middle East by the Presidents of the Council and the Com-
mission.
Parallel to the EU’s political role, we should recall its essential econo-
mic and financial contribution to the Peace Process, as the main aid donor
to the Palestinian people (approx. US$1.437 billion over the past five
years). This aid has an important political mission to perform in the case of
the Palestinians, in the sense that it enables them to diminish their intrin-
sic inequality as a party vis-à-vis Israel, thereby giving them a stronger
negotiating position.
The Cardiff European Council (15-16 June 1998) made a pressing call
upon Israel to recognise the Palestinians’ right to the exercise of free
determination, without excluding the option of an independent state. At
the same time it asked the Palestinians to reaffirm their commitment to
Israel’s legitimate right to live within secure and recognised borders. It also
recalled the EU’s opposition to Israeli settlements in the occupied territo-
ries and its commitment to co-operation in the matter of security, which
must be total, constant and unreserved. It likewise expressed its concern
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about the lack of progress in the Syrian and Lebanese tracks of the Peace
Process, insisting on the need to reactivate them in order to achieve com-
prehensive peace based on the principle of land for peace and the perti-
nent Security Council resolutions. Although it welcomed Israeli accep-
tance of Security Council Resolution 425, it renewed its call for full and
unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon. Finally,
it confirmed its intention to continue collaborating, through its Special
Envoy, its diplomatic relations and its economic involvement, as well as
through its relations of friendship with the parties concerned both within
and without the region, with a view to restoring confidence and strengthe-
ning the Peace Process.
All eyes are now focused on the implementation of the Wye agree-
ments, in the hope that progress will also be generated in other tracks of
the process.
CYPRUS AND TURKEY
The Cyprus dispute affects not only the European Union’s relations
with that country, but also the European Union’s relations with Turkey, Gra-
eco-Turkish relations, and the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean.
Therefore, Cyprus is frequently presented more as an object than as a sub-
ject in the disputes that polarise its surroundings. The historic and psy-
chological factors that are involved, which at times are presented with
passionate overtones that leave little margin for political rationale, merely
accentuate the divergent profiles.
The European Union continues firmly committed to the goal of achie-
ving a political and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus issue, on the basis
of the pertinent UN Security Council resolutions, in order that an end may
be put to the division of the island. The EU’s position is that a dual-com-
munity and dual-zone federation of two politically equal bodies must be
achieved. The accession of Cyprus is envisaged from this perspective of
civil peace and reconciliation, as pointed out by the Luxembourg Euro-
pean Council. However, when the accession negotiations started in March
1998, the EU was forced to note regretfully that it had not been possible
to draw closer to a mutually-acceptable solution. The Turko-Cypriot com-
munity responded negatively to the Cypriot Government’s invitation to
send representatives to the negotiations, although the offer remains open.
At the same time, concern continues about the excessive number of wea-
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pons in Cyprus, which contributes to raising the tension in the region. As
a result, efforts should be redoubled to ensure that all parties concerned
understand and appreciate the benefits that would be obtained if the uni-
fied island were to accede to the European Union. In the same way, there
is no doubt that in order to fur-ther a solution to the Cypriot dispute, it is
necessary to continue to stimulate relations between the European Union
and Turkey.
With regard to Turkey, many people expect it to decide between its
European or Asian, lay or Islamic, and Eastern or Western options. Howe-
ver, its specific nature as a bridge between different cultures must be
valued, since this constitutes one its major sources of wealth in all sphe-
res. Likewise, its options aimed at consolidating its democratic system (an
essential condition for its progressive integration into Europe, of which it is
an ally within NATO) must be respected and encouraged. Its dual Euro-
pean and Asian nature gives it a strategic value difficult to equal. Turkey
can play the part of a meeting place between Europe and the Near East
and the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as a central point radiating
stability and prosperity—at a time when there is significant international
interest in the Caspian oil resources.
The EU has reiterated its marked interest in the political, economic and
social stability of Turkey, which it considers to be a stabilising factor in the
entire area. The Luxembourg European Council (14, December 1997) con-
firmed Turkey’s eligibility to become a member of the Union, based on the
same criteria as those applied to other candidates, and drawing up a stra-
tegy to this end. The disappointment shown by Ankara is partly unders-
tandable. It led to the announcement by Prime Minister Yilmaz that, «there
will be no more political dialogue between Turkey and the European
Union», while at the same time adding that the process of integration of
the north of Cyprus into Turkey would move ahead, in parallel with the
negotiations on the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the Union.
In March 1998, the Commission formulated different proposals to pro-
mote the development of relations on a solid and evolutionary basis. Not-
withstanding the differences that arose concerning the future accession
and the fact that Ankara declined to participate in the London Conference,
which all the candidates had been invited to attend, there is a clear will to
improve bilateral relations to the mutual benefit of both parties, although
this also requires active co-operation by Ankara and a positive attitude of
rapprochement over the Cyprus issue. The hope remains that Turkey will
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agree to attend the second Conference, which is due to take place under




If, on the one hand, the process of separation and independence of
Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia is gradually being consolidated, peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina is progressing slowly, and even with worrying uncer-
tainties, within the framework of the Dayton Agreements. The results of
last September’s elections showed a strengthening of the ultra-nationalist
political parties led by Radovan Karadzic. However, the re-election of Alija
Izetbegovic as Bosnian representative in the collegiate presidency, which
opens up a possibility of continuity in the implementation of the Dayton
agreements, and the election of the moderate Zivko Radisic as Serbo-
Bosnian representative in this presidency, together with the absence of
Momcilo Krajisnik, are positive developments.
The consolidation of peace in the former Yugoslavia, including its insti-
tutional development, reconstruction and the return of the refugees, has
constituted one of the EU’s priorities over the past year. It was materiali-
sed in the form of assistance in an amount of 250 million ECUs. The EU’s
role as the primary contributor to international assistance was ratified at
the fourth Conference of Donors to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Brussels, 7-
8 May 1998). Humanitarian assistance has received special attention.
However, despite some improvements, the events in the region—and
especially the Kosovo crisis—could lead to more serious challenges.
In general terms, the EU’s relations with the countries of the region
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania) have continued
along the guidelines of the Conclusions of the April 1997 Council, ratified
on 28 April 1998. At the end of this year a decision will be taken about the
continuation in 1999 of the trade regime, bearing in mind compliance with
the established political terms. Relations with the FRY have been domina-
ted by the development of the Kosovo crisis and the successive attempts
to persuade President Milosevic to put an end to the indiscriminate use of
violence, as well as similar calls upon the Kosovo Albanian leadership. In
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June 1998, the Cardiff European Council ordered President Milosevic to
terminate the operations of the security forces against the civilian popula-
tion and to withdraw the security forces used for repression; to facilitate
international supervision in Kosovo, and the return of the refugees, as well
as free access by humanitarian organisations; and to advance in the poli-
tical dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian leadership. Otherwise, he was
warned, the international community would have to opt for much tougher
action.
At the same time, a number of complementary measures were adop-
ted (a weapons and materiel embargo, the refusal to grant visas, the free-
zing of export credits and a prohibition against new investment, as well as
the prohibiting of flights between the FRY and the EU). The EU is opposed
to independence for Kosovo, but is in favour of a special status, with wide-
ranging autonomy, within the FRY. As for Croatia, the EU’s position conti-
nues to be based on the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement, and with regard
to Bosnia Herzegovina, on the objectives established at the Bonn Peace
Implementation Council (December 1997).
ALBANIA
With regard to Albania, the EU has reactivated its political dialogue with
Tirana and has continued to provide aid for the purpose of overcoming last
year’s political, economic and financial crisis.
MALTA
Following the suspension by Malta of its application for accession to
the EU in 1996, which prevented its probable inclusion in the package of
priority candidacies adopted at Luxembourg, a Partnership Council was
held in April 1998 at which both parties agreed to continue the future deve-
lopment of their relations (Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue). There
was a new government following the Malta general election, which once
again included the submitting of an application for accession among its
goals.
THE SECURITY OF EUROPE AND THE STABILITY 
AND SECURITY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
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With regard to the potential for conflict in the Mediterranean, analysts
coincide in the fact that, in the same way as in other parts of the world, a
significant change of direction has taken place in this new era that has suc-
ceeded the cold war and bipolarity. The danger of armed conflict between
states has also declined in the Middle East since the Camp David Agree-
ments in 1979 and the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, as well as
the most recent treaty with Jordan and the agreements entered into with
the Palestinians. However, the risk remains comparatively high, given the
block-ing of the Peace Process. Likewise, there is increased danger of
domestic conflicts which almost always have more or less far-ranging
international repercussions. This constitutes a complex challenge to secu-
rity.
In societies in transition, such as those on the southern shore of the
Mediterranean, the old sources of conflict, such as the cultural, ethnic or
religious antagonisms, are enhanced by new factors such as the lack of
proper government, population problems, the scarcity or improper use of
natural resources, environmental degradation, and weapons proliferation.
The remedies to these problems are as complex as their causes. They
involve the need for a continued effort that combines a variety of instru-
ments. This is a task that requires the participation of international organi-
sations, as well as multilateral and bilateral co-operation between states.
The preventive dimension, directed at defusing tension, stopping the
immediate violence and implementing preventive policies that address the
underlying causes of conflict (peace building), is a key issue. Once they
have erupted, conflicts are much more difficult to resolve.
Apart from intensified dialogue and classic security methods, the long-
term building of stability and security requires elements such as co-ope-
ration, trade, backing for democratisation, good governance, and the
strengthening of civil society. The diversity of instruments underlines the
need for coherent and global approaches that integrate these different ele-
ments in a comprehensive and long-term perspective.
Short-term conflict prevention can include measures ranging from
mediation/negotiation to diplomatic or economic pressure—supported, if
need be, by the willingness to resort to military means (i.e., the strategy
applied in ex-Yugoslavia). At the same time, prevention and the capability
to carry out actions at short notice implies adequate early warning. That
involves the study of long-term trends and underlying sources of violence,
as well as the short-term monitoring of events likely to unleash it.
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Deriving from its responsibility as one of the main actors in ensuring
international stability (for obvious reasons, including that of its proximity)
the European Union is called upon to play an active role in the Mediterra-
nean, by helping to prevent or manage crises. This must be done in close
contact with other countries of the region, with the UN, with other compe-
tent international or regional organisations that have a Mediterranean
dimension or have established a dialogue in the area (the Council of
Europe, the OSCE, the WEU and NATO), but also the Arab League and the
AMU in the Maghreb. Close co-ordination with the United States, as laid
down in the Trans-Atlantic Action Plan, is likewise essential.
To summarise, it can be said that the greatest difficulty for the coun-
tries on both sides of the Mediterranean is how to assure a peaceful and
negotiated settlement of their differences, which is based on co-operation
and the need to address a common destiny at a time of transition that, alt-
hough to a different extent and in different ways, affects them individually
a s
states as well as regionally and sub-regionally.
Interest in security and co-operation in the Mediterranean has develo-
ped considerably in the past few years, giving rise to different Western-
European initiatives. All of them strive to find the means of making a spe-
cific contribution to the stability of the neighbouring regions.
This must consist of a gradual rapprochement that takes into account
the sensitivities of the countries on the southern shore. They are suspicious
of what could turn out to be an attempt by Europe to project its own sche-
mes in this area, and would like such initiatives to lead to true dialogue,
aimed at building together a system of stability and security in the region.
At the same time, their interests and commitments in the context of other
regional institutions to which some of them belong, such as the Arab Lea-
gue or the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), would have to be taken into
account.
The overall perspective from which the countries of the southern shore
view the stability and security of the area must be appreciated and under-
stood. For many of them, as shown in their positions within the framework
of the different Mediterranean dialogues now under way, socio-economic,
cultural and environmental factors, for example, constitute harsh realities
that must be addressed. They also endanger their internal security and sub-
regional relations, and constitute risks which are as great, if not greater, in
the immediate term than the traditional risks. They insistently ask not only
— 167 —
that Europe bear this duly in mind in such dialogues and in general co-ope-
ration with them, but also that it do so within its own European security
scheme.
THE BARCELONA PROCESS AS AN INNOVATIVE INITIATIVE FOR
SETTING UP AN AREA OF STABILITY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
In the 1997-98 Strategic Panorama produced by this Institute, a more
detailed analysis was made of the Euro-Mediterranean Process that led to
the Conference and Declaration of Barcelona of 27 November 1995.
Taking that analysis as the point of departure, the time has come, in this
new edition, to evaluate it together with the prospects of its immediate
developments.
By way of synthesis, and as a reminder, it must be pointed out that the
European and Mediterranean countries of the EU, among which Spain
cannot be discounted, played a key role of promotion. This was the con-
sequence of the maturing, since the seventies and eighties, and in con-
junction with the incipient European political co-operation (now the Euro-
pean Security and Co-operation Policy—better known as the
CFSP-PESC), of the need for a comprehensive and multilateral relations-
hip that would complete the traditional framework of bilateral relations bet-
ween the EU countries and its associates of the South. Its window of poli-
tical opportunity ar-rived with the profound changes in world policy and
the European scenario which prevailed in the first half of this decade, follo-
wed by the Kuwaiti crisis and the advances in the Middle-East Peace Pro-
cess (MEPP) following the 1991 Madrid Conference and the Oslo Agree-
ments between Israelis and Palestinians. The goal was to promote peace
and stability in the Mediterranean, in the wake of the aforementioned geo-
political changes and the emerging new challenges, through an innovative
partnership capable of contributing decisively to resolving the many and
complex regional issues. Its rationale lay in the fact that the political, eco-
nomic and social co-operation leading to development, modernisation and
the creation of an area of shared prosperity, would constitute the building
blocks of stability and would bring peace to the area.
Based on this philosophy, Barcelona was conceived in relation to the
Middle East as a post pacem process, at a time when the MEPP appea-
red to be channelled in the right direction, with a solution just around the
corner. The purpose of Barcelona was that of helping, through the creation
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of positive synergy, to settle the conflicts and tensions in the regions, but
it was not an attempt to replace the already-existing processes. At the
same time, it was assumed that the sheer magnitude of the Barcelona Pro-
cess and its importance for all its members would in some way place it
above the parties.
The negative effects on the Barcelona Process of the stagnation in the
Middle East Peace Process became clearly visible, especially in the politi-
cal chapter of Barcelona, but also in respect of other aspects, such as the
possibility of carrying out sub-regional co-operation. The reasoning behind
the position of Barcelona’s Arab members was that their agreement to par-
ticipate in it with Israel was the result of the progress achieved in the MEPP
and that the co-operation which it brought in its train constituted a com-
pensation. When the MEPP came to a standstill, it was not fair that Israel
should receive that benefit. This same reasoning was applied to the
MEPP’s multilateral tracks, such as the MENA Economic Conference.
The second Euro-Med Ministerial Conference in Malta (1997) was for
this reason, as well as the mistaken decision to use it to relaunch the
MEPP, a chilly occasion, but notwithstanding its difficulties, it provided an
opportunity for reflection. An awareness began to develop on both sides
of the Mediterranean of the dangers inherent in converting the Barcelona
Process into a permanent hostage of the MEPP. Without ignoring the ine-
vitable connection, its comprehensiveness and range should place it on
another plane, in order to enable the shared principles and goals formula-
ted in the Declaration and the Working Programme to be implemented.
The ad hoc Ministerial Conference of Palermo, held in June 1998 and
entrusted with evaluating the course of the Process, showed a clear and
shared political will to maintain its progress and to further its subsequent
development. Common, comprehensive and long-term interests gave the
process a basis of renewed strength.
Barcelona’s raison d’être combines a wide range of elements incorpo-
rated into its three Chapters and its Working Programme. These are
interdependent dimensions that must be mutually reinforced. Together,
they must afford greater confidence, a gradual convergence, and the foun-
dations on which to gradually build—among all its members—a specific
Euro-Mediterranean system of stability and multilateral or collective secu-
rity that is able to benefit from other previous positive experiences, such
as those deriving from the European process and from a new concept for
the inter-regional relationship.
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In this sense, the Association Agreements between the EU and the
Southern countries, which Barcelona sets out to complement by means of
multilateral co-operation, constitute a powerful instrument for promoting
such convergence.
There are still major difficulties and uncertainties, and a long road still
lies ahead, but it can be said that, for its members, the Barcelona Process
is the best option available. During decades of instability in the region, not-
hing similar has been possible or was attempted.
The goal is not only to promote a comprehensive North-South rela-
tionship, the immediate ambitious intention of which is to set up a free
trade area by the year 2010, constituting a key instrument in creating a
Euro-Mediterranean area of shared prosperity, albeit not its ultimate objec-
tive. Also envisaged is a sub-regional partnership, the need for which
becomes more or less acute according to the existing asymmetry between
it and Europe, as well as its evolution and new realities. One of them is
awareness of the essential indivisibility of the political processes: security
and socio-economic development, both national and international.
In order to meet this challenge, the basic ideas incorporated into the
Barcelona Declaration require:
—a sufficient degree of consensus on the universalisation and conso-
lidation of democratic values;
—a new global concept of security in the region based on peaceful
relations, co-operation and a system of reciprocal guarantees and
controls;
—a social policy oriented towards liberalisation and tolerance of other
people’s values, together with the search for a common denomina-
tor;
—the reduction of the existing asymmetry between the levels of inte-
gration and socio-economic development of the North-South and
South-South axes;
—a positive synergy and convergence between the processes existing
in the area, while working towards the attainment of greater co-ope-
ration and the integration of policies in the different fields.
The concept of stability invoked at Barcelona has a dynamic rather
than a static sense, associated to the guidelines incorporated into it.
Among them, it should be recalled, are: mutual respect and the obligations
deriving from international law and the regional instruments to which the
members are a party; sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-inter-
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vention in internal affairs; people’s equality of rights, including the right to
self-determination; the rule of law and the essential democratic principles
as well as the fundamental political and civil freedoms, which cannot be
dissociated from a more balanced model of development for the region;
diversity, pluralism and tolerance; and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
From this perspective, Chapter I of the Barcelona Declaration incorpo-
rates major goals and the means for enhancing the political dialogue and
achieving peace and stability. However, a common strategic language in
the region is still lacking, wherefore a joint conceptual basis needs to be
developed to deal with the main elements.
The plan for/objective of a security and stability charter must be con-
ceived as a flexible framework, based on a shared perception of the prin-
ciples and aims agreed at Barcelona. This must constitute a voluntary poli-
tical instrument of an evolutionary nature that, without carrying with it any
legal obligation, implies a moral commitment destined to develop such
principles, while providing the appropriate structure for the progressive
construction of the partnership in this sphere.
The task is not easy for several reasons, ranging from conceptual plu-
rality to the political situations or conflicts still persisting in the region,
whose solution depends on reconciliation.
Another obstacle has historic, psychological, socio-economic and cul-
tural roots that require the gradual building up of the partnership, in the
search for a confluence of perceptions about the main risks for stability
and the creation of common security, while bearing in mind the diversity of
traditions and values that make up the respective identity of each country.
Among the aforementioned risks are: terrorism, organised crime, political
and social violence, economic problems, cultural conflicts (including reli-
gious issues), and migratory tensions. Some cases will require waiting until
the political conditions prevail that will make convergence possible. It will
also be necessary to make the commitments of the member countries of
Barcelona compatible with their membership in different regional organi-
sations with influence in this sphere. Finally, greater transparency, infor-
mation exchange and confidence building are necessary, given that a sus-
picion sometimes persists in the South that Europe is trying to plan and
impose its own security schemes, rather than, together with them, evolve
a new scheme, adapted to the specific circumstances and needs of the
Euro-Mediterranean region.
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Only from this participatory and collective perspective, which provides
a multilateral framework, will it be possible to conceive the future of the
Mediterranean with any degree of optimism, in the hope, of course, that it
will be peaceful and harmonious. Only through it will it be possible to pre-
dict with a certain amount of confidence the necessary convergence of the
different ideological systems, attenuate insofar as possible the major
socio-economic disparities, temper the excesses of exalted nationalisms
and their aftermaths and, in short, face up to the multiple sources of con-
flict that endanger the peace, stability and prosperity of the whole region.
After the critical moment represented by the Second Euro-Med Minis-
terial Conference (Malta, April 1997), the Barcelona Process was revitali-
sed at the ad hoc Ministerial Conference at Palermo last June that, accor-
ding to all the European and Arab member countries, reaffirmed the spirit
of Barcelona and gave fresh impetus to the Partnership.
It was possible at Palermo to focus the concepts of security and sta-
bility from an overall standpoint, including in them the ideas of economic
and social stability. Moreover the complementarity of the Barcelona Pro-
cess and the MEPP was clarified once more, in the sense that they would
be considered parallel but interactive, with the former exerting a positive
influence but without holding the latter hostage.
It was also possible to take specific decisions that were unanimously
considered encouraging (e.g., dialogues on migration and terrorism, pro-
gress in the work on drawing up a Charter for Peace and Stability, appro-
val of the Spanish idea for a Conference on Regional Co-operation, among
other subjects), both by the partners of the South and by the European
countries most involved and interested in the effective development of the
Euro-Mediterranean Association.
With regard to the immediate prospects, the third Euro-Med Ministerial
Conference is due to be held in April 1999 in Stuttgart. It is also very
important because it will coincide with the renewal of the MEDA budgets
which, according to the priorities laid down to date, must strengthen the
overall concept of security and stability, thereafter developing the subs-
tantive contents of the Euro-Med Association.
Added to the confirmation and consolidation of the positive general
climate emanating from the ad hoc Palermo Conference, which was
directed at stimulating the greater, balanced and interactive develop-
ment of the three Chapters of the Barcelona Process, is a renewed spi-
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rit of participation and less distrust on the part of the Partners. At the
same time there is a greater willingness to enter into true dialogue, as
well as sensitivity on the part of Europe concerning the issues brought
up by them. A more flexible and pragmatic Arab attitude can be appre-
ciated: without renouncing the connection of the Barcelona Process
with the MEPP, nor the upholding of their position in this respect, they
are anxious to preserve all the common prospects and interests deriving
from the Barcelona Process.
THE MEDITERRANEAN FORUM
A precursor on a minor scale of the Barcelona process, the Medite-
rranean Forum groups 11 countries (Spain, Italy, France, Greece, Portu-
gal, Malta, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey). The Ravello
Ministerial Session (1996), followed by that of Algiers (1997), confirmed
the importance of preserving it as an informal and flexible forum and a
laboratory for Mediterranean ideas, since then oriented towards a more
substantive contribution to the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Process
without undergoing dilution of its specific nature. Spain held the presi-
dency of the Forum from the time of the Algiers meeting until the Palma
de Mallorca Ministerial Session (April 20-21, 1998). During that period
important work was achieved within these general guidelines. This helped
to transfer initiatives such as the start of dialogues on terrorism, migration
and the movement of people, as well as conceptual contributions to the
tasks concerning security, stability and different areas of co-operation in
the economic and socio-cultural areas, to the framework of Barcelona.
That contribution, ultimately reflected in the Palma de Mallorca Conclu-
sions, was incorporated into the aforementioned ad hoc Euro-Med Minis-
terial Meeting of Palermo, and continues on the agenda, under the current
Maltese presidency of the Forum, with a view to the third Euro-Med
Ministerial Conference at Stuttgart.
THE OTHER «MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUES»
Most of the members of the European Union are at the same time
members of NATO and, together with the Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the Western European
Union, they participate in the Mediterranean dialogue to a greater or les-
ser extent. In the South, the institutions to which the coastal countries
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belong cannot be overlooked—especially the Arab League and the Arab
Maghreb Union, although the latter has sunk into a state of lethargy, for
well-known political reasons. Finally, in the economic field, within the spe-
cific framework of the Middle-East Peace Process, there is the Economic
Conference for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Nor, in the field
of regional security, can the connections with weapons control and disar-
mament agreements be forgotten. These are: the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), the Chemical Weapons Treaty (CWT), the Biological Weapons Tre-
aty (BWT), and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT).
This poses the question of what the contribution of these and other
bodies or international organisations (e.g., UNESCO and the Inter-Parlia-
mentary Union) will be to the Mediterranean dialogue and what their con-
nection will be with the Barcelona Process, bearing in mind the different
features and substance of these bodies.
From the standpoint of the European Union, it is the latter which, on
account of its global nature, must co-ordinate the efforts of the Mediterra-
nean dialogue. However, all contributions are useful, as long as the princi-
ples of complementarity and coherence are observed regarding initiatives
that are sometimes similar in content but have different components and
institutional commitments. In other words, they must support each other
mutually, but refrain from interfering.
In this sense, Spain itself has provided strong inspiration to the Medi-
terranean dialogue of the New NATO, from the time of the alliance’s Stra-
tegic Concept, adopted at the 1991 Rome Summit, and the 1994 Brussels
Declaration, to the agreement on this matter adopted at the Sintra Minis-
terial Council and then endorsed at the Madrid Summit. The level of this
dialogue was raised with the setting up of the Mediterranean Co-operation
Group. Its first contacts with the six countries (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia,
Jordan, Israel and Mauritania) which currently participate in the 16+1 dia-
logue have been encouraging.
However, it is necessary to bear in mind the sensitivities that, for diffe-
rent reasons, persist in the Arab countries regarding the Mediterranean ini-
tiatives by the Western-European security organisations. In this context,
and with a view to diminishing such misgivings, Europe has undertaken
the task of explaining aspects such as EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR and the






By JOSÉ SÁNCHEZ MÉNDEZ
Overall, 1998 can be considered a positive year for Ibero-America,
even though the region’s economic performance—albeit excellent—was
lower in terms of macroeconomic figures than in 1997. Nonetheless, a
majority of the region’s inhabitants still voice concern over their future.
These at least were the findings of a large poll taken by Corporación Lati-
nobarímetro, a non-profit organisation based in Santiago de Chile that was
founded with aid from the European Union. The survey interviewed over
17,500 people in 17 countries throughout the region (with a few glaring
exceptions such as Cuba), and provided such a good overview of the sub-
continent that the mammoth task has been repeated three times conse-
cutively. From Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego, Ibero-American citizens
expressed their concern over the state of affairs, and 77 percent felt that
the situation of their country was either stagnant or getting worse. Alt-
hough the institutions of Ibero-America continue to enjoy the support of a
majority of the population (with 63% expressing support in Mexico and
South America and 66% in Central America), the results of the poll cast
doubt on whether Ibero-American institutions are strong and stable
enough to withstand the growing dissatisfaction. The inhabits of the region
are also beginning to express their dissatisfaction with the workings of
democracy, with a full 65% claiming disappointment with the system. The
exceptions are Uruguay and Costa Rica, both of which have long-standing
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(*) Translator’s note: The IEEE opted for this term rather than the more commonly used «Latin
America» in orden to reflect the Iberian peninsula’s special links with
those countries.
traditions of democracy, and where 60% of the population claims to be
satisfied with the progress of democracy.
This widespread dissatisfaction could be the reason behind the gro-
wing support for authoritarian forms of government, even in countries
where democratic institutions formerly enjoyed considerable backing. This
is the case in Mexico for instance, where in just one year support among
the population for an authoritarian government has increased to over 30%,
eight points higher than last year’s level. The advance of authoritarianism
is closely tied to the widely held view that governments are increasingly
ineffective and powerless. In one year, there was a drop from 60% to 48%
in the percentage of people who regarded the government as the country’s
most powerful institution, whereas the number of people who thought that
multinationals and large companies were the country’s true power brokers
dropped five points to 44%. If this is the case, who has increased their
power and influence throughout the continent? The almost unanimous
reply is the political parties and the armed forces. In Central America
however, the survey indicates that the influence of the armed forces has
actually waned (from 28% to 18%), as a result of increasingly stable
democracy following the devastating conflicts waged in the previous
decade.
POLITICAL ASPECTS
According to James Petras, sociologist and professor at New York’s
Binghamton University, two of the basic principles of Ibero-America’s tran-
sition to democracy—government by alternating administrations and ina-
bility of governing parties to use official institutions to retain their grip on
power indefinitely—are in grave danger right now. In his view, even though
the principle of alternating government remains in force, it has lost much
of its meaning for many citizens, whose growing lack of interest has led to
a drop in voter participation. This apathy is caused by the incapability of
political parties and leaders to implement measures to ensure that all par-
ties play by the rules of democracy in their election campaigns and to pre-
vent a situation where although parties and leaders come and go, their
style of politics is the same.
According to Petras, the second threat is a resurgence of continualism,
or self-perpetuation, although within the framework of a representative
system instead of a military regime. It has traditionally been held that
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abuse of power by the governments of Ibero-America has made the sys-
tem of au-thoritative governments endemic to the region’s culture, not only
in the sense of individuals holding on to personal power, but also institu-
tions such as the armed forces, and in the practice of limiting candidates
in elections to hand-picked successors. The renowned sociologist feels
that the influence of vested interests has fostered political corruption and
therefore made it necessary to eliminate one of the key features of conti-
nualism—the habit of re-electing the president. However, several adminis-
trations have used the resources and influence of the state to introduce
constitutional reforms designed to perpetuate their hold on power, and
Petras maintains that over half of Ibero-America’s population continues to
live under continualist regimes. The professor ends by adding that this
practice is a departure from the rules and regulations of democracy and
that these civilian authoritarian regimes initially arose from open political
competition with the aim or excuse of ensuring that the country did not fall
once again under the sway of military regimes, but that they are in reality
virtually identical in both form and content to these very same regimes.
This fact renders futile all efforts at breaking with the past and actually
paves the way for a return to the militarisation of politics through this new
electoral authoritarianism.
In the 1998 edition of the Strategic Panorama, the London Internatio-
nal Institute for Strategic Studies maintains that although the military in
Ibero-America have returned to their barracks, they have not renounced
influence or power, but simply adapted their tactics to the new circums-
tances of democracy. As an example, the article points to the designation
in May 1997 of General Hugo Banzer as president of Bolivia. Though he
did in fact win the post by fair election, the former dictator nonetheless
was able to once again to participate in politics and regain power. After
citing a number of similar cases of the participation of the military in
various Ibero-American republics, the IISS warns that many former and
current army officers are beginning to emerge not only as possible presi-
dential candidates, but also as a power behind the scenes that exercises
considerable influence over democratically elected civilian governments.
The article cites in particular the case of General Augusto Pinochet who in
March 1998 renounced his post of Commander in Chief of the Armed For-
ces of Chile in order to be appointed senator for life according to the
constitutional provisions of 1980 that were drawn up when he was presi-
dent. From this position he is able to take part in and influence the
country’s budget and other important policy decisions.
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The aforementioned London institute goes on to mention a number of
other cases of the military vying for considerable power through less
constitutional means. It specifically cites the armed forces of Mexico, whose
influence has grown due to the high-profile fight against Zapatist guerrillas
and the five major drug cartels who exert an ever-increasing influence over
the affairs of the country. It also points to the case of Colombia, where the
armed forces have secured a powerful position for themselves at regional
and local level under the pretext of combating the country’s guerrillas, drug
lords, and paramilitary militias. A further example is Ecuador, where the
armed forces constitute one of the country’s most popular institutions. The
military earned this popularity by its role in modernising the country during
the decade of the 1970’s when the large profits were being earned from the
sale of oil. The IISS goes on to mention Peru, where Alberto Fujimori relies
on the army to bolster his own position, particularly following the operation
mounted to rescue the hostages held by guerrillas at the Japanese embassy
in April 1997. The IISS ends its analysis by stating that future threats to
democratic stability in Ibero-America will not come from military take-overs,
but rather from capable officers who will attempt to fill institutional, political
and social power vacuums in fairly stable democratic governments with
good economic growth, but that are victimised by organised crime tied to
drug trafficking, and the vestiges of guerrilla movements that have not been
completely eradicated, especially in Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
In early September 1998 the 12th summit meeting of the heads of state
and government of the fourteen nations of the Rio Group was held in
Panama. The leaders of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay did not attend on
account of the serious economic setback caused by the international
financial crisis in summer 1998, among other pressing domestic problems.
The Rio group currently includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela,
as well as two rotating representatives of Central America and the Carib-
bean. At this summit, the four member states of Mercosur (Argentina, Bra-
zil, Paraguay and Uruguay) and Peru laid down their conditions for the
incorporation as full members into the Rio Group of the democratic Cen-
tral American and Caribbean countries that had requested membership.
These conditions—an in-depth discussion of the timeliness, advisability
and nature of enlargement—stemmed basically from the concern that the
enlargement of this group, founded in 1986, would be tantamount to esta-
blishing a new Organisation of American States, though without the Uni-
ted States and Canada. In my opinion, they are badly mistaken, for if the
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Ibero-American countries are to command respect, as they rightfully
should, from their two more powerful neighbours to the north, they must
do so together, with a single, united voice, as is the case of the European
Union. In Panama City, Ibero-America demonstrated the progress it has
made in consolidating democracy, but also its failures in implementing the
mechanisms necessary for building confidence and cushioning the effects
of the economic crisis of summer 1998. Servicing a foreign debt of 640
billion dollars uses up a good part of domestic savings and affects the
budget, development programmes and the fight against poverty and
unemployment. At the Panama meeting, the Rio Group negotiated with the
International Monetary Fund to exert 
greater multilateral control over the flow of speculative capital that volati-
ses capital and penalises weaker economies.
SECURITY AND DEFENCE
Urban violence, guerrillas, clashes between indigenous populations,
drug trafficking and border disputes continue to be the most serious pro-
blems that undermine the stability of the Ibero-American subcontinent.
Political Violence
At the 39th annual assembly of the governors of the Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB) held in the Colombian city of Cartagena de
Indias from 12-18 March 1998, it was warned that political violence levels
are now well above the world average and that this is having considera-
ble impact on social life and economic activity in the region. The report
entitled «Economic epidemiology of urban violence» drawn up by econo-
mist Juan Luis Londoño for the IADB states that there are some 140,000
homicides per year in the region, that every Ibero-American loses an ave-
rage of three working days because of violence and that 28 million fami-
lies are victims of theft or burglary every year. Londoño estimates that vio-
lence in Ibero-America is five times higher than in the rest of the world.
Violence represents a huge cost for the economy, since the destruction of
goods amounts to 14.2 percent of regional GDP and human capital los-
ses total 1.9 percent of the Ibero-American GDP—equivalent to total
expenditure for primary education—while capital resources losses stand
at 4.8 percent of GDP. In the opinion of different experts from the Inter-
American Development Bank, this wave of violence is holding back the
growth of the Ibero-American economies by between two and three
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points of their GDP each year. Few dispute that this is the cost, though
the specialists in violence do not agree on the causes and possible solu-
tions. While Londoño and the IADB blame the problem on lack of educa-
tion, possession of arms and consumption of drugs and alcohol, other
economists, among them the Peruvian Adolfo Figueroa, believe that
poverty and social inequality are the only cause.
The guerrilla
As mentioned in last year’s Strategic Panorama 1997-1998, the disap-
pearance of the socialist bloc left the guerrilla without an ideology or social
model, and its message thus lost much of its force and credibility. Furt-
hermore, the many years spent underground have, in a sense, led to a sort
of professionalisation of the guerrilla groups. The vacunas, «vaccines», as
the protection money they demand is called, kidnapping and a hand in the
drug trade have become a comfortable and profitable way of life which
they are not willing to abandon, and this explains why most of the Ibero-
American revolutionary groups are reluctant to disappear from the scene
even though the cold war has ended. What is more, in many parts the gue-
rrilla has become a substitute for the state, basically as far as social and
welfare services are concerned, and the state has lost its authority in large
areas of several Ibero-American countries.
At the same time, as the well-known political scientist Román Ortiz
warns, the continued action of the guerrillas, together with the armed for-
ces’ inability to neutralise their activities and stop them spreading, has led
to the proliferation of paramilitary groups which started out as groups of
extremists and have now become genuine private armies. This situation
evidences that poverty and the fragility of the state are among the main
factors that guerrillas feed off. The president of the Inter-American Deve-
lopment Bank, Uruguayan Enrique Iglesias, considers that the incidence of
poverty and its absolute levels continue to be higher than in 1980, the rural
areas being the worst hit. Therefore, maintains Iglesias, remedying this
situation through greater social and political stability and higher economic
growth is the major challenge the region faces at the beginning of the 21st
century, while poverty today is creating an extremely tense socio-political
atmosphere, as it is producing a mass of destitute people prepared to join
different types of armed bands. Likewise, on many occasions govern-
ments cannot guarantee the provision of certain basic services such as
public safety or the administration of justice, let alone others such as
social security. According to Román Ortiz, this is clearly evidenced by the
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fact that 90 percent of crimes against public safety go unpunished in the
peripheral districts of cities such as Bogota, Lima, Mexico or Caracas. The
fragile state of the administration, and in particularly that of justice, crea-
tes a perfect breeding ground for violence, since lack of state authority
causes a vacuum that tends to be filled by guerrilla or paramilitary groups.
Also, guerrillas often perform certain state functions, becoming the social
basis that any armed group needs to survive. To all these factors should
be added the complicated geography of the subcontinent, which hinders
cohesion of states, since national resources cannot overcome the natural
difficulties posed by forests, large rivers, impenetrable mountains and
deserts.
A particularly significant factor which should be borne in mind is the
complex relationship between the guerrilla groups and the indigenous
population, in which the security forces and, as we will see later on, drug
traffickers are also involved. The guerrilla groups usually operate in the
more remote regions between the international borders—precisely those
inhabited by the Indians—since they are the best places for escaping state
control and provide a perfect base from which to carry out offensive
actions and then cross the border. As a result, since they share their home
with the guerrillas and sometimes with drug traffickers, as occurs particu-
larly in Colombia, Guatemala and Peru, the indigenous populations have
to struggle to keep the difficult balance with the armed bands in the region.
Furthermore, the national governments are trying to identify the social
groups that are vulnerable to subversive influences and the indigenous
communities are usually classified as one of them.
Since the start of the guerrilla war, the Indians have been struggling to
free themselves from the FARC, M-19, ELN and other rural guerrilla
groups, trying to prevent the infiltration of rebel forces and being forced to
support them, while, from the other side, the law enforcement bodies ac-
cused the Indians of conniving with the guerrillas. In Peru, the indigenous
populations found themselves trapped between the Peruvian troops, on
the one hand, and Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) on the other. Thou-
sands were killed, since each side assumed that those who called them-
selves neutral peasants backed the other side until the Peruvian military
eventually changed their tack on realising that such assertions were false.
Thousands of Ashinka were forced to join Shining Path or else provide
them with financial support—which sometimes entailed the production of
coca leaf—and although at the beginning of the 90s they managed to
expel the Tupuc Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) from their terri-
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tory, it seems impossible to do the same with the Senderistas. According
to Peruvian sociologist María Isabel Remy, the indigenous communities
are putting up increasing resistance to the domination and intimidation of
Shining Path and are gradually joining forces with the military.
The Guatemalan armed forces initially believed that a large proportion
of the Mayan people supported the former guerrilla fighters who are now
activists of the URNG political party, the Guatemalan National Revolutio-
nary Unit. The URNG is not an indigenous movement and, indeed, its ide-
ology does not include the political and social claims of the Maya, but the
military crackdown on this people led them to join the URNG by the thou-
sand. Small armed groups that broke away from the indigenous Katanist
movement in Bolivia led the security forces to launch a major operation to
eradicate them, fearing that they would be taken over by Shining Path.
However, according to anthropologist Xavier Albó, although those groups
used indigenous slogans and names to attract the support of the rural
population, they were never made up of Bolivian Indians. This was similar
to the situation of the Puka Inti guerrilla (meaning «Red Sun» in Quechua)
in Ecuador, on whom the army clamped down harshly, considering they
were likewise influenced by Shining Path, even though this group was
never made up of indigenous activists, but rather the student population
of Guayaquil.
According to specialist in indigenous studies Donna Lee Van Cott,
the Zapatist National Liberation Army (EZLN) is an unusual example of
a guerrilla group and of an indigenous movement in Ibero-America
owing to the circumstances which gave rise to its founding and subse-
quent transformation, its strange mixture of members and supporters
and its set of cultural and basically nationalist left-wing ethnic claims.
Van Cott writes that the EZLN arose from the merger of two groups. One
of these was made up of Maoist intellectuals who were neither natives
of Chiapas or Indians and former members of left-wing Mexican guerri-
lla groups who later settled near Chiapas, while the second consisted
of a small group of indigenous activists who broke away from the paci-
fist Indian movement of Chiapas, fleeing to the Lacandón forest. Plum-
meting coffee prices in the international market in the early 90s, which
left many rural co-operatives bankrupt, and the suspension of state
subsidies led to growing discontent among the Mexican Indian popula-
tion. The merger of the two groups gave rise to an organisation that
com-bined the structure, strategy and military symbols of an armed
movement of Marxist leanings and certain indigenous characteristics,
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such as the basic demands of the pacific Indians of Chiapas, an appeal
for dignity, self-determination, respect for the indigenous culture and
identity and a considerable number of Mayan members, many of whom
only speak Indian languages. Even though the pro-Indian movement
and the EZLN are incompatible, they continue to team up in order to
obtain mutual benefits. 
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE STATE 
AND INDIGENOUS POPULATION
The confrontation between the indigenous population and the state in
recent years has heightened the frustration of the Indians set on making
political claims. Indigenous communities in Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico
have recently defied state authority in major disputes of a violent nature,
as a result of the continual violations of their territorial and human rights.
Where-as they have achieved recognition and protection through legal and
constitutional reforms in some Ibero-American nations, they continue to
be disproportionately the poorest of the poor and are frequently victims of
countless abuse.
At a conference given at the US National Defense University, Donna
Lee Van Cott stated that a better understanding of the concepts of secu-
rity and defence from the point of view of the indigenous communities
would help us to assess more rigorously the role of national policies in
worsening or alleviating the inter-ethnic conflict in Ibero-America. Although
relations between indigenous populations and the state differ considerably
across the region, the national security aspects generally consist of
defence of national sovereignty and territorial integrity and the fight
against drug trafficking and armed movements. However, indigenous
communities, governments and armed forces all have a different concept
of national security, and this influences their mutual relations substantially. 
The indigenous peoples regard themselves as nations and their con-
cept of national security is intrinsically linked to their survival. In addition
to physical security—defence from external coercion and violence—they
strive to protect their cultural security as a way of preserving the indige-
nous nation as a social, territorial and political entity. The ethnic and cul-
tural diversity of the 40 million human beings who belong to the dozens of
indigenous groups currently living in Ibero-America is an often insurmoun-
table obstacle to their integration, since they persist in looking at the world
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in their own particular way—which is neither better nor worse, simply dif-
ferent—and view the development of an industrial society as an alien con-
cept. We must accept that factors and circumstances such as the preca-
rious subsistence economies of the communities that surround them, the
diseases which their immune system is unable to resist, and western ways
of life do not allow them to emerge from their voluntary isolation as a way
of maintaining their own identity. The indigenous peoples are not familiar
with the concept of frontiers or property and consider that the most impor-
tant security aspect, in addition to keeping the lands they have dominated
for generations, is to maintain the right to govern them as communal
goods. They do not view the land merely as an economic resource, but
also as a guarantee of their own government and autonomy; it represents
the basis of the indigenous community as a social organisation, the vehi-
cle through which their culture and identity are handed down to their des-
cendants. In a very harsh communiqué issued on 13 January 1998, the
Catholic church denounced the oil and timber companies that expropriate
the Indians’ lands, in many cases «in complicity with the public authori-
ties». According to the Vatican, the indigenous communities are «investors
in their own lands» yet are «stripped of them and of their culture». Contrary
to the usual stance, it holds «the land-owning elite and the major compa-
nies that exploit timber and mining resources» directly responsible and
goes on to state that these multinationals «have had no qualms about
establishing a reign of terror, using intimidatory methods, illegal detentions
and even recruiting armed groups to get rid of those who defend the
weak».
The resistance the indigenous communities normally put up to direct
threats to ownership, invasions or incursions into their territories in search
of game and cultivable lands, the felling of trees, drilling for petrol or drug
trafficking, leads to serious clashes in which they normally come off the
worst. When they organise themselves into armed groups, it is almost
always to defend themselves from the violent attempts to expel them from
their ancestral lands or to oppose government policies to annul their terri-
torial rights established in former laws. It is necessary to examine land
ownership from the viewpoint of the indigenous peoples, who have
recently begun to put themselves across as nationalities, claiming the right
to autonomy laid down by international law. It is absolutely essential to
understand their aspirations, traditions and cultural values in order to
appreciate how violent the confrontation could become in the future and
on what basis these people could function as an autonomous ethnic and
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social group. Following the continuous, lengthy meetings between indige-
nous leaders and anthropologists in the seventies, an intellectual India-
nista current emerged, which aimed at promoting the cultural values of the
Indian civilisations by establishing the differences between their concept
of society and that of the rest of the peoples of the continent. Indianismo
advocates political autonomy and respect for their economic system and
traditional authorities, particularly in the territories they consider their own.
It emerged as an antithesis of indigenismo, a concept invented by the
state to refer to the integration of the indigenous population into western
culture through an apparent protection of their rights. Revolutionary Mar-
xism, in turn, raises the objection that the clash between Indianismo and
the state does not stem from cultural differences. It is likewise appropriate
to distinguish between the different political currents and trends of the dis-
tinct indigenous groups and also to examine how social change in Ibero-
America and ideological differences have affected the native American
peoples. The protection of their language, culture, autonomy and lands are
factors which influence the security of the subcontinent, but it is also
necessary to analyse in depth the complex relations between indigenous
communities, the armed forces, paramilitary groups and drug traffickers.
The control of natural resources in some countries in the hemisphere
has had equally serious repercussions on the indigenous populations, par-
ticularly the policy pursued by Brazil regarding Amazonia. This region is
home to 90 percent of Brazil’s indigenous population, which is thought to
amount to between 250,000 and 300,000 inhabitants divided into 200
separate ethnic groups speaking 170 languages and dialects. The largest
of these are the Guaraní, the Tikuna, the Yanomano, the Makusi and the
Kayapa, whereas the remaining 77 percent belong to ethnic groups num-
bering fewer than 1000 individuals. About 110 of these languages are spo-
ken by under 400 people. Brazil kept up a strong military presence in Ama-
zonia for a long time in order to protect its borders and control the
exploitation of its mineral and timber resources. This has at times led dif-
ferent international agencies and non-governmental organisations to take
action to prevent deforestation of the tropical areas through the felling or
burning of large areas of forest in order to raise livestock and introduce
commercial agriculture. They have also staged campaigns to protect the
indigenous populations and their territories from illegal predation and from
the gold seekers or garimpeiros and other adventurers who invade their
lands with total impunity. It should be stressed that two of the biggest indi-
genous groups, the Yanomano and Makusi Indians, who live by the bor-
— 187 —
ders of Venezuela and Guyana, are a source of concern for the Brazilian
military who fear that they may join forces with their neighbours, with
whom they have ethnic links, to try to set up an independent Indian nation.
It is therefore not surprising that one of the guidelines of Brazil’s national
defence policy, endorsed by the president in 1996, should be «to protect
Brazilian Amazonia, with the support of the whole of society and with a gre-
ater em-phasis on military presence». However, this should not constitute
a serious obstacle to understanding and respecting the attitude of these
peoples, who merely ask for their rights to be recognised and to live in
peace and freedom in the territories they have considered their own for
many centuries. Moreover, according to recent figures published by the
Brazilian government, their contact with western civilisation has led to
130,000 possibly becoming infected with the AIDS virus. Some of the
most conflictive regions are the headwaters of the Las Piedras river in
Peru, inhabited by the Mashco-piro, threatened by Mobil, and the Colom-
bian region of the U’wa, who refuse to allow Compañía Petrolera Occi-
dental to enter their territory and have threatened the government to stage
a mass suicide, while in Ecuador the Tagaeri will risk their lives in order to
shun any type of contact.
It can thus be inferred that governments should be more sensitive to,
and understanding of, the problems of the indigenous peoples and take
advantage of the current atmosphere of regional co-operation to foster
dialogue, in view of the impact that national social, economic and cultural
policies will have on the American Indian communities, for whom the right
of ownership of their lands plays an essential role. Such a measure would
contribute to political stability and national security in the continent.
DRUG TRAFFICKING
It is a fact that drug trafficking has increased and is thriving in nations
with weak governments, though other economic and social factors such
as poverty, lack of culture and education have also been vital to the deve-
lopment of this phenomenon.
Of almost equal importance in this connection were the sharp fall in the
prices of farm produce worldwide and the neo-liberal reforms which put an
end to state subsidies for rural farmers over the past two decades. Thou-
sands of farmers in Ibero-America now earn a living from growing
marihuana, poppies and coca leaf as the only possible means of subsis-
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tence. These crops provide farmers with net earnings from 4 to 34 times
those obtained from cacao or maize, the alternative farm produce. To cite
an example, according to an article recently published by The Economist,
whereas a hectare of land planted with cacao produces a harvest worth
some 400 dollars, another used to grow coca can surpass 10,000 dollars.
Buyers therefore approach farmers directly, thus saving them from having
to transport their produce to the market along narrow roads with worn sur-
faces that are difficult to negotiate. Furthermore, many drug traffickers pay
in cash and in advance. Farmers are thus at the mercy of most of the drug
traffickers in the subcontinent, sometimes with the blessing of paramilitary
groups and even the police. These factors, together with the links between
the guerrillas and drug trade, complicate even further the mix of interests
in the area. Shining Path, for example, has chosen the high areas of the
Peruvian valley of Huallaga as its strategic objective to control coca pro-
duction in the region—ideally suited to this crop—protecting the 300,000
farmers from Mr Fujimori’s crackdown on drugs and charging the drug
traffickers hefty sums of money for each flight made to pick up supplies,
as David Scott Palmer writes in the Journal of Interamerican Studies and
World Affairs.
Such situations often trigger violent action from the armed forces and
police operations to clamp down on the indigenous population, not as an
expression of discrimination but because most of the growers of poppies,
coca and marihuana in the Andean countries are Indians. Even when they
are not involved in growing these crops, they nevertheless bear the brunt
of the violence of paramilitary groups and drug cartels, since they find
themselves drawn into disputes over lands occupied by the cartel, whet-
her legally or otherwise. This explains why quarrels over land are the main
reason for the violent clashes between indigenous and non-indigenous
groups. Ethnic identity is not the initial cause of this drug-related violence
and it is thus important to come up with a solution to the problem: govern-
ments must be made aware of the cultural factors involved in the violence
against indigenous communities stemming from their undesired links with
the drug market. Some countries have emphasised the appropriateness of
cultivating alternative crops in combating the drug problem. This stance
clashes with that of the United States, which advocates eradication. It is a
fact that coca leaf prices have slumped considerably, owing, among other
factors, to the increased consumption of synthetic drugs. However, drug
trafficking continues to be crucial to the national economies, particularly in
the Andean region, not only to domestic or rural economies. In Colombia,
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for example, the narcotics trade accounts for almost 6 percent of the
country’s gross domestic product, according to the latest Annual report by
the geopolitical drug observatory, and has come to upset its productive
structure. Kevin Healy believes that the most prosperous and strongest
groups of traffickers and not the farmers are the most difficult to eradicate
and cites the case of Bolivia, where the drug trade amounts to 75 percent
of the country’s legal exports and has a greater impact on the economy
than in Colombia or Peru. Healy calculates that some 500,000 indigenous
farmers are involved in the coca trade, and in Bolivia, where it is legal to
grow this crop for medicinal purposes, they are represented by a well-
organised and politically active trade union—ANAPCOCA, the National
Association of Coca Producers. While growing alternative crops is appa-
rently the only way of freeing coca growers from their dependence on the
drug market, the Colombian forest of Chaparare, where most coca leaf is
grown and where farmers from the whole of the country have emigrated in
search of farm land, is a tropical forest unsuitable for traditional and com-
mercial agriculture. Given the shortage of opportunities in other parts of
the country for the over 800,000 families who live in Chaparare, the situa-
tion is unlikely to change in the near future.
But drug trafficking and its capacity to corrupt influences life in many
of the Ibero-American nations in a different and equally important manner.
Major state institutions and even senior officials responsible for the fight
against drugs have fallen only too readily under its sway. The drug mafia
have thus corrupted politicians, commanders of the armed forces, high-
ranking officials in charge of law enforcement bodies and magistrates to
such a dangerous degree that this scourge is currently one of the most
serious threats to stability and security in Ibero-America. They have suc-
cessfully pursued this line of penetration, adapting to new anti-drug tac-
tics, specifically splitting away from the major cartels into independent
bands or groups and processing their own cocaine using new technolo-
gies. As a result, it is now even more difficult to dismantle them. 
The substantial financial resources generated from drug trafficking
enable those who pull the strings to offer armed bands large sums of
money in exchange for protection. This has led certain guerrilla and para-
military groups to involve themselves in the drug market and means that it
is necessary to examine in depth the political and social links between
drug traffick-ers, paramilitary organisations and guerrillas, which under-
mine the internal stability of many Ibero-American countries. It is thus logi-
cal that clamping down on the drug market is not an attractive task for the
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armed forces, particularly at a time when some countries are still debating
the role of the military in a democratic society and their subordination to
civilian authorities. The army is keen to preserve its legal and constitutio-
nal role of defending and seeing to the external security of the nation.
However, since drug trafficking is now becoming a global threat to Ibero-
America as a whole, from Colombia and Peru to Mexico, and is spreading
to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, it is natural that the armed forces
should consider what their scope of action should be in combating drugs.
What do they stand to gain in this field? In principle, it would seem logical
for their budgets—which have been heavily slashed in recent years—to be
increased in order to equip them with cutting-edge technology and to
ensure appropriate action.
However, the forces consider that, irrespective of these or other possi-
ble advantages, there are major drawbacks and risks, the most serious
being the possible corruption and being obliged to intervene in keeping
public order. Such duties could lead them to take on a somewhat repres-
sive role which they happily shed with the advent of democracy. Perhaps
the task of the armed forces in combating drugs could be exclusively to
provide operational and logistic support to the law enforcement bodies,
car-rying out intelligence and surveillance missions, training in counter-
guerrilla tactics, analysing and studying material that is seized, controlling
the border and translating documents confiscated or recordings of phone
tapping and intercepted telecommunications, though it would be neces-
sary to define clearly the boundaries between surveillance and intelligence
tasks regarding drug trafficking and other issues relating to internal politi-
cal and social affairs. 
In the so-called Guayaquil Declaration signed after the closing cere-
mony of the 10th Andean Presidential Council on 5 April 1998, the presi-
dents of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela stated that com-
bating drug trafficking is one of the areas of regional co-operation which,
despite variations from nation to nation, affects all of them in the same
way. The document points out that the fight against drugs should be con-
ducted multilaterally and not through unilateral initiatives that can affect
relations between states. It likewise stresses that «the fight against the
production, trafficking, distribution and improper use of psychotropic
substances and related crimes» should be in keeping with the principles of
international law and with full respect for sovereignty and territorial inte-
grity.
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It is thus not surprising that Ibero-American politicians and military
should be deeply divided over this complex problem and that the United
States’ position should be difficult and contradictory, for the armed forces
are urged, on the one hand, to become involved in cracking down on drug
trafficking, yet also to commit themselves to democracy and the defence
of human rights. One of the chief aims of the Ibero-American nations in
combating the drug problem, the end of the United States’ unilateral cer-
tification, was achieved at the second Summit of the Americas held in
Santiago de Chile in mid-April 1998. It was agreed that it would thence-
forth fall to the Inter-American Commission for Drug Control and Abuse,
CICAD, to establish a single, multilateral process of governmental assess-
ment to monitor the individual and collective progress of the countries
taking part in the summits addressing the problem. It was also agreed at
Santiago to set up a multinational counter-narcotics centre in Panama, in
keeping with Washington’s plan to establish it at Howard Air Base in the
Canal zone, where Ibero-American military and police commanders and
agents can be trained under US authority. However, this plan is aimed at
conserving the United States’ strategic position in the Canal, while ena-
bling reconnaissance flights to be carried out without having to refuel the
craft in the air. Meanwhile, the problem remains, with a growing threat that
has now taken on hemispheric dimensions.
BORDER DISPUTES
Though somewhat slow, in 1998 the Ibero-American nations continued
to make notable progress in solving the border disputes which have lar-
gely arisen from the arms race the region has witnessed in recent decades.
The most serious of these conflicts involves Ecuador and Peru, which dis-
pute the ownership of a 68-kilometre strip of land around the river Zenepa
which had not been demarcated. The most critical moment was in January
1995 when an armed clash broke out, though it was stopped thanks to the
mediation of the four guarantors of the Protocol of Rio, which deployed a
Mission of Military Observers in Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP) made up of
representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.
When the war erupted between Ecuador and Peru in 1995, what had been
a remote possibility of an armed conflict between these two Ibero-Ameri-
can nations became a sad and bitter reality, particularly for the thousands
of Indians living on each side of the border, who bore the brunt of months
of violent fighting between the armed forces of the two countries. The
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Shuar community, 8,000 of whom were forced to evacuate the area, were
the most seriously affected. By mid-August 1998 headway had been made
in the peace talks and Ecuador had withdrawn its territorial claims, while
Peru had agreed that neither of the two adversaries could veto the media-
tors’ proposals. In the opinion of Bruce St. John, who has written about
Peru’s foreign policy, these proposals offered the best chances of achie-
ving a permanent solution that would prevent either of the two countries
embarking on an absurd and unnecessary rearmament. In any event, fin-
ding a solution to the conflict did not promise to be an easy task, since the
disputed area is rich in oil resources and was used by the Ecuadorian mili-
tary as a source of currency in the 80s. According to Donna Lee Van Cott,
retired Ecuadorian officers currently own vast areas of land in the Amazon
and have benefited from oil production. This explains the widespread mili-
tarisation of the region, which has a very dense indigenous population.
During the summer, the two countries set about closing down the seven
border bases located in that part of the Condor mountain range, as well as
separating forces from the disputed area, under surveillance of the
MOMEP. Later, during the 12th summit of the Rio Group at the beginning of
September, presidents Fujimori and Mahuad held a long meeting in the
city of Panama to speed up the peace process, announcing that a further
meeting would held in Brasilia, co-ordinated by Brazilian president Henri-
que Cardoso, in an attempt to find a definitive solution to the dispute. The
two sides undertook to carry out binational investments in welfare and
infrastructure in the area amounting to 3 billion dollars. As a result of the
meeting in the Brazilian capital, on 16 October the Peruvian and Ecuado-
rian parliaments approved by a large majority the border line proposal
agreed by the four guarantors—Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United
States—, thus settling one of the most serious and trickiest disputes in
Ibero-America. Weeks later, in Rio de Janeiro on 26 October, Ecuadorian
president Jamil Mahuad and his Peruvian counterpart Alberto Fujimori sig-
ned the peace agreement putting an end to 170 years of disputes, 56
years of negotiations and three of armed clashes between the two sides.
The peace accord was signed in the presence of the presidents of Argen-
tina, Brazil and Chile and a representative of the United States, since these
four countries were the guarantors of the treaty, and also two special
guests, the King and Queen of Spain, whom president Carlos Henrique
Cardoso described as «the greatest symbol of the admirable Ibero-Ameri-
can heritage». Also present was the cardinal prefect of the Clerical Con-
gregation, John Paul II’s special envoy. The peace accord, to be called the
Brasilia Act, recognises Peru’s sovereignty of the disputed area (a 220-
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kilometre strip of land, including some 78 kilometres of border) in the heart
of Amazonia, while Ecuador will have sovereignty over one square metre
of land, where a monument will be erected in memory of the soldiers who
died during the conflict.
Colombia and Venezuela continue to quarrel over the limits of territorial
waters in the Gulf of Venezuela, mainly because the area has large oil
reserves. So far, the dispute has not become as serious as the one bet-
ween Ecuador and Peru, because the countries meet regularly to study a
satisfactory solution. Furthermore, Colombia’s armaments policy is mainly
aimed at purchasing helicopters that will enable it to address successfully
the problem of the guerrillas and drug traffickers, rather than costly up-to-
date combat craft or modern battleships. However, tense situations some-
times arise between the two countries when, in their pursuit of guerrilla
groups and drug traffickers, the Colombian forces are almost obliged to
penetrate Venezuelan territory. 
At the same time, Venezuela continues to claim territory from Guyana,
particularly the region to the west of the Essequivo river, though in a less
intimidatory manner than in recent years, while Nicaragua insistently quar-
rels with Colombia over the ownership of the San Andrés archipelago.
Clive Schofield, assistant director of the International Boundaries Re-
search Unit at Durham University in Britain, believes that these disputes
are highly unlikely to develop into armed conflicts and cites as an exam-
ple Bolivia’s wish for access to the Pacific as a result of its loss of the Ata-
cama region following defeat by Chile in 1884. In order to find a satisfac-
tory compromise solution, the two nations have set up a permanent
bilateral commission to study how goods and Bolivian trade could be
transported across Chilean territory to the coast, though the Chilean aut-
horities maintain that this strip of land is, and will always be, under their
control and sovereignty. As Schofield says, it would otherwise be compa-
rable to Mexico demanding to be given back California. Another example
of how a potential conflict is defused is the dispute between Argentina and
Chile, which is approaching a satisfactory outcome thanks to the talks and
negotiations. According to analyst Patrice Franko, an expert in Ibero-Ame-
rican affairs at Colby College in Maine (US), before the advent of demo-
cracy Chile and Argentina were engaged in 28 different border disputes;
now there is just one over a 13-kilometre stretch of land between the two
countries. Although neither of the two national parliaments has yet appro-
ved the settlement of this latter issue, the analyst underlines the good will
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of the two governments in reducing the tension and pacifying the Southern
Cone.
Argentina, for its part, continues to claim the Falkland (Malvinas)
Islands, the South Sandwich Islands and South Georgia, though following
the armed conflict with Britain it has decided to file a request with interna-
tional organisations and use diplomatic channels, renouncing the use of
force. Some other differences remain, but these are of lesser importance,
though the more nationalist sectors attempt to fuel the tension from time to
time. This is the case of certain aims harboured by Bolivia, Chile and Peru
in small border areas or the traditional suspicion between Bolivia and Para-
guay, though the latter stems more from the spectre of the Chaco war of
the thirties than from real claims. It could be said that these border conflicts
and disputes, which have been a serious threat to peace and security in
Ibero-America, continue to have the potential to endanger stability in the
area, but with the emergence of forums for consultation and negotiation
and the establishment of intraregional economic alliances it is hoped that
the possible crises that could erupt will be steered towards peaceful solu-
tions.
THE HERALDED ARMAMENTS RACE HAS NOT OCCURRED
In early July 1998, sources at the United States department of state
confirmed that, despite the predictions of specialist analysts, there was no
indication of an armaments race having begun in Ibero-America following
the lifting in summer 1997 of the embargo established twenty years earlier
by president Carter.
Leading international authorities had spoken out against lifting the
embargo, fearing that rearmament in the region would lead to an increase
in poverty and a fall in the standard of living of its inhabitants. Among them
was former Costa Rican president and 1987 Nobel peace prize winner
Oscar Arias, who has devoted much of his public activity to promoting an
international code of ethics governing the sale of arms and who, together
with other people and institutions awarded the Nobel prize for peace,
expounded the contents of this code in New York in 1996, hoping it would
be adopted by the United Nations.
In 1998, Oscar Arias reasserted his position in an article in the Spanish
daily El Mundo, warning that although Ibero-America has been the region
to disarm the most following the cold war, this should not be used as jus-
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tification for acquiring technologically advanced weapons capable of un-
leashing a tiresome arms race. The previous year, in Atlanta, the Costa
Rican politician had proposed a two-year moratorium on the purchase of
modern weapons systems; the period should be used to negotiate a tre-
aty whereby the governments of the region would undertake to ban wea-
pons of this kind permanently from their territories. He likewise complai-
ned that there are still excessively large arsenals and contingents in the
subcontinent, the maintenance of which regrettably eats up resources that
could be allocated to other more basic needs, going on to accuse arms
deals of being a source of corruption and contracts signed under political
pressure from the selling countries. 
In a report submitted to the United States Congress on 25 June 1998,
the department of state declared that only some Ibero-American countries
were modernising their practically obsolete weapons systems and that the
very few which were carrying out replacements were doing so on a «less
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THE DEFENCE EFFORT IN IBERO-AMERICA
Defence budget Armed forces 
(constant prices) (thousands)
Total
Per capita % of GDP(thousands of dollars)
1985         1998 1985 1998 1985 1998 1985 1998
Cuba 2,275 700 225 62 9.6 3.2 162 55.0
Dominican R. 75 72 11 9 1.1 1.0 22.2 24.50
Costa Rica 40 70 16 19 0.7 0.8 (param.) 8.40
El Salvador 360 90 75 15 4.4 1.0 41.7 24.60
Guatemala 168 140 21 12 1.8 1.1 31.7 31.40
Honduras 195 35 23 5 5.1 0.8 16.6 18.30
Nicaragua 315 30 96 6 17.4 1.2 62.9 17.00
Panama 130 125 59 44 1.8 1.4 (param.) 11.80
Argentina 5,160 3,500 169 99 3.8 1.1 108.0 73.00
Bolivia 180 185 28 21 2.0 2.0 27.6 33.50
Brazil 3,350 14,200 25 84 0.8 2.4 276.0 313.25
Colombia 605 2,700 21 74 1.6 3.5 66.2 146.30
Chile 1,770 2,100 147 142 3.8 2.7 101.0 94.30
Ecuador 405 575 43 46 1.8 2.8 42.5 57.10
Mexico 1,770 2,300 22 24 0.7 0.9 129.1 175.00
Paraguay 85 110 23 20 1.3 1.2 14.4 20.20
Peru 915 840 49 34 2.5 1.4 128.0 125.00
Uruguay 340 325 113 100 2.5 2.4 31.9 25.60
Venezuela 1,175 1,300 68 56 2.1 1.8 49.0 79.00
than one-for-one» basis, and were not necessarily increasing their power.
The report went on to say that arms expenditure in the region continued to
be the lowest in the world.
A special survey on defence in Ibero-America published in spring 1998
by Defense News, a US weekly specialising in defence policy and arms
issues, confirmed the slowing down of acquisitions of new, technologically
advanced weapons systems. To support its assertions, the weekly cited
the example of the Argentinean aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo, which
was withdrawn from service but with no plans for replacement, meaning
that the Dassault Super Etendard aircraft would have to operate from
ground bases in the future. The evolution of the defence effort is shown in
the chart, which compares 1985 figures with those of 1998. The two nota-
ble exceptions are Brazil and Colombia. Whereas the first leads the region
in relative and absolute terms of increased defence spending, the second
is forced to boost its spending by the fight against guerrillas and drug traf-
ficking. Three nations show slight increases—Ecuador (owing to the con-
flict with Peru), Chile, Mexico and Venezuela—whereas the biggest decre-
ases are recorded in Argentina, Cuba, El Salvador, Honduras and
Nicaragua. The evolution is more accurately expressed in terms of GDP,
owing to the economic growth these countries have experienced in recent
years.
The Ibero-American nations had received outdated, second-hand US
weapons since the end of the second world war and the embargo impo-
sed by president Carter forced them to modernise and update their arma-
ments or resort to European suppliers or even Israel. This has mainly been
the case of the air forces. The Argentine air force, for example, has been
ob-liged to make do with modernising 36 surplus A-4s from the US navy,
while Brazil and Chile are studying programmes to update their F-5E/F air-
craft. Moreover, the sale of French fighter planes from 1977 onwards has
led to the need for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and
Venezuela to modernise different types of Mirage. Peru is also modernising
the Mig-29 and Sukhoi acquired by its air force. The only possible excep-
tions regarding the acquisition of more modern aerial weapons systems
are Chile and Ecuador. In the former, the withdrawal from service of the 39
old Hawker Hunter planes requires the Chilean air force to replace them
and it seemed to be trying to make up its mind whether to buy just 12
second hand US F-16s or F-18s, French Mirage 2000s or Swedish Jas-39
Gripens, as it emerged from the exhibition by those planes at the Chilean
international air and space fair (FIDAE) in 1998. However, in June the Chi-
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lean government cancelled the replacement project. In the case of Ecua-
dor, the military clash with Peru in 1995 could lead Ecuador to boost its air
arsenal, possibly with Mig-29 aircraft. Likewise, the Ibero-American
navies, tradi-
tionally equipped with old US cruisers, destroyers and submarines, set
about replacing them in the late 80s and early 90s with European vessels,
mainly from Germany and Italy and also France and Spain. But they are no
longer satisfied with second-hand ships, despite their limited budgets;
they prefer to have fewer but more modern and powerful vessels and in
the case of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the purchase should include indus-
trial compensation and the transfer of new technologies.
Many commentators see a second interpretation of the lifting of the US
embargo—an outlet for what became surplus arms reserves in the wake of
the cold war, especially as the recent Asian crisis has halted those coun-
tries’ arms purchases and the European defence industry is gaining
ground in a traditionally US market. However, given the current economic
situation of the region, extraordinary expenditure on modernising and
strengthening the armed forces is unlikely to be witnessed, except for in
countries that need to be able to keep up with the new technologies of the
drug traffick-ers, though under no circumstances should this entail the
start of an arms race. 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS
The annual report of the aforementioned 39th annual assembly of
governors of the Inter-American Development Bank in March 1998 noted
with great satisfaction that Ibero-America had recorded substantial eco-
nomic growth in 1997 and unemployment had fallen. The region’s econo-
mic growth amounted to 5.2 percent, the second highest figure since
1980, owing largely to the rapid growth in Argentina and Mexico—the
regional driving forces—whose real gross domestic product rose by 7.8
percent and 7.1 percent respectively. The Dominican Republic, with 7 per-
cent, also witnessed a considerable upswing, as did Peru. Brazil’s eco-
nomy grew by 3.5 percent as compared to 3 percent in 1996, as a result
of the monetary and credit measures adopted by the authorities to prevent
the internal imbalances from worsening. Economic growth increased in 10
countries and amounted to over 4 percent in 14, though it was under 3
percent in Costa Rica. For its part, the much-feared «Asian flu» caused
only a slight relapse in the area.
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According to the IADB report, unemployment fell in Ibero-America for
the first time since 1988 owing to the economic recovery. This was parti-
cularly marked in Argentina, where the percentage of jobless dropped from
18 percent during the 1995 recession to under 14 percent in the second
half of 1997. Unemployment in Mexico fell from 6.3 to 3.2 percent during
the same period, and a further seven countries recorded decreases, albeit
less sharp.
Real investments grew steadily in most of the region at an average of
over 10 percent, and at an outstanding 26 percent in Argentina and 20 per-
cent in Ecuador, Mexico and the Dominican Republic. The countries also
boosted their exports considerably, with increases of around 10 percent at
constant prices and 12 percent in dollars. This upsurge in economic acti-
vity and demand led to a rapid growth in imports, pushing the region’s
current account deficit up. Inflation continued to drop in 1997, reaching an
average of 11 percent, though it remained at a considerable 35 percent in
Venezuela, while the Dominican Republic and Ecuador—where it remained
at over 10 percent—also showed an inflationist trend.
However, these favourable economic conditions will not be the same
in 1998. Indeed, the most optimistic would settle for an average growth
of between 2.5 and 3 percent in Ibero-America. According to the IADB’s
chief economist, Ricardo Hausmann, the main causes for this downturn
are the «Asian flu» or «sake effect», the crisis of the rouble, the fall in the
prices of basic goods in the region (oil, pulp, paper, copper ...) and a pos-
sible economic slowdown worldwide. In this connection, it should be
borne in mind that raw materials prices account for 2.6 percent of Brazil’s
GDP, 17.6 percent of Chile’s, 19.1 percent of Ecuador’s and 21.9 percent
of Venezuela’s. In any event, Hausmann reckons that the storm will soon
blow over, and it is necessary to consider the region’s economic pros-
pects in the long term. If this is done, according to this economist, the
increase in investments, the relatively strict fiscal policy, the continuation
of structural reforms and the recent fall in unemployment should be cause
for optimism. Enrique Iglesias, the president of the IADB, has recalled that
the first and most essential thing is for politicians and society to reach a
consensus and complement the economic reforms with labour reforms;
invest more money in human resources and boost workers’ productivity
and wages; improve social security schemes; adopt special measures to
support women and indigenous communities; promote small and
medium-sized enterprises; and, above all, overcome social inequality,
poverty and violence.
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In 1994 the economic crisis in Mexico, also known as the «tequila
effect», dragged the growth rate of Ibero-America’s GDP down from 5.7
percent to 0.8 percent in 1995. This gives greater grounds for fearing that
the weakness of the Asian economies—particularly that of Japan—and the
situation of the rouble may have more negative consequences than initially
assumed. As always, the measures adopted to counter or mitigate these
effects will be detrimental to the most underprivileged social classes.
Indeed, the effects of those applied in late 1997 at the start of the Asian
crisis to prevent the flight of capital, such as raising interest rates and gre-
ater fiscal stringency are already being felt. As vice-president Nancy Bird-
sall of the IADB warns, a tax on short-term capital movements should be
established to prevent the flight of funds from Ibero-America earlier this
decade from reoccurring, as this would undoubtedly have negative effects
on the region’s growth and social goals.
However, at the end of August 1998, the economic crisis in Japan and
the emerging Asian countries, the worsening of the situation in Indonesia
and, in particular, the collapse of the rouble caused the world stock mar-
kets to plummet. This downswing was especially marked in the Ibero-
American markets owing to rumours of possible cascading devaluation of
the currencies of Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico and even Chile, and further
confirmed the global nature of the economy. With the exception of Mexico,
all the countries’ exchange-rate systems are tied to the dollar. This can
give rise to sharp devaluation and entails both major risks for investors and
considerable opportunities for speculators. Therefore, on 3 September, the
director of the International Monetary Fund, Michel Camdessus, called a
meeting of the finance ministers of the nine biggest Ibero-American repu-
blics to analyse the situation of the region and provide backing from the
multilateral organisation in order to restore international confidence in the
regional economies. Following two days of talks between the directors of
the IMF, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank and
the finance ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, the international financial and
monetary authorities pledged their support for the structural reforms
carried out by those countries, expressed their confidence that they would
continue to record positive growth and low inflation rates and asked the
world financial markets to distinguish clearly between the Asian and Rus-
sian crises and the current situation in Ibero-America. Even so, during the
meeting, the international credit rating agencies made downward adjust-
ments to the ratings of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. This spar-
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ked harsh criticism from the finance ministers of those nations, who accu-
sed the organisations of acting against the Ibero-American economies and
banks, reminding them that the main states in the region are underpinned
by sound macroeconomic foundations and historically high levels of
international reserves to protect their currencies. However, the conse-
quences of the economic shambles in Russia and Asia have taken their
toll, as stated by the executive secretary of the Economic Commission for
Ibero-America (Cepal), José Antonio Ocampo, who has forecast that the
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THE IBERO-AMERICAN ECONOMY (source: IMF)
GDP CPI
1997           1998 1997           1998
Argentina 8.6 5.0 0.8 1.3
Brazil 3.2 1.5 7.9 5.0
Chile 7.1 4.5 6.1 5.4
Colombia 3.1 2.7 18.5 19.5
Dominican Rep. 8.1 6.0 8.3 5.0
Ecuador 3.4 1.5 30.6 33.6
Guatemala 4.1 4.5 9.2 6.5
Mexico 7.0 4.5 20.6 15.3
Peru 7.2 3.0 8.5 7.5
Uruguay 5.1 4.0 19.8 10.2
Venezuela 5.1 - 2.5 50.0 37.0
region’s economic growth for 1998 will be down to between 2 and 3 per-
cent as opposed to the 7 or 8 percent needed to ensure sustained growth.
The growth forecasts to 1998 year-end, according to The Economist Inte-
lligence Unit, put Argentina in the lead, with an increase of between 4.6
and 5.1 percent, followed by Chile, estimated between 4.1 and 5.1 per-
cent, and Mexico with 4.3 percent. Of the countries belonging to different
economic blocs (Andean Pact, Mercosur and Central American Market),
Argentina also has the highest per capita income with 6,910 dollars, while
Bolivia, with 911, has the lowest. However, Argentina also tops the list in
terms of growth in the number of poor persons. According to the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the percentage of Argentine-
ans living in dire poverty has risen from 7 to 19 percent in recent years,
followed by Peru, where the incidence has risen from 26 to 34 percent, and
Paraguay, whose figure is up from 53 to 60 percent.
In the field of interregional co-operation, the aforementioned 10th
Andean Presidential Council approved the commitment to set up a com-
mon market and strengthen relations with other supranational blocs. By
signing the Guayaquil Act or Declaration, the Andean presidents aim to
embark on a new stage in boosting their internal cohesion, which could
lead them to totally deregulate their markets. The Act defines the mecha-
nisms for giving impetus to the integration of the five nations and for orien-
ting them towards other trade blocs such as the European Union, with
which their relations are described as a model for links between blocs. At
the meeting the general framework was agreed on for setting up a free
trade area with Panama and time scales for implementing the free move-
ment of persons were set.
These states also decided to join forces to combat the effects of the El
Niño meteorological phenomenon, displaying a spirit of integration, since
Ecuador and Peru are the worst hit. However, environmental issues were
not addressed, nor was the subject of foreign debt raised. The Andean
Community, which emerged 29 years ago, has gone through bad periods
of disunity and isolation, but it appears now to have laid solid foundations
for facing the challenges of the 21st century. Arrangements have already
been made to hold the 1999 Andean Summit in the Colombian city of Car-
tagena de Indias.
A few days later, on 16 April, the two major South American economic
blocs, Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) and Can (Boli-
via, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) signed an agreement in Bue-
nos Aires to lift all the customs barriers between them from 2000. The
agree-ment was signed by the foreign and trade ministers of the countries
from the two groups, whose population totals 300 million. The GDP of this
future Ibero-American free trade zone is equivalent to 13 percent of the
whole of the continent, including Canada and the United States. Mercosur
and the Andean Community of Nations underlined their wish to negotiate
as a single bloc the shaping of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),
on the agenda of the 2nd Summit of the Americas which began in Chile two
days later. Two stages of negotiations should facilitate the setting in
motion of a programme to gradually reduce tariffs on all customs-listed
products as from 1 January 2000. These negotiations will be conducted
with the commitment to promote free competition and reject restrictive
trade practices. In 1997, the volume of trade between the two blocs
approached 4 billion dollars, with a balance of 30 million in favour of the
Andean club. Mean-while, Chile, which does not belong to either group,
signed three separate agreements at the 2nd Summit of the Americas: one
with Mexico, another with five Central American countries and one with
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Mercosur, in order to speed up the process of integration towards the cre-
ation of the FTAA.
THE SECOND SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS
In mid-March the ministers of 34 American countries met in San José,
Costa Rica, to confirm the so-called Free Trade Area of the Americas,
FTAA, which was to be given a substantial boost at the 2nd Summit of the
Americas in Santiago de Chile the following month. But at San José the
differences between these countries regarding the integration programme
came to light. Whereas the United States appears to focus on issues such
as intellectual property, Bolivia, Chile and the four Mercosur countries
regard the lifting of tariffs and free access to markets as being more impor-
tant. It was agreed that Miami would become the first headquarters of the
future Pan-American market from 2005, while the capital and presidency
of the association would be arranged on a rotating basis every two years,
and Miami would eventually hand over to Panama and Panama, in turn, to
Mexico. In this connection, Canada will initially hold the presidency, which
will then go to Argentina and Ecuador.
The 2nd Summit of the Americas took place from 18 to 19 April and was
attended by the heads of state or government of the 34 nations except for
Cuba. The agenda included what have been termed second-generation
reforms: access of all sectors of the population to education, poverty era-
dication, the fight against drug trafficking, terrorism, corruption, defence of
independent justice, democracy and economic deregulation.
The United States, which had promoted the creation of this forum by
organising the first summit in Miami in 1994, considered that it continues
to play a leading role in the continent and that its relations with the rest of
America are the best they have been for a decade, despite the lack of
agree-ment over Cuba and the difficulties in implementing the economic
integration designed to create the biggest free trade zone in the world,
with a market of almost 800 million consumers. But the United States arri-
ved at this second summit in a weak position, for the US Congress had
repeatedly failed to grant President Clinton fast-track authority to nego-
tiate the setting up of the Free Trade Area of the Americas. In the absence
of fast-track, the United States was unable to sign new free trade agree-
ments, such as one with Chile. This gave rise to talk of a new «Santiago
consensus» to replace the old «Washington consensus» and pointed to a
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new period in relations between Ibero-America and its powerful northern
neighbour. These new relations are characterised by equality and evidence
the will of the Ibero-American nations to negotiate as a bloc rather than
bilaterally—as has always favoured Washington. Should this situation
materialise, the United States will have lost its chance to achieve integra-
tion through the progressive incorporation of individual states into NAFTA.
Contrasting with the weakened role of the United States is the emerging
attitude of Canada, which had hitherto centred its interests on Europe.
But there is a further cause of persisting differences between Ibero-
America and the United States—the issue of Cuba. Washington is against
Cuba attending the Summits of the Americas and being a full member of
the Organization of American States unless it becomes a democracy. This
stance contrasts with that of other nations such as Peru, whose President
Fujimori stated that «it is not right that a country which in no way repre-
sents a threat to the continent should suffer the consequences of an
embargo that does not affect the government but rather ten millions of
Cubans». Similar statements were made by other leaders, though they did
require Fidel Castro to meet certain conditions such as releasing political
prisoners and moving towards a democratic system. Some nations did not
voice their opinion about relations with Cuba, though their support is well
known. But the problem worsened when it was announced that the Cana-
dian prime minister was going to travel to Cuba the week after the sum-
mit. Several nations likewise expressed their intention of inviting Cuba to
attend the next meeting in Ottowa in four years’ time.
During the closing ceremony it was agreed to continue to promote the
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas and what is known as the Santiago
Action Plan and Declaration was drawn up. Despite its 170 points, many
aspects of the action plan lack clear objectives, resources and suitable
follow-up mechanisms and a number of specialists believe it contains
many more initiatives than the Inter-American system can seriously take
on. The document starts by expressing a clear commitment to defending
democracy and broadening its areas, though there is no democratic
clause concerning the future of the FTAA as in the European Union, Mer-
cosur and OAS treaties. Other important points refer to poverty eradica-
tion, education and human rights, for which the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank and the United States department of
development assistance provide 45 billion dollars in loans. It is proposed
that by 2000 all children on the continent have access to basic education
and three out of four adolescents to secondary education, and that a con-
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siderable number of the 50 million small and medium-sized enterprises
have access to better banking conditions in 2000, as well as improve-
ments in health and nutrition. The plan aims to achieve a legal framework
for gender equality by 2002 and to promote measures to combat traffic-
king in minors, child prostitution and pornography, and a commitment to
modernise the legal system and ensure the rights of emigrants.
One of the most debated issues was the fight against drugs. As men-
tioned earlier, it was agreed to put an end to the unilateral certification
required by the United States, as was the need to combat corrupt practi-
ces involving moneys seized from mafia and from drug traffickers, and a
second specialised Inter-American Conference was convened to evaluate
anti-terrorist efforts. Another issue addressed was the media, since in the
past two years some two hundred journalists have been murdered in the
region. To this end, it was agreed to create an agency to control the free
exercise of journalism and to monitor the situation. A revision group of
foreign ministers was set up to monitor the implementation of the sum-
mits, and is to meet twice or three times a year. No statements were made
about Cuba, though the Brazilian president called for Cuba’s presence at
future summits, saying, «one country is absent, it is well-developed in the
education and health fields and I do not see why it should not join the
democratic community». Lastly, it should be pointed out that the United
States will have to change its attitude substantially by the time the next
summit is held in 2002, since the Mercosur countries are continuing their
talks with the European Union, the Andean community is showing greater
cohesion and all, individually, are enhancing their bilateral relations.
One of the biggest surprises of the year in inter-American relations was
Canada’s policy towards the countries lying south of Rio Grande, as evi-
denced by the visit of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina and Chile at the beginning of the year, followed, as mentioned
earlier, by a trip to Cuba after the 2nd Summit of the Americas. At the end
of 1997, the Canadian secretary of state for Latin-America, David Kilgour,
stated that his country is an American country, a geographical fact which
is now confirmed by history since, though it may seem obvious, Canada’s
political membership of the continent is very recent, dating back to 1990
when it joined the Organization of American States (OAS), the most impor-
tant regional institution. The Canadian governor was accompanied on his
tour by what is known as the Canada 98 Team, a diplomatic-cum-com-
mercial mission set up a few years ago and made up of 500 business peo-
ple. Indeed, back in 1995 the government of this nation described Ibero-
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America as a region of particular strategic interest. This view is borne out
by the increase of Canadian exports to the region in the past four years
from 260 billion pesetas to 500 billion—more than German and French
exports—while a further 200-billion worth of contracts are currently being
negotiated. While Ottawa regards Mexico as a key customer (it is worth
remembering that it belongs to NAFTA, together with the United States
and Canada), a similar agreement with Chile has been in force since 1997,
and it now has its sights firmly set on Mercosur. But this increase in trade
relations has also benefited its foreign policy. With Ibero-American sup-
port, Canada has been able to carry through some of its projects, such as
the treaty banning anti-personnel mines, the continuation of the peaceke-
eping force in Haiti and opposition to the Helms-Burton act penalising
trade with Cuba. It was precisely Mr Chrétien’s trip to Havana which unle-
ashed the rage of Bill Clinton, who tried unsuccessfully to persuade the
Canadian politician to cancel his trip to the Caribbean island. In an attempt
to counteract Canada’s ploy, early in May US sources released the infor-
mation that the sum total of the United States’ investments in Ibero-Ame-
rica amounted to 76.4 billion dollars—almost 11 trillion pesetas—accor-
ding to the figures supplied by the Federal Reserve.
THE 8TH IBERO-AMERICAN SUMMIT
Unlike previous years, the agenda of the 8th Ibero-American Summit
held in the Portuguese city of Oporto from 17-18 October was slimmed
down, the main novel feature being the elimination of the traditional
addresses given by the twenty three participating heads of state and
government, which made the working sessions somewhat impractical.
This measure facilitated contacts between the leaders and allowed more
bilateral talks, translating into a shorter and more incisive final document
with greater political impact. This new format was also more in line with the
spirit and goals of these summits.
Similarly, Spain’s endeavour to make the summits more agile and ope-
rative, permitting a more detailed follow-up to the development projects
approved at these meetings, turned out to be fully effective with the set-
ting up of a permanent secretariat for co-operation. This has not entailed
the disappearance of the «pro tempore» secretariat made up of repre-
senta-tives of the country holding the presidency that particular year and
those of the preceding and successive presidencies. Spain is in favour of
affording the secretariat considerable political weight and therefore belie-
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ves it should be headed by a person of repute who has held high office in
an Iberian or Ibero-American nation.
The Oporto Declaration, referring to «the challenges of globalisa-
tion and regional integration», underlines the setting up of a secretariat for
co-operation, as mentioned earlier, whose structure and working will be
proposed by the Iberian and Ibero-American officials responsible for co-
operation and co-ordination and submitted during the 9th Summit to be
held in Havana in 1999. The document reiterates «the commitment to
streng-then democratic institutions, political pluralism, the rule of law and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms», and it should be
stressed that it was signed by Fidel Castro, even though his regime does
not guarantee right of meeting or association and Cuba has over three
hundred political prisoners. The second section of the Declaration enshri-
nes «the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention and the right of
each people to build its political system in peace, stability and justice» and
the existence of «a fair system of co-operation and international relations».
It likewise points out that «the action of our governments should be aimed
at the pursuit of social justice, raising the standard of living in societies, the
promotion of policies to support the most vulnerable sectors and the
strengthening of international co-operation». It also underlines the need
«for the international community and in particular the G7 countries and
financial organisations to adopt more effective measures» that are condu-
cive to the stability of agreements for lasting economic growth and calls
for states to assist each other, whether bilaterally or through international
organisations, as well as appealing for solidarity in areas such as the rene-
gotiation of external debt or initiatives to eliminate anti-personnel mines in
Central America.
Section eight of the document emphasises that «international coexis-
tence requires respect for the principles and standards of international law,
for the United Nations Charter and for the sovereignty of states. Therefore,
we Ibero-American countries flatly reject the extraterritorial application of
national laws. In this connection, we reiterate our appeal to the govern-
ment of the United States of America to put an end to the application of
the Helms-Burton act». The clarity and forcefulness of this requirement is
considered a triumph of Fidel Castro and also a concession, since in 1999
the 9th Ibero-American Summit will be held in Cuba. The Ibero-American 
statesmen pledged their support for the International Criminal Court and
underlined «the gravity of the drugs problem, in that it has a deeply harm-
ful effect on individuals and societies and a negative influence on the wor-
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king of democratic institutions and economies», launching an appeal for
the development of suitable co-ordination mechanisms to deal with the
destruction of nature and the growing degradation of ecosystems, judicial
co-operation and the fight against corruption, terrorism and organised
crime.
Section 12 of the declaration underlines that the European Union-
Ibero-American and Caribbean Summit, to be held in Rio de Janeiro in
June 1999, is of paramount importance, defining the role of regional inte-
gration in a globalised world and support for regional initiatives. It likewise
states the need to «step up bilateral and multilateral co-operation in the
fields of culture and education» and appeals for «support for the co-ope-
ration programmes and projects approved by the successive summits, in
order that they contribute to promoting an Ibero-American area». Two
collateral achievements enhanced the overall success of the Oporto sum-
mit—the announcement of the solution to the border disagreement bet-
ween Ecuador and Peru and the firm and unconditional backing of the
newly-elected president of Colombia, Andrés Pastrana, for the peace pro-
cess he began after coming to power in August 1998.
The Summit was particularly successful for the president of the Spa-
nish government, José María Aznar, who reiterated our country’s commit-
ment to the Ibero-American countries and our wish to support them at all
the forums so that they overcome the financial crisis for which they are not
considered to be responsible. The Spanish premier pointed out that the
international economic situation should not be grounds for shifting away
from the economic model based on deregulation, stability and competiti-
veness and expressed the need to re-establish Ibero-America’s normal
access to the capital markets. He informed of his government’s decision
to contribute 3 billion dollars to new financial-support initiatives that the
IMF could carry out in Ibero-America and stated that he would raise the
need for solidarity with Ibero-America at the European Council meeting to
be held a week later in the Austrian town of Pörtschach. Furthermore, the
summit evidenced the favourable situation of Spanish-Cuban relations,
which led to meetings of the King and José María Aznar with Fidel Castro,
during which the visit of the King and Queen of Spain in spring 1999 before
the 9th Ibero-American Summit in Havana was addressed.
Despite the spirit of understanding which prevailed and the success of
the Summit, the atmosphere was clouded by the decision of Spanish
judge Baltasar Garzón to request the indictment of former Chilean presi-
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dent general Augusto Pinochet, currently a life senator of his country, who
at the time was in London recovering from an operation. The impact of the
news cast a shadow over the prominence and image of the 8th Ibero-Ame-
rican Summit.
THE IBERO-AMERICAN NATIONS
For Central America, 1998 will be a hard year to forget due to the disas-
ter and desolation caused by Hurricane Mitch, the second most destructive
to ravage the zone in this century. The hurricane, which devastated El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, particularly vented its fury on
the two latter countries, causing a death toll that may have surpassed
20,000. Added to the tragedy of the human losses was the grave damage
done to infrastructure, agriculture, housing, industries and services in the
region, specialists estimating that the devastation has set both countries
back some twenty years. When initial reports underlined the magnitude of
the catastrophe, the international community, particularly Spain and the
countries of the European Union, responded in solidarity. Official as well as
NGO aid to these nations has reached impressive levels: practically the
entire debt of the countries affected has been written off by most EU mem-
bers and the Union has approved a thorough reconstruction plan. It is worth
remembering that, according to the World Bank, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua owe the world a combined debt of 17 billion
dollars.
Before the tragedy, Central American life had been quite eventful, par-
ticularly noteworthy being the start up of the Central American Armed For-
ces Conference, CFAC, which had been instituted at the end of November
1997 by the presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicara-
gua. The conference has as its objectives military integration and co-ope-
ration in the region, the drafting of sets of regulations to unify procedures
in the fields of logistics, education and instruction, intelligence, and other
areas of military practice. In the field of defence, during 1998 the pro-
grammes aimed at reducing the numbers of troops in the zone continued
to be carried out by the majority of the Ibero-American nations. In El Sal-
vador troops have been reduced to 24,600, in Guatemala to 31,400, and
in Honduras to 18,300, while Nicaragua has continued to maintain 17,000
soldiers in the aftermath of the civil war ended in 1991, when the number
of persons enlisted in its armed forces stood at close to 70,000. Costa
Rica and Panama have no armed forces; the former has slightly increased
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the number of its security forces by 1,400, while no change at all has taken
place in Panama, which maintains the same level of 11,800 security forces
that it had in 1997. These last two countries have been the only ones in the
region to have boosted their security budgets, the former upping its to 70
million dollars (a 20% increase over the previous year) and the latter to 125
million, which represents 10% more than in 1997. The need to achieve a
lasting peace following the turbulent years of the previous decade has led
these nations to make significant reductions in the size of their armed for-
ces, but in view of the spectacular rise in organised crime—something
almost corollary in societies that have undergone strife—this demobilisa-
tion is perhaps being carried out too rapidly since it affects all of them and
particularly El Salvador and Colombia.
As regards domestic affairs, newsworthy events were the people’s
choice of Christian Socialist Miguel Angel Rodríguez as the new president
of Costa Rica in elections that took place without incident on 1 February
and his induction, which was attended by the Prince of Asturias. 9
February marked the commencement of the 14th edition of the San José
Group to foster dialogue between the European Union and the six Central
American nations. Nonetheless, life in Guatemala was profoundly shaken
by the assassination of Archbishop Juan Gerardi, creator of his country’s
office of Human Rights. In the international sphere, on 27 January the
government announced the normalisation of relations with Cuba. In like
measure, violence rocked Honduras, where Orlando Fúnez, leader of the
main opposition party and former minister of co-ordination, planning, and
budgeting under ex-president Rafael Callejas, was assassinated in the
streets of Tegucigalpa. At the end of January, Carlos Roberto Flores assu-
med the presidency, and his investiture was also attended by the Prince of
Asturias. In Panama President Ernesto Balladares won the referendum on
30 August enabling him to stand for immediate re-election. In mid-
February, 23 foreign ministers attended the 8th meeting of the Rio Group
and the EU. In the field of regional economic and political co-operation, it
must be remembered that it was the Rio Group’s 12th summit, held in early
September 1998, that facilitated the rapprochement between Ecuador and
Peru, which in turn led to the peace treaty between the two nations.
As ventured in last year’s «Strategic Panorama», Pope John Paul II’s
visit to Cuba has to be considered the most important event to take place
in 1998 on the Caribbean island. His Holiness’s visit, from 21-25 January,
turned Cuba into a centre of world attention and a hot spot for the interna-
tional media. Some five thousand journalists bore witness to the warm
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welcome offered the pontiff, whether Christians, santeros (adherents of a
Caribbean religion of African origin), or self-proclaimed atheist revolutio-
naries. The fact that prior to the papal visit the cardinal archbishop of
Havana, Monsignor Ortega y Alamino, (who at the end of the 1970s was
sentenced to ten years of field labour with the Military Units for Aiding Pro-
duction), was able, free of shackles and restrictions, to address the entire
nation over Cuban television after 39 years of total censorship was an indi-
cation that things would no longer be the same after John Paul II’s arrival.
The affection and respect Fidel Castro showed the pontiff seemed to indi-
cate a certain friendly reciprocity, though the Cuban leader’s welcoming
speech at the airport took on a blatantly political tone when he harangued
against the church for its past errors and subsequently plunged into an
inopportune re-examination of Spanish decolonisation. But John Paul II
took advantage of every opportunity he had to speak to the public to
remind Mr Castro and the Cuban people of the absence of freedom, the
material wants, the affliction and the misery suffered by a great part of the
population and to criticise the educational system and the decriminalisa-
tion of abortion. To understand the key to the papal visit, it is necessary to
recall the words exchanged in the Vatican during his Holiness’s first
audience with Fidel Castro in 1996: «I can’t throw my doors open to the
world just because 
there’s a pistol being held at my head» said Mr Castro. To which the Pope
replied, «you go ahead and open your doors to the world, I’ll take care of
the pistol».
John Paul II offered the Cuban leader his disinterested mediation in
trying to bring about the lifting of the US embargo, which the pontiff se-
verely criticised, and urged Fidel Castro to see to it «that Cuba opens up
to the world and that the world opens up to Cuba.» An immediate fruit of
the papal visit was the release of 299 Cuban prisoners, pardoned at the
Vatican’s request, though Cuban foreign minister Roberto Robaina haste-
ned to warn that this act of clemency did not signify a liberalisation of
policy—proof of this being the government’s refusal to free 70 political pri-
soners.
The Pope’s public denunciation of the Helms-Burton act was echoed
by the international community, especially by the nations of Ibero-America
and officials of the Roman Catholic Church. Some foreign ministers, such
as Chile’s José María Insulza, pronounced themselves in favour of the Uni-
ted States’ adopting a more conciliatory stance towards Cuba, in view of
the fact that Cuba «represents no threat to the security of the United Sta-
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tes nor to anyone else’s for that matter.» For his part, Monsignor Theodore
McCarnik, president of the North American Roman Catholic bishops’
international policy committee, declared that the time had come to pro-
mote reconciliation between the two nations and requested the American
government to ship food and medical supplies to the island. Likewise,
clergymen in Germany suggested that their country’s political leaders
should consider establishing a policy of bilateral co-operation with Cuba.
The condemnation of the American embargo continues to garner adhe-
rents world-wide, most pointedly within the United States itself, where a
number of business people and politicians are in favour of it being lifted,
and even White House spokesman Mike McCurry acknowledges that the
controversial Helms-Burton act has not achieved the hoped-for results.
For Spain’s part, on 13 February, the council of ministers approved a bill
to protect Spaniards who invest in Cuba, in accordance with the European
Union mandate stipulating that any citizen affected by the Helms-Burton
act shall receive economic compensation. Given Europe’s firm stance, the
number two man in the US state department, Stuart Eizenstat, found him-
self obliged to travel to Brussels in February to offer terms of a commer-
cial pact vis-à-vis the aforementioned act. To that effect, on 19 March
Washington announced certain measures to ease the embargo: authorisa-
tion of direct flights for humanitarian reasons, a raising of the upper limit
of the number of dollars that Cubans resident in the United States may
remit to those on the island, and leave to ship medical supplies and items
of basic necessity.
In a report addressed to the American Congress on 30 May, the US
secretary of defence, William Cohen, made it clear that Cuba no longer
represented a threat to the United States inasmuch as the revolutionary
armed forces have dwindled and a large part of their materiel is unusable,
playing down the importance of the dangers posed by the chemical and
bacteriological weapons presumably still in the hands of Fidel Castro’s
regime. For the Pentagon, the greatest risk to the nation is the possibility
of another huge influx of Cuban immigrants such as took place in 1994
when 20,000 crossed the sea to American soil on rafts.
Though on 21 April the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
rejected a draft US resolution charging Fidel Castro’s government with vio-
lating human rights, the prime minister of Canada, Jean Chrétien, during
his visit to Cuba in the wake of the 2nd Summit of the Americas, insisted in
the presence of the leader that political prisoners should be released and
the Declaration of Human Rights honoured. On 18 May, the United States
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and the European Union announced an agreement that would exempt
European investments in Cuba from the sanctions set forth in the Helms-
Burton act, but not the firms’ executives and the investors, since that
would require congressional approval. Speaking publicly on 10 October,
former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger called for a review of his
country’s policy towards Cuba.
But for Spain, the most significant event of the year was the normali-
sation of relations with Cuba following Eduardo Junco Bonet’s being
appointed ambassador to Havana on 2 April, bringing an end to almost
500 days of diplomatic crisis, initiated when the Cuban government with-
drew its agrément for the then ambassador designate José Coderch.
Spain laid down two prior conditions: that the ambassador must have free
access to all social sectors, including freedom to move about at will, and
that ETA terrorists and drug-traffickers who flee to the island to escape
prosecution must be subject to strict controls. The new situation has
paved the way for the king and queen of Spain to pay a state visit to Cuba
in 1999, independently of their compulsory visit later in the year on the
occasion of the 9th Ibero-American summit. Moreover, trade relations and
political contacts between the two nations have been stepped up, as wit-
nessed by the arrival in Havana on 16 April of a delegation of 97 Spanish
business people, headed by the president of the Spanish confederation of
business organisations (CEOE), José María Cuevas; among their objecti-
ves were the re-negotiation of Cuba’s debt, which has risen to 138 billion
pesetas, and the opening of offices to provide legal and professional
advice to Spanish firms doing business on the island. Fidel Castro held a
long meeting with the CEOE heads and a protocol was signed between
the CEOE and the Cuban government as a framework for the business
organisation’s relations with the island. Several weeks later, on 4 June,
Fidel Castro attended a reception given by the commander of the training
ship «Juan Sebastián Elcano», on the occasion of its visit to the island
marking the 100th anniversary of the end of the Spanish-American war.
Great importance was attached to the visit paid on 21-25 June by the
minister of industry and energy, Josep Piqué, accompanied by senior offi-
cials in his department, the presidents of Endesa, Iberia, Indra, Ebro, and
Red Eléctrica, and executives from Telefónica, Roca, Iberdrola, Renfe and
Dragados, among many others. Mr Piqué had the opportunity to meet
several times with Mr Castro. In like manner, other Spanish political lea-
ders visited the island, one of the more noteworthy being the president of
the autonomous government of Galicia, Manuel Fraga.
— 213 —
On 22 August the Cuban leader journeyed abroad to the Dominican
Republic to attend the Caribbean Forum (Cariforum) as guest observer.
Speaking on behalf of the 15 Caribbean heads of state and government
who took part in the event, Dominican president Lionel Fernández said
that Cuba formed part of the region and «we could not have had a mee-
ting of this kind without including it.»
The previously mentioned Ibero-American summit in Oporto showed
clearly the good state of relations between Spain and Cuba, as evinced by
the meetings held by the king and the president of the government with
Fidel Castro. A consequence of those encounters was the official visit to
Havana made 8-11 November by the minister of foreign affairs, Abel Matu-
tes, whose agenda included setting dates and making preparations for the
royal visit in 1999, re-negotiation of the Cuban debt, the signing of various
accords (among them one of mutual co-operation to stem drug traffic-
king), and pressing for the release from prison of four adherents of the poli-
tically opposed Internal Dissidence Support Group, charged with sedition
and incarcerated without trial some 14 months ago.
Though the attorney general of the Dominican Republic confirmed on
1 April that he was considering the extradition of ETA terrorist Belén Gon-
zález, which had been requested by the Spanish government at the end of
October, days before the elections for the autonomous region of the 
Basque Country, she and her companion Angel Iturbi Abásolo managed to
flee the country. In the parliamentary and municipal elections held on 16
May, the Dominican Revolutionary Party won 25 of the 30 seats in the
senate and the majority of deputyships and municipal offices. President
Lionel Fernández’s visit to Haiti was an historic event, given that no Domi-
nican political leader had visited the neighbouring country since 1934. One
of the many aims of the visit, begun on 20 June, was to tackle the serious
problem posed by the presence of more than a half million Haitian migrant
workers. The Caribbean Forum, attended by 15 regional heads of state,
met in Santo Domingo on 21-22 August.
For Argentina, 1998 could be considered the year of the reorganisation
of its armed forces, since its congress and senate passed a bill which some
military sources have described as a directive of far-reaching operational
consequence that defines the political, structural, and functional aspects of
the nation’s military organisation. The architect of act no. 24948 is the
statesman José H. Jaunarena, whose aim in conceiving it was to increase
the power of Argentina’s military capacity to achieve the twofold objective
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of maintaining national security and upholding international stability by
taking part in peacekeeping operations. For the first time, the armed forces
have a political mandate that supports their missions beyond the bounda-
ries of the country. The law is supplemented by two others: no. 23554 deals
with national defence and no. 24059 addresses internal security, thus cove-
ring every possible aspect of military operations. However, it should be
noted that the law on internal security prohibits the armed forces from par-
ticipating in conflicts originating within the country, responsibility for which
lies with the police forces, though it does provide that they can lend sup-
port in certain circumstances such as, for example, combating drug-traffic-
king or battling armed groups within the national boundaries. In addition,
the possibility of establishing a regional framework of security among
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile based on mutual trust and the carrying out of
joint military operations makes it possible to envision a much more influen-
tial role for their armed forces than merely taking part in peacekeeping ope-
rations.
The national territory will be divided into strategic areas, with a joint
military command attached to each one, thereby effecting cut-backs in the
current military chains of command. The operational units within each area
will be grouped so as to make better use of installations and training faci-
lities, thus ensuring considerable savings which will be reflected in salary
rises to personnel. In peacetime, the armed forces will be made up of full-
time personnel and reservists, with more emphasis on rapidity of response
than on size. Similarly, the military training system will be integrated into
the national educational system. As regards the procurement of equip-
ment and materiel, attempts will be made to unify items suitable for com-
mon use, and those purchased abroad should be acquired with an eye to
technology transfer and industrial compensation, and should also, when
appropriate, include training methods such as simulation. The defence
industries will be privatised, and foreign investments in the sector will be
welcomed.
For the first time, the armed forces will have a multi-year budget. The
3.505 billion dollars established for 1998 will be increased by 3 percent in
1999 and perennially over the next four years. «It’s not much», says Jauna-
rena, «but at least the former downward trend will be reversed». The law
provides for one billion dollars to be invested between 1999 and 2003 in
the modernisation of materiel, including the purchase of new equipment,
with the major portion of the financing to come from the sale of installa-
tions and military property. Likewise, decisions will be made regarding
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which existing materiel ought to be preserved, which is worth moderni-
sing, and which should simply be scrapped. The implementation of the law
will be super-vised by an administrative board of six senators and six
deputies belonging to the defence committees of the two respective hou-
ses. Three months after the law comes into effect, the ministry of defence
must inform the board of its progress in achieving aims, such as new ope-
rational and support structures, proposals for personnel cut-backs, chan-
ges in the retirement system, and new pay scales. By the time the law has
been in effect one year, the ministry will have determined its reserve requi-
rements, long-term estimates of expenditures and programmes, a national
mobilisation plan, and a catalogue of installations to be sold. Three years
later, the study on the integration of military training into the national edu-
cational system must be ready, as well as the design for a military com-
puter network. The legislators aim for completion of the entire groundwork
for reform within a five-year period. The project will entail considerable dis-
tress, however, inasmuch as the goal of streamlining the military cannot be
accomplished without cutbacks; troop numbers, already relatively low,
presently stand at just 74,000, of whom 10,000 are enlisted and the rest
officers. A twenty percent reduction could be traumatic and excessive.
Domestic affairs continued to be disturbed by the question of «the
disappeared». The arrest of Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael Videla, or-
dered by Judge Roberto Marquevich for the alleged kidnapping and rena-
ming of several children of political prisoners, and his subsequent incar-
ceration in Caseros prison have led to uneasiness among the military. Of
graver consequence still was the court order handed down by Judge Bal-
tasar Garzón of the Spanish central criminal court to the effect that 200
Argentine military men were to appear before him in Madrid, recommen-
ding that arrest warrants should be issued for nine of them, inasmuch as
President Carlos Menem said, «I find that I must of necessity assume the
task of thwarting this manoeuvre of judicial harassment against the Argen-
tine armed forces by those who do not understand the process of pacifi-
cation and do so much harm to relations between Spain and Argentina.»
These words were delivered by the president at the Puerto Belgrano naval
base, 980 kilometres south of Buenos Aires, to a select group of naval offi-
cers. Mr Menem assured them that he was «the president who has been
closest to the armed forces and proud of it» and that they would «always
have this president on your side, and I hope this message makes you take
heart.» In relation to the question of the disappeared, the Argentine parlia-
ment appeared in favour of repealing the «full-stop» and «due disobe-
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dience» amnesty laws, though not retroactively, thereby allowing for the
judgement of any human rights violations that may occur in the future.
On the subject of his candidature for re-election, President Menem
announced in a July 1998 speech that he would not seek a second con-
secutive term because it might give rise to social fractiousness. He stres-
sed his readiness to stand trial when he abandons office next year, stating
that from that time onward he would commence work to return to the pre-
sidency in the year 2003. Regarding the international economic crisis that
erupted in the summer of 1998, the president pointed out that the nation
had sufficient cash reserves to bear up against it and went on to say that
he would maintain the parity of the peso with the dollar come hell or high
water. Nonetheless, Argentina has an unemployment rate of 14% and 5%
GDP growth as opposed to the 8.6% predicted twelve months earlier, and
it is feared that the nation’s considerable indebtedness will persist through
1999, in spite of the measures adopted. 24 July brought the conclusion of
the 14th Mercosur summit, which the presidents of Bolivia and Chile atten-
ded as associates in the free trade zone.
At the end of October, the president was the first Argentine leader to
make an official visit to Great Britain since the Falklands War. During his
stay, Carlos Menem asked British authorities to bring their good will—as
would his country—to the task of finding an amicable solution to the disa-
greement over the South Atlantic islands, 16 years after the armed conflict
had ended.
In January 1998, Bolivia presented its five-year anti-drug plan, the goal
of which is to eliminate some 38,000 hectares of illegal crops, investing
952 million dollars, displacing 15,000 families, and offering alternative pro-
grammes to another 20,000. The plan likewise envisages economic con-
tributions on the part of the European Union, the United States, and the
United Nations Development Programme. In spite of the fact that Bolivian
economic indicators were encouraging for 1998—albeit with a slight
upturn in inflation—at the beginning of April the Bolivian Labour Federa-
tion (COB) called a general strike to demand better salaries. The situation
degenerated when the army was deployed to prevent coca growers in the
region of Cochabamba from blockading the main highway, resulting in
several deaths. The government accused the drug-traffickers of provoking
the incidents following the 40% reduction in the 2,300 dollar bonus that
the government pays to those who harvest the coca leaves for each hec-
tare of the crop eliminated, which spurred the drug merchants to prolong
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their activity as long as possible. As a result of the detention of General
Augusto Pinochet in London, several political sectors headed by the
National Revolutionary Movement pressed for having President Hugo
Bánzer tried for 
crimes against humanity, given his implication in Operation Condor, a pro-
gramme of concerted action carried out against leftist groups in the 1970s
by South American dictators.
The beginning of 1998 revealed Brazil’s plans to revive ship-based
naval aviation on the aircraft carrier Minas Gerais with the possible pur-
chase from the Kuwait airforce of 23 Skyhawk A-4 aeroplanes for a total
amount of 70 million dollars. For some time, the Brazilian navy has been
preparing to use aeroplanes that can be launched and landed on warships
with a flight deck, and during the recent ARAEX exercises, Argentine
Super Etendard aircraft operated from the Brazilian carrier, as did an S-2E
Track-er, also Argentine. Argentina’s navy has been co-operating with Bra-
zil’s in this respect for a few years now, having trained two pilots from that
country and lent an A-4Q for a compatibility study. Should Brazil acquire
the Skyhawk aircraft, it will be the only country in the western hemisphere,
apart from the United States, with ship-based aerial capacity.
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Nevertheless, three events came to shape the domestic scene in Bra-
zil during the course of 1998; in order of chronological occurrence, these
were a devastating forest fire in the Amazon basin, the world economic cri-
sis, and the re-election of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The year
began with the continuation of the huge forest fire that had been ravaging
the Amazonian region of Roraima since November 1997 and which during
the opening months of 1998 destroyed close to 40,000 square kilometres,
an area larger than the Spanish region of Galicia. The Brazilian authorities
refused the United Nations’ repeated offers of aid on the grounds that it
was an internal problem that should be dealt with using the means which
that nation had at its own disposal, contrary to the opinion of the UN, who
considers Amazonia the world’s most important biosphere reserve with its
six million square kilometres of tropical forest. International pressure obli-
ged president Cardoso to accept Argentine and Venezuelan aid, and at the
beginning of April heavy rains helped to control the blaze. But the defo-
restation of Amazonia continues practically unchecked, for 370,000
square kilometres have been razed by fire in the past twenty years alone.
The worst thing is that deforestation is highly profitable—a cleared hectare
sells for 23,000 pesetas whereas a hectare of autochthonous tropical jun-
gle fetches a mere 2,300. What is more, the blaze caused even greater tra-
gedy in that it destroyed the food crops of the Yanomani Indians, one of
the twelve tribes that inhabit Roraima, according to reports published by
the Missionary Council of Indigenous Peoples (CIMI), which has repea-
tedly denounced incursions into indigenous peoples’ territories by econo-
mic interest groups, despite constitutional guarantees of the Indians’ sole
right to occupancy; the reality is quite different, inasmuch as the majority
of their lands have already been encroached upon.
In mid-August 1998, the grave world-wide economic crisis precipitated
a difficult situation in Brazil which in turn imperilled the economic stability
of all Ibero-America. At the end of 1997, Ibero-America’s largest economy
was the first to suffer the effects of the depreciation of the Indonesian,
Malaysian, and Thai currencies brought on by excessive speculation, and
consequently in early 1998 the Brazilian government found itself in the
position of having to take strong measures, such as curbing public spen-
ding and raising interest rates to over 40% to avoid the devaluation of the
real. This regenerated international confidence in Brazil and encouraged a
return of capital inflows, permitting rates to be lowered 20% and bolste-
ring currency reserves to an all-time high of 70 billion dollars in May 1998.
But such measures had a high social and political price and sparked off
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the occupying of lands, the looting of supermarkets and attacks on supply
lorries, making it necessary to summon the army to restore public order. In
the face of these events, a number of Brazilian bishops, especially those
of the progressive wing, criticised the government’s repressive measures,
pointing out that instead of deploying anti-riot forces they ought to have
distributed food hampers and questioned whether the country was a
democracy. During President Cardoso’s official visit to Spain in mid-May,
he said that the so-called «landless movement» was trying to exploit the
situation for its own political ends. Plummeting prices on the world’s stock
exchanges during the summer of 1998 caused Brazil to lose more than 15
billion dollars in only two weeks, shrinking reserves to October levels of
the previous year. In spite of financial adjustment measures, the massive
flight of capital continued and, accordingly, the nation’s reserves dwindled
down to a low of 45 billion dollars. Among the emergency measures, the
central bank of Brazil raised annual interest rates to 49.75% and reasses-
sed the economic adjustment package of the stabilisation plan, announ-
cing to President Cardoso during the middle of his re-election campaign
the need for severe public spending cutbacks this year and the following.
As a result of all this, Brazil’s central bank admitted that the country would
end the year with growth of under 2% of GDP, a 7.3% shortfall in GDP—
the second largest in the world, exceeded only by Sweden’s 7.7%—and
public debt of more than five billion dollars. To head off the grave crisis,
the Brazilian government asked the International Monetary Fund and the
G7 for a bail-out package of close to 40 billion dollars; the request was
granted but en-tailed a severe austerity plan to prevent the collapse of the
economy and the devaluation of its currency, which, if they should be allo-
wed to occur, would inevitably plunge the whole of Ibero-America into a
deep and lasting recession.
General elections were held on 4 October. President Cardoso stood for
re-election as the candidate of a centre-right coalition, which he won by a
wide margin garnering over 20% more votes than leftist candidate Luiz
Ignacio Lula da Silva. The coalition’s candidates likewise obtained a majo-
rity of votes in the elections for the governorships of the 26 states and
federal district. News of Mr Cardoso’s victory was received with satisfac-
tion by practically all of the American and European foreign ministries, as
well as by international institutions and organisations, because it was also
considered to be the triumph of the economic reforms, adopted in the face
of the international crisis in August and September, which only the recently
elected president would be able to put into practice. Later that month, on
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25 October, a second round of gubernatorial elections was held in states
where no candidate had achieved a sufficient majority in the 4 October
elections. The choice of governors was crucial because Mr Cardoso would
have to rely on them to implement his financial adjustment plan. Ratifying
Mr Cardoso’s claim to the presidency a second time, these new elections
brought to a close the process of choosing new local and national autho-
rities constituting a third of the senate, the entire chamber of deputies, and
members of the regional assemblies.
A peace treaty signed in Brasilia on 26 October put an end to the fierce
border dispute between Ecuador and Peru. The event was attended by the
king and queen of Spain and five Ibero-American heads of state. President
Cardoso had played a noteworthy role in the negotiations leading up to the
accord, acting as co-ordinator between the four guarantor nations—
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States—and the two opposed
countries.
During 1998, life in Colombia was marked by the ongoing confronta-
tion between government and guerrilla forces. For that reason, during the
visit to Spain by President Ernesto Samper in early February, José María
Aznar proposed that Madrid could host peace talks aimed at finding a
solution to a conflict that has cost an average of ten lives daily over the
past 30 years. This led to an outline agreement being signed in Madrid,
known as the Viana preliminary accord, between the Colombian govern-
ment and the National Liberation Army (ELN), the second largest guerrilla
force in the country and led by former Spanish priest Manuel Pérez. Howe-
ver, these efforts did not come to fruition because in April the guerrilla
group accused the authorities of using the pact for electoral purposes to
benefit the governing party’s presidential candidate, liberal Horacio Serpa.
News of the death of the guerrilla priest came at the same time. On 31
May, voting took place to choose the two candidates who would stand in
the presidential elections to be held 21 June. Following the vote count, the
two winners to emerge were Serpa for the liberal party and Andrés Pas-
trana for the conservatives; eliminated from the contest was independent
candidate Noemí Sanin, who, even so, had succeeded in garnering nearly
three million votes. Despite army and police surveillance, terrorist attacks
and abductions were carried out by the guerrillas, who had announced
that they would not interfere in the electoral process. The following day,
the ELN broke the deadlock on the negotiations that had begun with the
Viana outline agreement and accepted Spain, France and Germany as
mediators, in addition to Nobel literary laureate Gabriel García Márquez.
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Nevertheless, terrorist outrages continued to occur during the three-
week period between the two elections. At the beginning of June, the
report published by Amnesty International said that in 1997 there had been
some 30,000 deaths, 114 massacres, 200,000 displaced, 140 «disappea-
red» at the hands of security forces, 600 abducted by the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and the ELN, and 40 mayoral and
council candidates assassinated. The presidential elections on 21 June
were won by conservative Andrés Pastrana, who confirmed his offer to
enter into talks with the guerrillas. Sure enough, at the beginning of June
the president-elect travelled to a jungle zone in the country’s east where
the FARC have their headquarters to meet their two principal leaders,
Manuel Marulanda Tiro Fijo («Sureshot») and Jorge Briceño El Mono Jo
Joy, and committed himself to demilitarising the five towns that the rebel
movement had requested as possible sites of the peace talks. A few days
later, the ELN agreed to take part in a peace summit starting on 12 June
in the German city of Mainz with members of the National Peace Com-
mission, including the attorney general of Colombia and the president of
the National Federation of Commerce, and went on to sign the Mainz
declaration, which among other points advocates the «humanisation of the
conflict.»
But on Wednesday 5 August, Colombian guerrillas dealt the armed for-
ces one of the most devastating blows of the past few years, razing to the
ground their main counter-narcotics centre, located at Miraflores; the
rebels described the attack as «a send-off to the government of Ernesto
Samper», who handed over executive power to Mr Pastrana on 7 August.
At least 250 guerrillas, military men and civilians were killed in the clash,
and nearly 100 were wounded. The guerrilla onslaught spread to other
provinces, where there were also large numbers of victims. In spite of
these developments, President Andrés Pastrana reiterated his offer of
peace on assuming office and announced a profound political change in
the country that included peace, political reform, and economic adjust-
ment. The Prince of Asturias and eight heads of state attended his swea-
ring-in ceremony.
In September, with the participation of the Spanish ambassador Yago
Pico de Coaña, the talks continued between the ELN and the National
Peace Commission, assembled in the Colombian town of San Francisco.
It was announced that they would start up an ambitious national conven-
tion on 13 February 1999 to discuss various important issues, such as
human rights, armed forces, corruption, natural resources, democracy, the
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economy, agriculture and drug-trafficking. Meanwhile, President Pastrana
set in motion an extensive overhaul of the upper echelon of the armed for-
ces and on 13 October ordered the withdrawal of military forces from a
large district in the country’s south. He furthermore conceded the FARC
p a r t y
treatment, declaring that 42,139 square kilometres would remain under
guerrilla control as «a peace laboratory» and assured that the demilitarisa-
tion would be in effect from 7 November to February 1999 «to foster dia-
logue leading to a firm and lasting peace.» A few days later, the senate
approved an initiative to ask the leaders of the FARC, the EZL, and the
People’s Liberation Army (EPL) to appear before the legislative body to set
forth their proposals for political reform to be undertaken by parliament,
the ultimate aim being to allow the nation to put the many years of civil war
behind it. The proposal was accepted by the three guerrilla bands.
But the grave world-wide financial situation in mid-summer seriously
affected the Colombian economy. The new president was the first Ibero-
American leader to adopt measures to overcome the crisis and on 2 Sep-
tember decided to devaluate the peso by 9%, in order to avoid the flight
of capital, which during the 12 preceding months had amounted to over
1.3 billion dollars. The harsh adjustment programme gave rise to massive
day-long protests throughout the country, leading to violent clashes with
security forces. Owing to the crisis, Colombia’s economy grew by less
than 3% in 1998, and there was also an upturn in inflation.
On 26 February, the United States lifted the sanctions it had imposed
on Colombia two years earlier, in recognition of «the efforts the country is
making to combat drug-trafficking». In this connection, Colombia is nego-
tiating with France to extend an agreement to monitor the areas where
crops are grown by means of satellite. Also, when visiting France, Spain,
and the Netherlands, the Colombian counter-narcotics director acknow-
ledged that the guerrilla groups had the capacity to shoot down aircraft,
going on to refer specifically to the government’s loss of three aeroplanes
and seven helicopters.
Politics in Chile during 1998 revolved around the figure of General and
Senator-for-life Augusto Pinochet. No sooner had the year begun, the
communist party of Chile lodged a complaint against the general—still the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces—for crimes of «genocide, abduc-
tions followed by disappearances, criminal conspiracy, and the illegal dis-
posal of corpses». These charges were later admitted by a judge of the
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court of appeals in Santiago. Likewise, the National Council of Christian
Democracy, a party that forms part of the governing coalition, debated the
constitutional case against General Pinochet brought by five of its depu-
ties, to the effect that he should not be designated senator-for-life since,
according to the constitution in force, this post can only rightfully be held
by someone who has been president of the republic for more than six
years. Nevertheless, speaking on behalf of the executive, the minister of
the interior pointed out that the government would not support the consti-
tutional case against the general because it considered it «inadvisable»
during this time of transition, when preparations were under way for Pino-
chet to step down as commander-in-chief of the armed forces sometime
between 26 January and 11 March. In the face of the controversy, the
government proposed a referendum to reform the constitution so as to eli-
minate the offices of senator-for-life and senator designate.
As a response to the incidents that took place in the chamber of depu-
ties in mid-January, which precluded debate on the constitutional ques-
tion, the general postponed his retirement to the 11 March deadline. This
delay led to the resignation of the minister of defence, Edmundo Pérez
Yoma, on 16 January. Mr Pérez Yoma, who had been appointed as the go-
between for the civil authorities and the armed forces during the transition,
was replaced by Raúl Troncoso Castillo, who declared a few days after
taking office that Pinochet had done much for the country and called him
a defender of democracy. Around the same time, the supreme court of
Chile rejected the petition by Spanish judge García-Castellón for records
of the alleged violations of human rights of Spanish citizens during the
regime of General Pinochet. On 2 February, the Chilean president,
Eduardo Frei, set out on an official visit to Spain, during which he critici-
sed the Spanish judicial enquiries and asked that the democratic transition
under way in his country should be respected. Also, the Chilean foreign
minister, José Miguel Insulza, pointed out that the elderly military man’s
seat as senator-for-life, following his retirement, was a «reasonable price
to pay» for the transition to democracy.
On 8 March, the armed forces declared Pinochet «meritorious com-
mander-in-chief» for his «lifetime achievement and labours accomplished»
and to bear witness to «the imperishable recognition of his leadership».
Three days later the general was sworn in as senator-for-life in a ceremony
preceded by numerous incidents in the upper house as well as in the
chamber of deputies. For its part, the European parliament, after a speech
by the Spanish Euro MP of the United Left, Carlos Carnero, ratified a refu-
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sal to recognise Augusto Pinochet’s being appointed senator-for-life. In an
early April debate in the Chilean parliament on the question of a new
constitutional charge against the general, the president of the nation,
Eduardo Frei, declared that «Augusto Pinochet was not an obstacle to
democracy and that the armed forces at all times respected the law and
legitimately established political power.»
But the leisurely pace of life in Chile during the summer break was to be
severely shaken by the decision of Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón to
request the British government to «guarantee [General Pinochet’s] remai-
ning on British soil» until a statement could be taken from him. General
Pinochet was subsequently arrested on 17 October in a London hospital,
where he was recovering from surgery. Judge Garzón charged him with
genocide, terrorism, and torture. But Britain’s high court ruled that the
senator-for-life enjoyed sovereign immunity and quashed the warrant for his
arrest, though the Crown prosecutor appealed against this decision on
behalf of the Spanish judge. On 25 November, the judicial committee of Bri-
tain’s House of Lords annulled Augusto Pinochet’s immunity in an historic
decision that cleared the way for his possible criminal prosecution. This led
to a grave political crisis in Chile. President Frei immediately convened a
meeting of the National Security Council and addressed the nation in a 
broadcast and televised appeal for responsible and calm behaviour on the
part of institutions and citizenry. Close on his heels, the military—who, as is
well-known, enjoy considerable influence in domestic affairs—issued a
strongly worded statement and urged the executive to set in motion the
steps necessary to permit the elderly commander-in-chief to return to
Chile. Apparently, in the meeting of the national security council, the mili-
tary officers demanded that the government should immediately break off
diplomatic relations with Spain and Great Britain. General Ricardo Izurieta,
commander of the army, called a meeting of 2,000 officers in Santiago to
analyse the situation.
On the economic front, on 1 June Chile and the European Union for-
malised the incorporation of political dialogue into the Co-operation 
Framework Agreement, ratified in June 1996, the ultimate objective of
which is to establish a political and economic association. Later, on 22
June, the European Commission approved the mandate of the creation of
a free trade zone with Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay) and
Chile. The fall in commodity prices as a result of the international financial
crisis caused a drop in exports of Chilean copper, making it necessary to
cut public spending by 700 million dollars in mid-summer in order to avoid
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an upturn in inflation, which had been kept below 3% with respect to
1997. As for the acquisition of new weapons systems, at the beginning of
the year the air force ordered the purchase of 12 UH-60 Blackhawk heli-
copters, postponing the acquisition of modern combat planes.
In Ecuador, the armed forces have had to face up to pressure from the
private sector, which is keen to see them stripped of their commercial pri-
vileges; they have vested interests in hotels, the textile industry, agricul-
ture, metallurgy, explosives and shellfish farms, etc., as well as receiving a
substantial part of the profits from petroleum exports. The military argue
that these sources of income help meet defence expenditures and furt-
hermore that the armed forces constitute the country’s most worthy insti-
tution, since they maintain a wide range of social programmes such as
teaching farming methods to the Indian population, providing electricity
supply in rural areas and public education. Ecuador is one of the few
Ibero-American countries that has been increasing its defence budget, no
doubt on account of the conflict it had been engaged in with Peru and the
need to protect its frontier with Colombia against penetrations by guerri-
llas and drug-traffickers, bearing in mind also that its oil pipelines run
through the immediately adjoining region.
On 1 March, the board of elections called general and presidential elec-
tions amid a tense atmosphere following the damage caused by the mete-
orological phenomenon known as «El Niño», which had devastated the
coastal area, and the confrontation between President Fabián Alarcón and
the national assembly over the latter’s decision to postpone the dates of
constitutional reform. The first round of elections, held 31 on March, resul-
ted in victory for the Christian social party, while Quito’s mayor, Jamil
Mahuad, and populist banker Alvaro Noboa were chosen to compete in
the second round of presidential elections on 12 June. Winning the final
vote by a slim margin (51.16% as opposed to his opponent’s 48.83%),
Jamil Mahuad assumed the presidency, declaring that his priorities would
be the country’s economic recovery and a solution to the conflict with
Peru. The response to the economic adjustment measures was a general
strike in early October that led to disorder and violence in several cities
and towns, particularly Guayaquil, while the lengthy negotiations with Peru
culminated in the peace treaty that was ratified in Brasilia on 26 October.
The beginning of the year in Mexico—and practically the whole year—
were marked by the profound nation-wide grief in the aftermath of the
Acteal massacre at the end of December of the previous year. In January,
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the recently appointed secretary of the interior, Francisco Labastida
Ochoa, carried out an extensive overhaul of his department, which inclu-
ded the dismissal of the governmental co-ordinator in the Chiapas peace
talks and his replacement by Emilio Rabasa. At the same time, pressured
by the progressive deterioration of the situation, the new governor of the
state of Chiapas, Roberto Albores, requested army assistance to reform
the police force and laid the blame on foreign interests for the problems
registered in the region. The under-secretary of the interior, Fernando
Solís, likewise 
lashed out against the hundreds of foreigners who had come to the region
months earlier (most of them members of numerous NGOs), accusing
them of «taking part in demonstrations, political indoctrination, and inci-
ting to revolt.» The upshot of this was the expulsion in late April of these
foreign nationals, among them several Spaniards who had been working
as human rights observers and were accused of «revolutionary holiday-
making.» Almost simultaneously, various governmental media accused
Chiapas bishop Samuel Ruiz of having links with the Zapatist National
Liberation Army (EZLN). This triggered the protest of the Mexican Roman
Catholic hierarchy and Chiapas’s four bishops pointed out to the secretary
of the interior, Labastida Ochoa, that Mexico was standing at a dramatic
cross-roads and must choose «either the road to democracy or that which
leads to dictatorship, repression, and war.»
The growing presence of army units in the southern state was critici-
sed by the Mexican episcopate, whose vice-president, Bishop José Gua-
dalupe, requested the government to «withdraw the army from indigenous
communities to avoid provoking conflicts and a consequent escalation of
violence.» The EZLN responded by threatening to take up arms should any
new attacks by paramilitary groups occur and condemned the ever-incre-
asing presence of military forces; for its part, the National Indigenous
Council reiterated its protests that Mexico’s Indian communities lived in an
atmosphere of terror and entreated the executive to adopt in their entirety
the San Andrés Larrainzar Accords on the Culture and Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples, ratified by the government and the EZLN in 1996. For their
part, the media advocated the dismantling of the region’s political power
structures, which they described as «criminal», in order to lay the ground-
work for peace in the region. On 17 March, to prevent the situation wor-
sening, the government presented a peace plan, inviting the leader of the
EZLN, deputy commandant Marcos, to renew talks. He in turn replied that
the executive must accept the terms of the bill drafted by the Commission
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of Concord and Pacification for Chiapas (COCOPA) and based on the afo-
rementioned San Andrés Accords. The government proposal entails
amendments to seven articles of the constitution: to acknowledge indige-
nous peoples’ right to decide in an autonomous manner their social, eco-
nomic, political, and cultural organisation; guarantee their cultural identity;
foster the transmission of their language via their own communications
media; impart justice according to their own laws; sanction their right
when being formally examined in court to be provided an interpreter and a
lawyer who speak their language; guarantee their right to use the natural
resources on their lands; protect the development of their communities;
and promote the growth of local government, bearing in mind the geogra-
phical location of indigenous populations.
On the occasion of her mid-March visit to Chiapas as an ambassador
of UNESCO, Nobel peace laureate Rigoberta Menchú said that the tension
in the area was evident and that the strong military presence there could
well lead to hostile encounters. She stressed that the conditions of poverty
and social marginalisation in which the Indians of Chiapas live have
actually grown worse over the past few years and pointed out that there
was virtually no communication between the main players, the govern-
ment, EZLN, and COCOPA. The Nobel laureate considered that the grea-
test danger lay in the existence of armed groups that are linked to local
political bosses and act with impunity, and viewed with trepidation the gro-
wing number of such groups; she observed that these terrorist groups
must be put out of action before any efforts at reconciliation could bear
fruit. Rigoberta Menchú likewise advised that the indigenous communities
should be consulted and their opinions taken into account in relation to
any political initiatives likely to affect them. As part of a tour through Ibero-
America, UN secretary-general Kofi Annan stopped off in Mexico on 21
July for a two-day visit. During his stay, he urged the EZLN and the
government of President Ernesto Zedillo to enter into sincere, honest, and
continued talks lead-ing to peace and stressed that Mexican society had
a role to play in encouraging serious negotiations and not inciting to vio-
lence. Mr Annan pointed out that the UN’s role would be to promote the
peace process and reiterated that the UN would not mediate in the con-
flict because it had not been asked to do so by the Mexican government.
In a public-opinion poll conducted by the Rosenblueth foundation and
published on 18 August, 70% of Mexicans considered the government,
the Chiapas authorities, and paramilitary groups close to the PRI to be res-
ponsible for the crimes committed at Acteal the previous December. 73%
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regarded the 1994 Indian uprising as justified and thought that the conflict
had repercussions at a national level, while 53% reckoned that the govern-
ment had no intention to come up with a solution and that the San Andrés
Accords had not been complied with. As to whether or not the EZLN
represented a danger to peace, opinion was almost equally divided, with
approximately 40% both pro and con. The opposition severely criticised
President Zedillo for not mentioning the Chiapas conflict in his fourth state
of the nation report published in early September and for concealing the
truth of the situation there from the public. Meanwhile, a documented enti-
tled «The legality of injustice», published by the Fray Bartolomé de las
Casas Foundation, states that since the Acteal massacre, 57 people have
been murdered in Chiapas. On 14 September, ten bishops belonging to
the Peace and Reconciliation Commission of the Mexican Episcopal Con-
ference journeyed to Chiapas to gather additional information to supple-
ment the data provided by government sources as part of the preparations
for the visit of Pope John Paul II to Mexico, slated for 22 January 1999.
The fall in oil prices forced Mr Zedillo’s government to do some budget
trimming and also led to a shortfall in predicted revenues of more than 1.5
billion dollars. Unlike in 1986, when the Mexican economy depended on
oil for 75% of its income, nowadays crude oil accounts for only 37% of
exports, though this is still a high percentage and one that could have a
worsening effect on what is already a grave deficit. The world-wide eco-
nomic crisis in August entailed a further risk factor for Mexico and forced
it to raise interest rates, which stood close to 27% by summer’s end. All
this resulted in a downturn in growth which, it is feared, will be less than
4%—down considerably from the previous year’s 7.1%. Nevertheless, in
his government’s fourth state of the nation report, mentioned above, Mr
Zedillo defended his fiscal policy in the face of the fall in crude oil prices,
the crises in Russia and Asia, and the depreciation of the peso against the
dollar, while putting the blame for corruption on «white-collar criminals»
(among those accused is the director of Mexico’s central bank, reported
by the newspaper Reforma to be suspected of embezzlement). The
International Monetary Fund expects Mexico to reform the banking sector,
adjust its monetary policies and diversify its revenues so as to contain the
slowdown in economic growth and the devaluation of the peso, which in
October fell 32% against the dollar.
Once more, drug trafficking played a regrettably prominent role in
Mexico’s affairs. The counter-narcotics prosecution department revealed
that it had detected activities related to the drug trade in 20% of the
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nation’s 2,418 townships and reported that during 1997 it had located and
destroyed 770 clandestine landing-strips, eradicated 41,000 hectares of
marijuana and opium crops, and detained 11,000 people in relation to this
criminal activity. Furthermore, the attorney general’s office arrested the for-
mer director of the federal criminal investigation department, whom it
accused of having links to the drug trade and of having committed other
alleged crimes during his term in office (1993-95). As to urban crime, thou-
sands of Mexicans demonstrated against violence. Indeed, according to
some media sources, 694 crimes are committed daily in the capital alone,
and it is estimated that in 1998 some million and a half violent crimes took
place in Mexico’s federal district, with a total of 1,100,000 victims. In the
fight against organised crime, authorities detained Daniel Arizmendi, lea-
der of a powerful Mafia responsible for 200 abductions. Among the victims
of this organisation were several Spaniards, whose ears they cut off and
sent to their families to persuade them to pay ransom money.
It is evident that the Mexican armed forces have been playing a major
role as power brokers in Mexico and, contrary to the rest of the Ibero-Ame-
rican countries, they are increasing the defence budget and carrying out
assignments relating to the country’s internal affairs. This new role has had
a deteriorating effect on their image and introduced new elements of ten-
sion vis-à-vis the police forces and the citizenry. The arrest of counter-nar-
cotics chief General Gutiérrez Rebollo in 1997 for his links to drug-traffic-
kers and his sentencing on 3 March 1998 to 13 years and 9 months in
prison, the unpopular intervention of the army in Chiapas, and General
Gallardo Rodríguez’s arrest and 14-year sentence for the misappropriation
and destruction of archives belonging to the armed forces have all had an
extremely negative effect on the latter’s image. This led President Zedillo to
adopt measures to distance the military from the risks of involvement in
corruption and to re-establish their honour, placing the attorney general’s
office in charge of combating organised crime, corruption and drug-traffic-
king.
The political scene in Paraguay in 1998 was marked by the victory of
the Colorado Party in the presidential elections and the affair of General
Lino Cesar Oviedo, who had been put on trial for an attempted coup d’é-
tat in 1996 and had been incarcerated since 2 December of the previous
year by order of President Juan Carlos Wasmosy, pending decision by a
special military tribunal. On 9 March, the general, who had won the run-
offs to be nominated the presidential candidate of the Colorado Party
(ANR), was sentenced to ten years in prison by the court for a crime
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«against the order and security of the armed forces»—a decision that the
supreme court confirmed a month later. This in turn led the electoral aut-
hority to disqualify General Oviedo from standing in the 10 May elections.
Thus was ended a political and military crisis that could have put paid to
the political transition in a country which, in the words of Paraguayan wri-
ter Arturo Roa Bastos, has not seen the advent of democracy and «conti-
nues to be an island surrounded by land.»
The presidential elections were won by the candidate of the ruling ANR,
Raúl Cubas, who polled 54% of the votes compared to the 43% secured
by his opponent Domingo Laíno of the Democratic Alliance. The elections,
which achieved a turn-out of 80%, also seated 45 senators, 80 deputies,
and 17 governors of the departments that make up the country. New pre-
sident Raúl Cubas was installed in office on 15 August; attending his swe-
aring-in ceremony were the Prince of Asturias and seven heads of state.
But on 18 August, Cubas commuted the ten-year prison sentence of his
friend and fellow party member, General Oviedo, to three months in prison.
This led to his immediate release, since he had already been behind bars
for eight years. The presidential decision met with disapproval in the con-
gress, but an attempt at impeachment fell short of the required two-thirds
majority and was accompanied by the silence of the military. The presi-
dential action also led to a purge of the armed forces.
As to the economic picture, there were satisfactory results in reducing
public debt and stemming inflation, and the military defence budget was
trimmed back by 110 million dollars, though the opposition complained
that corruption entailed losses of 2 billion dollars to the nation.
Although the El Niño phenomenon affected some parts of Peru at the
start of the year, a preliminary accord with Ecuador establishing a timeta-
ble leading to the signing of a peace treaty between both countries par-
tially compensated for the damage caused by the flooding. The security
forces chalked up a major success on 22 April when they captured Pedro
Quinteros, long-established leader and member of the principal policy-
making and executive committee of the Shining Path. Nevertheless, the
resignation of Prime Minister Alberto Pandolfi in early June—precisely
when negotiations with Ecuador over the forthcoming peace accord were
at their most intense—contributed to the growing atmosphere of crisis. In
view of the situation, Alberto Fujimori appointed a new premier within 24
hours—Javier Valle Riestra, a known critic of the head of state who oppo-
sed his re-election as president of the country. In his first public address,
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the new prime minister said that he would endeavour to «encourage
democracy and respect for human rights» and, declaring himself opposed
to any re-elections, went on to state that his government would have to
deliberate on the question of Mr Fujimori’s eligibility to stand for re-elec-
tion in the year 2000. But at the beginning of August, Mr Valle Riestra han-
ded in his resignation, explaining that his efforts to democratise the
country had proved ineffective; he was replaced by Alberto Pandolfi, who
had quit the job two months earlier.
On 20 August, the removal of General Hermoza as commander in chief
of the army and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff caused considerable
unease among the nation’s military, who had placed their trust in the gene-
ral throughout the seven years he had held his post. He was replaced by
the minister of defence, General Cesar Saucedo. A week later, on 27
August, the Peruvian congress ruled against holding a referendum to
determine whether President Alberto Fujimori should be able to run for a
third term, thereby leaving the way clear for a new re-election. The oppo-
sition had only been able to come up with 45 votes of the 48 required to
repeal the law permitting the re-election of the president, though the call
for a referendum had been supported by 73% of Peruvians. Mr Fujimori
has enjoyed United States support because of his participation in the war
against drug-traffickers. That nation has provided Peru with state-of-the-
art radar systems to detect and monitor the aircraft used to transport the
drug, enabling the air force to shoot several of them down and undermine
the «air lift» to Colombia, thereby curtailing cocaine shipments by almost
a third as market prices for the drug dropped.
In Uruguay, the year began with the resignation of the minister of
foreign affairs. In February, the senate, in full session, made a formal
declaration of solidarity with the Spanish people, condemning the latest
crimes of ETA. In mid-May, Montevideo hosted the 9th Conference of the
Speakers of Ibero-American Democratic Parliaments, which Cuba atten-
ded for the first time as a full-fledged member. Spain was represented by
the speaker of the chamber of deputies, Federico Trillo. On 18 July, a Uru-
guayan judge turned down a letter of request from his Spanish counterpart
Baltasar Garzón to interrogate an official, retired in 1971, about the disap-
pearances of Spanish citizens in Argentina. Noteworthy achievements in
the economic sphere were the fall in inflation from 19.8% to 10.2% and the
European Commission’s decision in July to open negotiations with the four
members of Mercosur for the creation of a free trade zone.
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The international economic situation had a particularly heavy impact on
Venezuela. The sharp drop in oil prices, which dipped below 12 dollars a
barrel—welll below the 21 dollar figure set by the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) of which the nation is a member. Petro-
leum is Venezuela’s main export product, and the price drop resulted in
losses of over 7 billion dollars in the country’s revenues for 1998. Despite
the more or less co-ordinated attempts by the OPEC countries, and also
by some non-member nations, to reduce oil production with a view to pus-
hing up prices, these slumped to their lowest level in ten years. In the face
of the situation, on 18 August the Venezuelan and Mexican energy minis-
ters agreed to reject new cutbacks in petroleum production, which had
already been reduced by 525,000 barrels a day in Venezuela and by
200,000 in Mexico. To head off a massive devaluation of the bolivar, at the
end of August the Venezuelan government decided to float the currency
and let it find its own feet in the international exchange market, effecting a
devaluation in all but name. And the economic downturn has made it the
only Ibero-American country combining a negative growth rate and a soa-
ring CPI, which rose to 37%. On 14 September, the Deposit Guarantee
Fund reported that interest rates were in the region of 100%, that the boli-
var had been devalued by 14,000% since 1984, and that inflation had risen
by 89,000% during the same period.
As for political affairs, on 14 April a court ordered the immediate arrest
of former president Carlos Andrés Pérez on charges of lining his pockets,
confining him to his residence in Caracas since his age—he is over 70—
precluded his incarceration in a penal institution. But more important were
the regional and legislative elections held on 6 December. The winner was
former lieutenant colonel Hugo Chávez, ringleader of the attempted coup
of 4 February 1992. His coalition, called the Patriotic Pole, was made up
of the Fifth Republic Movement, which is his party, the socialists, the
nationalist sector and the communists, while the traditional parties recei-
ved a sharp rebuff at the polls, providing clear evidence of the Venezue-
lans’ desire for change.
On the international scene, at the inauguration of its 27th general
assembly on 1 June in Caracas, the Organization of American States rati-
fied a declaration of commitment to their «common destiny» of striving to
encourage democracy in the lands of the western hemisphere.
SPAIN IN IBERO-AMERICA
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Spain has maintained and increased its presence in Ibero-America in
both the political and economic spheres. On 15 March the president of the
Spanish government set off on his sixth trip to the region before comple-
ting his second year in power. On this occasion the tour included a visit to
three countries—Bolivia, Uruguay and Chile, in that order—lasting a week.
It marked a further step in strengthening Spain’s cultural and economic
presence in the Southern Cone of the continent and conveyed two mes-
sages: an appeal for greater collaboration in combating terrorism and a
call for democracy. On arriving in the Bolivian city of Santa Cruz de la Sie-
rra, José María Aznar stated that «the important thing now is for us, with
our roots, with our past, to be capable of building a future together».
During his visit agreements worth a total of 130 million dollars were signed,
whereby resources were channelled towards debt relief and programmes
to promote small and medium-sized enterprises. Of the most important
agreements, mention should be made of the one designed to strengthen
Bolivia’s civil defence system in order to combat the effects of the El Niño
meteorological phenomenon, another to boost the fight against drug traf-
ficking and to promote the growth of alternative crops other than coca leaf
in the Chapare region, and yet another to foster the development of the
indigenous peoples. Precisely at the headquarters of the Indigenous
Forum (an institution set up at the Ibero-American Summit of Madrid in
1992) he called on all the countries of the Southern Cone to recognise the
indigenous peoples in their constitutions and to grant them their rightful
place in national parliaments.
In Uruguay, the second country on the agenda, Mr Aznar centred his
message on anti-terrorist efforts, as 13 members of the ETA group
currently reside in that country. Spain had accomplished certain achieve-
ments in this field in Uruguay, such as persuading the senate to sign a
declaration condemning terrorism. Uruguay was furthermore the first
country whose authorities publicly showed the video made by the Spanish
ministry of the interior to demonstrate to the world the true nature of ETA.
As soon as he trod Chilean soil, José María Aznar urged the chamber
of deputies in full session in the city of Valpara to «dilute any authoritarian
residues» and to exercise daily «the spirit of concord» and the principles
of the rule of law. On the second day of his visit he issued a novel mes-
sage in his address to parliament—that of creating a common legal Ibero-
American space, similar to the one the different Spanish governments
have proposed for Europe. The Chilean members of parliament applauded
the president when he thanked them for giving a warm welcome to Spa-
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nish exiles and emigrants «in difficult times». The two governments tacitly
agreed that Spain would not interfere in any way with Chile’s transition to
democracy and that Chile would not make complaints to the Spanish pre-
sident regarding the conduct of Spanish justice in relation to the missing
Spanish people. José María Aznar, who was accompanied on this trip by
a large group of businessmen, also had a number of economic objectives,
since Spain is the leading foreign investor in Chile, which has a very favou-
rable co-operation treaty with the European Union. 
The trip made by the president of the Xunta de Galicia (the Galician
autonmous government) to the Mercosur countries likewise reflected
Spain’s economic co-operation with Ibero-America.
In May the Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso renewed
his April visit to Spain which had been interrupted on the 22nd owing to the
death of one of his closest collaborators. Mr Cardoso arrived with several
ministers and a group of businessmen in order to enhance the trade rela-
tions which have developed spectacularly in the past few years.
The Spanish Royal Household, which pays special attention to Ibero-
America, was represented by the Prince of Asturias at the swearing-in
ceremonies of five new presidents: those of Honduras and Costa Rica in
late January and on 8 May, respectively and later that year, the Prince cut
short his August holidays to travel to Colombia to attend the investiture of
Andrés Pastrana as head of state; he then travelled to Ecuador, where
Jamil Mahuad was sworn in and went on to Paraguay to represent Spain
at the swearing-in ceremony of Raúl Cubas. He also visited Venezuela to
attend the 5th Centenary of the arrival of Christopher Columbus in the Ame-
rican continent. 
In mid-September President Aznar made his seventh trip to Ibero-
America, this time visiting Colombia and Peru. On arriving in Cartagena de
Indias, he made an offer of Spanish mediation in the peace process which
the newly-elected president of the Colombian Republic, Andrés Pastrana,
intended to relaunch. His offer included using Spanish diplomats as
mediators and Madrid as a neutral headquarters for negotiations with the
guerrilla groups, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,
the FARC, and the National Liberation Army. It should be recalled that an
average of 30,000 homicides are committed in Colombia every year and
violence has displaced and obliged 150,000 people to emigrate. When
signing several bilateral co-operation agreements and a programme of
financial aid, Mr Aznar raised the subject of guaranteeing respect for
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human rights, though he did not lay down conditions for Spanish aid.
Before going on to Lima, the Spanish premier visited the Amazonian loca-
lity of Iquiitos, where Spain is actively involved in co-operation projects. He
signed an agreement with Alberto Fujimori establishing annual high-level
contacts, stating that the Spanish government had thus «filled the
vacuum» which had existed for six years. Moreover, the increase in Spa-
nish investments in Peru, in José María Aznar’s opinion, justified affording
this nation political support. Several days later, the wife of the Spanish
prime minister was a special guest at the 1st Conference of first ladies of
the Americas in Santiago de Chile, giving the opening address on female
inmates, a sector of the population which «suffers painful marginalisation».
Following the Ibero-American Summit in Oporto, the Iberian and Ibero-
American leaders belonging to the Christian Democrat International met in
the Galician city of Bayona. In the Declaration of Bayona they undertook
to reject all forms of corruption and the temptation of any totalitarian or au-
thoritarian conduct, advocating the universal values of Christian huma-
nism as the basis for consolidating democracy. In addition to the president
of the Spanish government, this meeting was also attended by the heads
of state of Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile and Ecuador and the
president of the European People’s Party, Wilfred Martens. At the same
time, the 3rd meeting of ministers of the Ibero-American presidency took
place in the Spanish city of Cordoba. The aim of this event, which was offi-
cially opened by Spanish deputy premier Mr Álvarez-Cascos, was to find
a global response to common problems. Meanwhile, Fidel Castro visited
Extremadura before going on to Madrid on 20 October, where he held
several meetings with José María Aznar.
However, this major boost to relations with Ibero-America was ham-
pered by a serious incident: judge Baltasar Garzón’s request for the indict-
ment of general Augusto Pinochet, which was mentioned earlier in con-
nection with the 8th Ibero-American Summit. Despite the personal efforts
of President Frei and José María Aznar to limit the crisis to a strictly legal
affair, the impact on relations between the two countries was considera-
ble, so much so that the Chilean government recalled its ambassador to
Madrid and violent demonstrations disrupted life in Chile, where Spanish
flags were burnt and marches were staged outside the Spanish diploma-
tic residence in Santiago to protest at the Spanish government’s decision
to request the British authorities for extradition. It is worth remembering
that Spain has a strong economic presence in Chile, with public and pri-
vate investments totalling a trillion pesetas.
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Spain’s economic policy with regard to Ibero-America was to increase
investments in 1998, surpassing the trillion-peseta mark reached in 1997.
Spanish investments in Argentina now amount to some 400 billion pese-
tas and, if partnerships are taken into consideration, the figure is over 900
billion. The main Spanish operators in this country are Telefónica, Repsol,
Endesa-Enher, Aguas de Barcelona and Campofrío, while the most active
banks are Santander, BBV, Banco Español de Crédito and Central-His-
pano. Special mention should be made of Telefónica’s presence in Brazil,
where it invested almost a trillion pesetas in 1998 in purchasing Telesp and
Tele Sudeste Celular; as for banks, the Santander group has a major pre-
sence in the country, as does BBV, which strengthened its foothold in the
Brazilian market by acquiring Banco Excel during the year. The Spanish
banking sector is also very active in Chile, where the Santander group
secured a market share of 11.3 percent in 1998, while Central-Hispano has
invested over 70 billion pesetas and currently controls the two leading Chi-
lean banks. Telefónica and BBV have likewise made substantial invest-
ments and control about 45 percent of Telecomunicaciones de Chile and
Banco Hipotecario de Fomento respectively, while Endesa is the main 
shareholder of Enersis, the biggest electric utilities company in Chile.
Mexico is another principal recipient of Spanish investments and in 1998
Santander, Bilbao-Vizcaya and Central-Hispano increased their volume of
activity in the country, as did Telefónica, Dragados, FCC, Entrecanales and
Cubiertas, the Seville company Abengoa and the Ríu hotel group. In Vene-
zuela, BBV, the Santander Group, Central-Hispano and Telefónica were the
main companies to continue with their investments. The Spanish economy
also has its sights set on Cuba, where Spain is the leading investor, parti-
cularly in tourism, both hotels and tour operators. Spain also increased its
presence in the food, construction, tobacco and plastics industries in
1998, as well as in other sectors of economic activity.
But the number of Spanish companies that are investing in Ibero-Ame-
rica, and also the number of recipient nations, is increasing. For example,
Banco Bilbao-Vizcaya has extended its presence to Colombia, Peru and
Uruguay, while the Central-Hispano has expanded into Bolivia. Repsol, for
its part, has invested over 600 billion pesetas through its subsidiaries and
has service stations in Argentina, Peru and Ecuador, in addition to distri-
buting gas to Bogota, Buenos Aires, Monterrey and Mexico city. Telefónica
signed a contract with the Peruvian government in August 1998 to put an
end to the telecoms monopoly in the country, where its current invest-





A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW OF 1998
By FEDERICO FERNANDO DE BORDEJÉ Y MORENCOS
The most significant events occurring after the article was completed
at the end of December are as follows:
Balkans
Although the 4th meeting of the Peace Implementation Council for the
Bosnia and Herzegovina peace agreements, which took place in Madrid in
December, was aimed—through the strengthening of democracy, the
return of refugees, the establishment of a market economy and the setting
up of an independent and multiethnic judicial system—at bringing about
the gradual withdrawal of the international community from the country,
the fact is that the delicate situation does not allow withdrawal for the time
being, unless full tolerance and reconciliation is achieved between the
communities. The final declaration merely served to strengthen the role
and powers of the International High Representative for Bosnia, Mr Wes-
tendorp, who stressed that the next two years will be crucial in building a
modern and democratic Bosnia.
In Kosovo, on Christmas day the UCK guerrilla broke the unilateral
truce it had upheld since October following the Serbian offensive in the
north of the province. Both actions signified a new challenge for the
international community, since Belgrade seriously upset the fragile peace
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maintained since October while the OSCE observers were incapable of
contain-ing the crisis. From whichever angle the issue is viewed, the
OSCE’s mission is called into question.
Middle East
The early elections in Israel, confirmed by parliament for 21 December,
triggered the break-up of the Likud conservative coalition and the emer-
gence of several candidates. This was an explicable incident, given the
weakness of the government coalition which has been incapable of impo-
sing on the political class its vision of the peace plan with Palestine, inclu-
ding Mr Netanyahu’s refusal to recognise the proclamation of an indepen-
dent Palestinian state in May next year. This situation is further worsened
by the standstill in Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank and the virtual
disappearance of Washington’s mediation attempts from the scene, owing
to the discredit suffered by the United States in the Arab world and the
Clinton impeachment hearings. These two factors point to an increase in
violence in this sensitive area.
Iraq
As expected, on 17 December President Clinton ordered air raids on
Iraq, in which the British RAF also took part. The attacks were carried out
on very specific targets for a four-day period and did not have the unani-
mous backing of the international community or, indeed, of most of the
allies. This offensive made it very clear that, whenever it deems fit, the Uni-
ted States will use military force rather than the system of inspections as
the most appropriate and effective method of keeping Saddam Hussein
under control. The attack likewise put paid to the diplomatic efforts of the
UN, whom Washington warned of its decision to use its right of veto if the
embargo were lifted. It should also be stressed that NATO dissociated
itself from these strikes, stating that it had nothing to do with the way the
crisis was being handled, thus revealing its underlying discontent at not
having been consulted before the attack.
Russia
Russia and Belarus—which, together with Ukraine, had encouraged
the dismantling of the USSR in the past—took the first steps towards reu-
nification at the end of the year by announcing a referendum in 1999. It is
reckoned that this announcement conceals underlying objectives and
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could confirm that Minsk is the capital of a state that is unviable, in terms
of its geostrategic position and ability to develop and consolidate an inde-
pendent economy free from the influence of its bigger neighbours. In short,
its future prospects do not seem bright.
On another note, Moscow announced around the same time that it
would be modernising its nuclear arsenal of strategic missiles. This is pos-
sible, since the Russian parliament has not ratified the START II treaty on
the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, which has now been appro-
ved by the US congress. Russia contends that the difficulty in ratifying the
trea-ty stems from the attacks by the United States and the United King-
dom on Iraq.
Japan
1998 ended with unemployment at an all-time high in Japan, worse-
ning the country’s economic crisis. In addition to this negative factor, the
bad loans of the 17 major commercial banks to 31 March total some 61
trillion pesetas.
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THE BUILDING OF EUROPE
By JAVIER PARDO DE SANTAYANA Y COLOMA
December witnessed many significant events for the European Union.
In a co-ordinated decision, all the euro-club countries agreed to lower their
interest rates to 3%, where, according to Mr Duisenberg, they should be
kept in the near future.
The Franco-German summit at Potsdam revealed a certain lack of
understanding between the two countries, though they did agree on
some aspects as deduced from their shared wish for the WEU to be inte-
grated into the European Union and from their position regarding
employment, which was the subject of a joint proposal submitted at the
Vienna summit. Relations between Spain and the United Kingdom con-
tinued along the same positive lines mentioned earlier, and the countries
also signed a joint proposal on labour, which is a significant fact bearing
in mind the ideological differences between their governments. Both
proposals were used to draft the related document then signed in
Vienna. The Vienna summit again evidenced the lack of agreement over
future funding. Spain actively opposed the idea of freezing or elimina-
ting—whether directly, gradually or covertly—the cohesion funds and
managed to secure the withdrawal of such proposals and a return to
Agenda 2000 as the sole official reference.
The final conclusions, which postpone decision until the March sum-
mit, responded to Spain’s goal of having the word «stabilisation» removed
and established that the basis for future negotiations would be precisely
Agenda 2000, as proposed by the European Commission. One of the most
encouraging aspects of the final conclusions is that they state the possi-
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bility of seeking a solution through other channels that entail increasing the
contribution of other «wealthy» countries, apart from Germany.
On the last days of the year Europe awoke sharply from the sluggish-
ness it had displayed during the year with respect to the pending defini-
tions of the European security and defence. Indeed, in December, the
French and British proposals for the future of the Western European Union
were debated at the Franco-British summit of St Malo before being sub-
mitted in Brussels. The situation at year end is that Britain’s position is
coming closer to that of France and also to that of Spain, which are incli-
ned towards establishing a European defence identity within the EU
through a formula that takes advantage of whatever of the WEU is valid.
The disappearance of this organisation—which Britain initially advocated
in practical terms—thus appears to have been ruled out. The definitive
solution must be adopted before the NATO summit in spring, in order to
prevent subsequent decisions on the European defence identity from
requiring the revision of the new strategic concept, which must be appro-
ved on that date and occasion.
The most significant step taken regarding the NATO alliance at the
ministerial meeting in December was to approve the detailed implementa-
tion plan for the integrated military structure.
As for the Balkan conflict, a major event was the Madrid conference of
the council in charge of implementing the peace agreements for Bosnia.
The authority of the International High Representative was consolidated
and strengthened, and the priority objectives defined were the pending
issue of the return of refugees and displaced persons, the structuring of
the democratic fabric and the modernisation of the economy in order to be
able to gradually reduce external protectorship.
The exchange rates for the euro and the national currencies were set
on the last day of the year and are now irreversible. The rate for Spain
amounts to 166.386 pesetas/euro and, although slightly lower than
analysts’ forecasts, is practically what had been predicted since May.
There were thus no surprises or controversies. That same day, the Spanish
minister of the treasury submitted to EU Council of Ministers Spain’s sta-
bility programme for the next four years.
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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
By RICARDO ÁLVARES-MALDONADO MUELA
The following events which occurred at the end of the year are worthy
of mention:
Russia’s official condemnation—unanimously backed by all the leaders
and different political groups—of the attacks carried out by the US and
British armed forces on selected Iraqi targets on 16, 17 and 18 December,
which Russian president Boris Yeltsin described as a «gross violation of
the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law».
The Russian defence minister expressed his protest by failing to attend
the NATO-Russia Joint Council meeting in Brussels. This stance can be
interpreted as Russia’s pursuing the same foreign policy line throughout
the year of continuing to claim what it considers to be its rightful role of
major power inherited from the Soviet Union.
The EU summit held in Vienna on 11 and 12 December decided to
postpone the settlement of the pending issues of the so-called «Agenda
2000”, particularly those relating to EU funding and their impact on the
scheduled enlargement, which will possibly be further delayed.
The related decisions will probably be taken at the forthcoming summit
due to be held in March 1999 under the German presidency. Spain stands
to lose the structural and cohesion funds it receives—or at least the
current amounts.
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STABILITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
By PEDRO LÓPEZ AGUIRREBENGOA
Turkey
In early December, Bulent Ecevit (of the Democratic Left, DSP), the
deputy prime minister of the caretaker government and leader of the
Social Democratic Party coalition, was entrusted with the task of forming
a new government. By the 21st, however, he had obviously failed in his
undertaking, and the president thus invited Yalim Erez, an independent
member of parliament and caretaker industry minister, to try his hand.
With a more open, progressive approach than Mr Ecevit, he seemed pre-
pared to form an executive that could engage considerable parliamen-
tary support and did not rule out contact with the Islamists of the Faci-
let party. However, he too was unsuccessful and the president therefore
came back to Ecevit on 8 January, after Tansu Ciller (True Path party,
DYP) announced she would support a minority DSP government, which
is expected to be announced very shortly. The period of 45 days esta-
blished by the constitution for forming a government expires on 9
January. After that date, if the task is accomplished, the president could,
in principle, appoint a prime minister of his choice without having to sub-
mit his candidate to a vote of confidence in parliament, something that
Mrs Ciller did not seem willing to accept.
Algeria
The appointment of a new government with Smail Hamdani, a career
diplomat, as prime minister, gives the impression that the country is con-
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tinuing with the line of Mr Ouyahia’s former administration. However, the
start of Ramadan could trigger more violent terrorist attacks.
Sahara
On 29 December the EU presidency issued a statement reiterating its
full support for the UB settlement plan and for the secretary-general’s
proposal of mediation to settle the differences that persist between the
two sides regarding the holding of a referendum, particularly the issue of
completing the census of voters and the three disputing tribal groups. It
also expressed satisfaction at Security Council Resolution 1215 of 17
December extending Minurso’s mandante until 31 January in the hope of
conducting further consulations during this period and achieving an agre-
ement.
Iraq
On 12 December, the European Council of Vienna debated the situa-
tion of Iraq, condemning its failure to abide fully by its commitments to co-
operate with UNSCOM. It also issued a new appeal to Baghdad to comply
with the resolutions of the Security Council and co-operate as fully as pos-
sible so that the latter, on the basis of a report by the United Nations secre-
tary-general, could carry out a thorough examination of the situation.
Faced with the prospect of being left to agonise slowly under the sanc-
tions and harassment of UNSCOM, whose action, led by ambassador
Richard Butler, is perceived by Baghdad as a US ploy to achieve its sta-
ted goal of ousting Sadam Hussein, the Iraqi regime seemed to opt for
height-ening unrest and confrontation. Mr Butler’s final and controversial
report was the element that sparked the fresh crisis.
On 16 December the USA and Britain retaliated by launching air raids
on Iraq, which ended just at the beginning of Ramadan and, by curious
coincidence, the very day that the Senate voted that Mr Clinton’s impe-
achment proceedings should go on to the Congress
The action of the allies, justified by Iraq’s obstinate failure to meet its
international obligations regarding the UN resolutions—there is general
consensus regarding the requirement to comply with them and condem-
nation for failing to do so—took the Security Council by surprise precisely
when it was debating on the issue of Iraq, a fact which to a degree ques-
tioned the role of the UN. It also coincided with the aforementioned im-
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peachment proceedings in parliament and, following Mr Clinton’s return
from his trip to Gaza and Israel, some substantial achievements, particu-
larly for the Palestinians. However, Mr Clinton did not succeed in obtaining
a change of attitude to enable the implementation of the Wye Memoran-
dum to be settled once and for all.
The foregoing gave rise to different interpretations and reactions to the
Iraq crisis, even in certain political circles in the US, as well as questioning
of the appropriateness of US policy which, in the opinion of some, lacked
a global strategic design and dual yardsticks needed to deal with instabi-
lity factors that affect the complex area stretching from the Mediterranean
to India.
The allies declared that their chief aim was to cause maximum des-
truction to Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical military capacity and to
prevent the country from again threatening its neighbours. However, it was
no secret that there was a further aim, and indeed, the stance of «double
contention» which in itself goes beyond the scope of the UN resolutions
concerning Iraq, has developed into a final goal which is none other than
overthrowing the Iraqi regime. Moreover, Iraq’s capacities are confusing
and the results of the allied action, together with Iraq’s hardened stance
regarding the perpetuation of the sanctions and the return of Unscom in
its former composition, point to a standstill in political solutions and fresh
outbreaks of violence. During the first days of the new year the no-fly zone
was the scene of incidents and there is a question mark hanging over why
the same treatment is not applied to the arsenals of unconventional wea-
pons that other countries in the area are commonly known to have. The
UN secretary-general repeatedly expressed his unease, distancing himself
from the US policy towards Iraq by pointing out that according to Resolu-
tion 687 of the Security Council (1991), whereby a ceasefire was declared
and sanctions imposed, Iraq was bound only to fulfil disarmament obliga-
tions and no other conditions as the US suggested.
It again became clear that Jordan was concerned about the possible
consequences the crisis could have both on the domestic situation and
petrol supplies and on the subsequent delay of the MEPP. The destruction
of part of Iraq’s economic infrastructure, such as the Basora refinery—jus-
tified by the US on the grounds that it was used to channel illegal
exports—could render ineffective the UN-endorsed «oil for food» policy
and ulti-mately harm the Iraqi population, strengthening their nationalist
sentiment. For some, the possible elimination of Saddam Hussein would
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simply usher in a period of internal struggles and unforeseeable conse-
quences. Russia took a critical line with the allied unilateral military action
and did not conceal its belief that the crisis had been artificially provoked,
criticising the role of Unscom (the Butler Report), as did China and—albeit
more mutedly—France, among other members of the Security Council.
The Palestinian leaders found themselves in an uncomfortable position,
like many of those in the Arab world since, although they are opposed to
the Saddam Hussein regime, the public opinion in those countries conti-
nues to display solidarity towards the Iraqi people in reaction to what they
perceive to be an abuse of western political power vis-à-vis Arab nationa-
lism, although the visible protests were more tempered. Europe showed
solidarity with its western allies, while displaying doubts about how to
classify the military action and its consequences. In short, the crisis
remains latent and the military action has made a political solution a more
distant possibility.
Western Balkans
The European Council underlined the need for the two sides involved
in the Kosovo crisis to comply fully and immediately with United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199, 1203 and 1207, in order to
achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Regretting the lack of com-
mitment of either side to supporting the negotiating process, it appealed
to the government of the RFY and to the Albanian leaders of Kosovo to
show flexibility in the talks needed to reach an agreement on the future
status of Kosovo. It also confirmed the EU’s determination to support the
political process and contribute to the humanitarian efforts and, when the
parties reach such an agreement, to help rebuild Kosovo, even through a
donors conference.
However, there was a renewal of military action around Christmas, par-
ticularly on the part of the Serbs.
The Madrid meeting (15-16 December) of the Peace Implementation
Council opened up encouraging prospects for normalisation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Peace Process in the Middle East
The Vienna European Council welcomed the Wye River Memoran-
dum of 23 October 1998 and, while taking note of the headway made
by both parties in implementing it, condemned the recent violence,
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mutual recrimination and the establishment of new conditions (on the
part of Israel) that threatened to ruin it. It likewise appealed to the par-
ties to display moderation, abstain from unilateral action and fully
implement the remaining provisions. The historic visit paid by the US
president to Gaza, as mentioned earlier, marked a pat on the back for
the Palestinians, who were fulfilling through their National Council their
pledge to annul solemnly the provisions of their constitution that were
contrary to Israel, and a new period of relations with Washington.
However, neither in the tripartite meeting with prime minister Netanyahu
nor in the Jerusalem stage was it possible to overcome Israel’s refusal
to make further headway in implementing the territorial redeployment
provisions and other key aspects such as freeing prisoners, settlements
and action in East Jerusalem. Israel’s new demands practically brought
the subsequent implementation of the Wye and Oslo commitments to a
grinding halt.
On 21 December, the Israeli Knesset passed at first reading and sub-
sequently approved on 4 January a bill enabling the elections for parlia-
ment and prime minister to be brought forward. These are slated for 17
May and 1 June 1999. Furthermore, on 20 December, the government
had approved and submitted to parliament the 5 new conditions to be
required from Palestine in order to continue to implement the Wye agree-
ment (such as publicly renouncing a state with a capital in Jerusalem),
but the motion was defeated. This decision set the pre-electoral process
in motion, the immediately consequence being the announcement of
new candidates for prime minister from the two major parties and plans
to set up new centrist splinter groups from both. The first opinion polls
do not favour Mr Netanyahu’s standing for another term, though the
electoral scene in Israel is always full of surprises; five months in the
Middle East can be changeless or else an eternity... In any event, on this
occasion, more than ever before, the election campaigns will focus on
the peace process and will, perhaps, be the last opportunity for achie-
ving a negotiated settlement.
The foreseeable result is that the peace process and implementation of
the Wye accords will suffer the paralysing—or perhaps even radicalising—
consequences of the electoral process, with unilateral Israeli measures on
the ground, giving Palestine particular cause for concern. The now acting
Netanyahu government has confirmed its intention to freeze the Wye
memorandum. Another hint of things to come was the draft adopted at
first reading by the Knesset of a new bill requiring any return of the territo-
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ries in the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem to be approved by an abso-
lute majority of the parliament, followed by a referendum.
IBERO-AMERICA
By JOSÉ SÁNCHEZ MÉNDEZ
As regards the economy in general, the World Bank’s Global Economic
Forecasts for 1999, published at the beginning of December, predicted a
mere 0.6 percent growth in the Ibero-American economies and considered
that Brazil, already hit by recession in late 1998, would continue to report
negative growth the following year. In this respect, at the end of December
the Brazilian government admitted that it would not be able to meet the
year-end external deficit target agreed with the International Monetary Fund
of under 4.2 percent of its GDP. Furthermore, the downward trend in oil pri-
ces worsened the Venezuelan economy’s loss of revenue from oil sales,
which will amount to over 8 billion dollars. Nonetheless, on 27 December
the government of Honduras announced the condonation of 65% of its
external debt with major international finance institutions—some 2.8 billion
dollars, which will go towards rebuilding the country after hurricane Mitch.
While the outcome of the meeting between the three state powers and
the main guerrilla in Colombia, held in Caquetá , in the south of the
country, in late November, was not as good as expected, both President
Pastrana and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC, confir-
med that 7 January would be the date for the intended meeting between
the head of the executive and the leader of the FARC, alias Tirofijo, aimed
at signing a peace agreement. At the end of the year a violent armed clash
broke out between members of the FARC and the United Self-Defence,
AUC, paramilitary group, in which dozens of people died. The death of
AUC’s leader, Carlos Castaño, was not confirmed.
As expected, former lieutenant colonel Hugo Chávez won the presi-
dential elections in Venezuela with 60 percent of the vote. The new presi-
dent confirmed that his main priorities would be to combat tax fraud, rene-
gotiate external debt and introduce a new oil policy. In mid-December, Mr
Chávez, who defined himself as a firm believer in democracy, was granted
a visa to travel to the United States and made a tour of Argentina, Brazil
and Colombia, followed by Mexico.
Although the British home secretary, Jack Straw, authorised the start of
the process to extradite general Augusto Pinochet and on 10 December
Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón issued an indictment order, the house of
lords allowed the appeal of the Chilean general’s lawyers to annul the pre-
vious ruling rejecting his sovereign immunity. As a result, the lengthy pro-
ceedings will start all over again in early 1999. The Pinochet issue has
clouded relations between Spain and Chile. The Chilean foreign minister,
José Miguel Insulza, accused the Spanish government of violating point
eight of the Oporto Declaration of the 8th Ibero-American Summit which
calls for «respect for the national sovereignty of the states and firmly
rejects the extraterritorial application of national laws....», warning that
«Chile will be giving consideration to attending an event where a docu-
ment is signed on the 18th and violated the following day». At the same
time, the Chilean senate passed a resolution expressing its «most outright
rejection of the Spanish government’s attitude in starting to process the
extradition request for senator Augusto Pinochet». However, this did not
prevent the Chilean speaker from making an official visit to Spain several
days later to attend a meeting with José María Aznar.
In Paraguay general Lino Oviedo could return to prison after the
supreme court of justice annulled the decree of president Raúl Cubas
granting him freedom. This could trigger a serious power clash, since Raúl
Cubas has stated that this judicial measure is unconstitutional since it
undermines the powers of the president of the republic.
1998 ended with a new overture by Fidel Castro to John Paul II, when
he declared that Christmas Day would thenceforth always be a public holi-
day, after 29 years of prohibition.
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